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Vérification de protocoles cryptographiques paramétrés à base de
résolution de contraintes
Résumé : Les protocoles cryptographiques sont cruciaux pour la sécurité des transactions éléctroniques. La
confiance en ces protocoles peut être améliorée par une analyse formelle de leurs propriétés de sécurité. Bien
que de nombreux travaux aient été consacrés aux protocoles classiques tels que celui de Needham-Schroder,
très peu s’intéressent la classe prometteuse des protocoles de groupe. Nous présentons un modèle synchrone de
protocoles de groupe qui généralise les modèles classiques en incluant des listes non bornées dans les messages.
Dans ce modèle étendu, nous proposons un ensemble correct et complet de règles d’inférence pour la vérification
de propriétés de sécurité en présence d’un intrus actif pour une classe de protocoles bien taggés. Nous prouvons
que l’application de ces règles pour un système de contraintes termine et que la forme normale obtenue peut
Ãªtre testée pour la satisfiabilité. Ainsi, nous présentons ici une procédure de décision pour cette classe.
Mots-clés : protocoles cryptographiques, système d’inférence, protocoles de groupe, réécriture, sécurité,
vérification, contraintes
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1 Introduction
Cryptographic protocols are crucial for securing electronic transactions. They rely on cryptographic functions
to ensure security properties such as secrecy or authentication. The confidence in these protocols can be
increased by a formal analysis in order to verify that the security properties are met at least at the logical
level, that is, even when abstracting from the cryptographic functions and considering messages as first-order
terms. Verification at the logical level is nevertheless a non-trivial task since cryptographic protocols are
infinite state systems and for instance the set of potential messages that can be generated by an intruder is
unbounded. Recently numerous works have been dedicated to the design of automated verification tools for
cryptographic protocols. Such tools are often based on model-checking, modal logics, equational reasoning,
and resolution theorem-proving (see e.g., [Wei99, AC02, MT07]). Checking whether a protocol is flawed in the
abstract Dolev Yao model ([DY83]) can often be reduced to a constraint solving problem in a term algebra
(modulo an equational theory). This constraint-based approach has proved to be quite effective on standard
benchmarks and has also permitted the discovery of new flaws in several protocols (see e.g., [BMV03]).
However to our knowledge it has never been applied to the more challenging group protocols. In fact
very few formal verification results are available for such protocols. The difficulty relates to the fact that
group protocols may perform an arbitrary number of steps since the group of communicating agents is a priori
unbounded. This allows one to encode easily undecidable problems.
In this work we present a synchronous model for group protocols, that can also be viewed as an extension of
standard protocol models ([RT03]) to handle messages containing possibly unbounded lists. In this extended
model we propose a correct and complete set of inference rules that allows one to check security properties
in presence of an active intruder, for a class of so-called Well-Tagged protocols. We show that relaxing the
conditions on Well-Tagged protocols leads immediately to undecidability. Our inference rules generalize the
ones that are implemented in several tools for a bounded number of sessions and fixed size lists such as Cl-
ATSE ([Tur06]). In particular when applied to protocols with standard pair operator our inference system
provides us with a decision procedure.
Related work Several works have considered protocols with unbounded number of participants and recursive
steps. The formal analysis of such protocols goes up with [Pau97] who studied the Recursive Authentication
(RA) protocol of [JD97] for an unbounded number of participants using Isabelle/HOL theorem prover ([Pau96]).
However if the protocol is defective there is no automatic mechanism to find the attack.
The validation of group protocols has been investigated in the CLIQUES project ([SWT98]), based on
group Diffie-Hellman (A-GDH) protocols. Several analysis methods have been applied in this project, from
manual to automatic ones. An interesting result in this area has been obtained by [PQ03] who found several
attacks on the CLIQUES suite and have shown that it is impossible to design a correct authentication group
key agreement protocol built on A-GDH for a number of participants greater than three ([PQ04]). Recently,
[KMT08] have developped an automata-based approximation technique to analyse this class of protocols and
check the absence of flaw in presence of a passive intruder. [MS01] have adapted the NRL protocol analyser,
which is based on a combination of model checking and theorem-proving techniques, to handle the GDOI’s
protocols. Although Diffie-Hellman exponentiation has been encoded in the tool, it was not able to rediscover
Pereira-Quisquater attacks on the CLIQUES suite ([Mea00]). [SB04] have used Coral system to analyse an
improved version of the multicast group key management protocol by Tanaka and Sato ([TJ03]). Two serious
attacks have been found on this protocol. Coral has also discovered other attacks on Asokan-Ginzboorg
protocol([AG00]) and Iolus protocol([Mit97]).
Some works have focused on the modelling of recursive computations performed by some participants (such
as a server) in group protocols. [KW04] introduce tree transducers to model recursion and to allow the protocol
participants to output structured messages. This work gives a decision algorithm for secrecy in the case of
atomic keys and bounded message size in the Dolev Yao setting. However messages cannot be tested for
equality without losing decidability. Similarly using composed keys or adding equational theories for XOR or
Diffie-Hellman exponentiation in their model leads to undecidability. [Tru05] introduces a class of Horn clauses
to model the recursive behavior of participants. In this model protocol participants may receive messages of
unbounded sizes, send multiple messages in a single step, compare and store messages. He gives a decision
procedure to check whether protocols in this model satisfy secrecy properties. His algorithm is in NEXPTIME
and is based on the derivation of an exponential bound on the size of minimal attacks. Hence this nice result
is rather of theoretical flavour and is not suitable for an implementation. Only atomic keys are allowed for
encryption. Moreover, Truderung’s model cannot model some computations such as list mapping or functional
symbol mapping. Note that non-atomic keys can be handled by our verification procedure (to be presented in
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the following sections). [KT07] extend this model to handle XOR operator. Security can then be decided for a
class of recursive protocols where principals are forbidden to XOR several messages (depending on messages)
received from the network. [KRT07] extend the Truderung model to model freshness of nonces and keys more
accurately.
The class of protocols that we study admits tagged messages. Tagging basically avoids some unifications
between messages that could be exploited for attacks. Several works on protocols have considered tagging
techniques on messages as ours in order to enforce decidability. But these works ([BP03, RS03]) do not consider
group protocols, or protocol with unbounded lists. Moreover in our case tagging is limited to messages that
contains indexed variables, that is variables to be instanciated by items of unbounded lists. The other messages
do not need to be tagged in our analysis.
Organization of the paper. We introduce in Section 2 our protocol model. We define attacks and show
that their detection is undecidable. This motivates us to introduce the class of Well-Tagged protocols with
autonomous keys for which we prove decidability. In Section 3, we introduce auxiliary predicates and their
semantics. They are meant to express message constructibility (from intruder knowledge) and they are used to
build constraint system whose satisfiability is equivalent to the existence of attacks on a protocol. In Section 4,
we introduce a set of simplification rules to reduce these constraints. In Section 5, we give an algorithm
for applying these rules on a constraint system modelling a protocol security problem. Completeness and
correctness are proved in Section 6. Proof of termination for Protocols without mpair(, )’s is given in Section 7.
Proof of termination for Well-Tagged Protocols with Autonomous Keys is given in Section 8. In Section 9,
we prove satisfiability. The analysis of the the Asokan-Ginzboorg protocol by our Rules and our verification
algorithm is detailed in Section 10.
1.1 Motivating Example: Synchronous Group Protocols
As a motivating and running example, we introduce the Asokan-Ginzboorg group protocol which is an appli-
cation level protocol. Let the group be of size n + 1 for n ≥ 1. The protocol describes the establishment of a
session key between a leader (an) and a random number n of participants (ai where 1 ≤ i ≤ n). Indeed, the
leader starts the execution of the protocol by sending the key of encoding (e). As a response, each participant
generates a symmetric key (ri) and a contribution to the group key (si) and sends them encrypted under the
key e. The group key would be f(s1, . . . , sn+1).
1. an+1 → ALL : 〈an+1, {e}p〉
2. ai → an+1 : 〈ai, {〈ri, si〉}e〉 1 ≤ i ≤ n
3. an+1 → ai : {〈s1, .., sn+1〉}ri 1 ≤ i ≤ n
4. ai → an+1 : 〈ai, {〈si, h(s1, . . . , sn+1)〉}K〉 some i, K = f(s1, . . . , sn+1)
Since here, modulo index renaming, all members of the group have identical actions, we are going to abstract
them in one agent S. Thus, S is a simulator for agents a1, . . . , an. Agent L simulates the leader an+1. This
way, we obtain below a protocol with a fixed number of steps to the expense of introducing a variadic list
constructor mpair( , ). This protocol is called synchronous protocol. Note that all parametric lists have the
same length n. They are nested as follows:
1. L −→ S : mpair(t, 〈l, {e}p〉)
2. S −→ L : mpair(i, 〈ai, {〈ri, si〉}e〉)
3. L −→ S : mpair(i, {〈mpair(j, sj), s
′〉}ri)
4. S −→ L : mpair(i, 〈ai, {〈si, h(〈mpair(k, sk), s
′〉)〉}f(〈mpair(k,sk),s′〉)〉)
We assume that the leader L has in initial knowledge his name l (an+1 in the initial version), the fresh public
key e, the symmetric key p and two hash functions f and h (f, h ∈ H). Its contribution to the group key is
noted s′ (sn+1 in the initial version). The simulator S knows the symmetric key p, the two hash functions f
and h and ∀i the identity ai, the contribution (nonce) si and the public key ri.
2 The Protocol Model
We extend the protocol model [RT03] in order to deal with parametric lists (whose length is the parameter).
They are constructed with a new operator denoted by mpair( , ). The intuition is that a mpair message is
equivalent to a list of messages built with the same pattern.
INRIA
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2.1 Names, Operators and Messages
Let X be a set of variables represented by capital letters. Let I be a countable set of index variables. Let
−→
X be a
set of symbols represented by overarrowed capital letters, disjoint from X . Let XI = {Yi s.t.
−→
Y ∈
−→
X and i ∈ I}
be a countable set of (indexed) variables. Similarly, let C and
−→
C be (disjoint) sets of symbols, represented
by (overarrowed) lower case letters, and let CI = {ci s.t. c ∈
−→
C and i ∈ I}. Elements in C and CI are called
constants. In this paper, terms can be (optionally) tagged by an index. That is, let −→e ∈
−→
C be a symbol that
we reserve for tagging operations only. Then a term is an element of T in the following language:
Ts = {T }
p
T | {T }
s
T | h(T ) | 〈T , T 〉 |mpair(I, T ) | X | XI | C | CI\{ei | i ∈ I}
T = [ei, Ts] | Ts with i ∈ I
where Ts is by definition the set of untagged terms. The operators { }
p and { }s represent asymmetric and
symmetric encryptions respectively, 〈 , 〉 is a pairing operator, h is a hash function and mpair(i, t) is a symbolic
representation of a list (or tuple) of terms, built from the common pattern t by iterating i along integers. The
translation function defined in Section 2.4 gives the semantics of this operator. We denote by signature G the
set of operators in Ts. To simplify the syntax, in the following we will write t
i instead of [ei, t], and call it a
tagged term. We also omit the tag i of a term ti, whenever the tag i is not relevant to the discussion. We
denote by Tg the set of ground terms, i.e. any term t ∈ T with no variable in X or XI and no mpair symbol.
Ground terms will be used to describe messages that are circulated in a protocol run. Given a term t we denote
by V ar(t) (resp. Cons(t)) the set of variables (resp. constants) occuring in t. We denote by Atoms(t) the set
V ar(t) ∪ Cons(t).
In order to represent a list of terms we iterate the pairing operator 〈 , 〉. For instance to represent a, b, c, d
we can use the term 〈a, 〈b, 〈c, d〉〉〉 and we shall write this term in a shorthand: 〈a, b, c, d〉. However we do not
assume any associativity property of pairing.
A substitution σ assigns terms to variables. A ground substitution assigns ground terms to variables. The
application of σ to a term t is written tσ. These notations are extended to sets of terms E in a standard way:
Eσ = {tσ|t ∈ E}. The set of subterms of t is denoted by Subterm(t). It is defined recursively as follows: If
t is a variable or a constant then Subterm(t) = {t}. If t = f(t1, .., tn) or t = f(t1, .., tn)
i
with t ∈ G, then
Subterm(t) = {t} ∪ ∪ni=1Subterm(ti). Note that u is not considered as a subterm of u
i. We denote by ≤
the subterm relation on T . We define the relation 6m over T × T as the smallest reflexive and transitive
relation such that if t = f(t1, .., tn) or t = f(t1, .., tn)
j
with f 6= mpair, then for all i = 1, . . . ,m we have
ti 6m f(t1, .., tm). Note that t 6m u implies t ≤ u.
Finally, we define two kind of Index-operations: replacements, used in the inference rules over constraints,
and substitutions, used to define the solutions of constraints (See Section 3).
Definition 1 (Index-Replacement δ, Index-Substitution τ). An Index-Replacement δ (resp. Index-Substitution
τ) is an application from I to I (resp. to non-negative integers) that is extended to indexed variables and
constants with δ(Xi) = Xδ(i) and δ(ci) = cδ(i) (resp. τ(Xi) = Xτ(i) and τ(ci) = cτ(i)) and extended to terms
and sets of terms in the natural way.
We will use the notations δi,j (resp. τi,j) to denote the replacement (resp. substitution) of i ∈ I by j ∈ I
(resp. j ∈ N). We also use δki,j to denote the replacement of i ∈ I by j ∈ I and the other indexes apart from i
by k ∈ I. We extend this notation to sets with δkQ,j for some set Q ⊆ I.
We define the set of indexes occuring in a term as follows:
Definition 2 (Term Indexes). Given a term t ∈ T , we denote by V arI(t) the set of indexes in t, recursively
defined as follows:
V arI(mpair(i, t)) = V arI(X) = V arI(c) = ∅ with X ∈ X and c ∈ C
V arI(Xi) = V arI(ci) = {i} with Xi ∈ XI and ci ∈ CI
V arI(f(t1, .., tn)) = V arI(t1) ∪ .. ∪ V arI(tn) otherwise
V arI(t
i) = V arI(t) ∪ {i}
Moreover, we define also the set of indexes of variables in u ∈ T as
V arXI (u) = V arI(u) ∩ V arI((Subterm(u) ∩ XI))
RR n° 6712
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2.2 Protocol Specification
A protocol is given by a set of principals and a finite list of steps for each. We associate to each principal A a
partially ordered finite set (WA, <WA) steps Rι ⇒ Sι where Rι is an expected message and Sι his reply. Init
and End are fixed messages used to initiate and close a protocol session. Our notion of correct execution of a
protocol session (or protocol run) follows [RT03].
Example 1. We return to our running example: the “synchronous version” of AG protocol with n + 1 partic-
ipants (See Section 1.1). The specification of this protocol is given below:
(L, 1) Init ⇒ mpair(t, 〈l, {e}p〉)
(S, 1) mpair(i, 〈L, {Ei}p〉) ⇒ mpair(j, 〈aj , {〈rj , sj〉}Ej 〉)
(L, 2) mpair(k, 〈ak, {〈Rk, Sk〉}e〉) ⇒ mpair(m, {〈mpair(o, So), s
′〉}Rm)
(S, 2) mpair(q, {〈mpair(u, su), S
′〉}rq ) ⇒
mpair(w, 〈aw, {〈sw, H(〈mpair(y, sy), S
′〉)〉}F (〈mpair(y,sy),S′〉)〉)
(L, 3) mpair(x, 〈ax, {〈Sx, H(〈mpair(z, Sz), s
′〉)〉}F (〈mpair(z,Sz),s′〉)〉) ⇒ End
The ordering on steps is: WL = 1, 2, 3, WS = 1, 2 with 1 <WL 2, 2 <WL 3, and 1 <WS 2.
2.3 Intruder
We follow the intruder model of Dolev and Yao [DY83]. The actions of the intruder are simulated by a sequence
of rewrite rules on sets of messages. These rules are defined as follows. We note −→∗DY their reflexive and
transitive closure.
Ld(〈a1, . . . , an〉) : 〈a1, . . . , an〉 →
a1, . . . , an, 〈a1, . . . , an〉
Ld({a}
p
K) : {a}
p
K , K
−1 → {a}pK , K
−1, a
Ld({a}
s
K) : {a}
s
K , b→ {a}
s
K , b, a
Ld(t
i) : ti → t
Lc(〈a1, . . . , an〉) : a1, . . . , an →
a1, . . . , an, 〈a1, . . . , an〉
Lc({a}
p
K) : a, K → a, K, {a}
p
K
Lc({a}
s
K) : a, b→ a, b, {a}
s
K
Lc(t
i) : t→ ti for any i ∈ I
2.4 Attacks
We recall from [RT03] the notion of derivation D of goal t from E, denoted by Dt(E). We define a Non-
Redundant Derivation as follows:
Definition 3 (Non-Redundant Derivation). Given a derivation D = E0−→L1 . . .−→LlEl with goal u. D is
a non redundant derivation if ∀i∀t ∈ Ei, if Lc(t) ∈ D then ∄Ld( ) ∈ D that generates t, and if ∃Ld( ) ∈ D
generating t then Lc(t) /∈ D. We denote by NRD the set of non-redundant derivations.
Remark 1. For each derivation Dt(E), there exists a non redundant derivation D
′
t(E). Indeed, D
′ is obtained
by elimination of Lc(t) if Ld( ) ∈ D where Ld( ) generates t and by eliminating each Ld( ) ∈ D that generates
t if Lc(t) ∈ D.
We define a predicate Dy. This predicate checks whether a message can be constructed by the intruder
from some known messages.
Definition 4 (Dy, Dyc and Dyd). Let E be a set of ground terms, K be a set of ground terms and t be a
ground term such that there exists D ∈ NRD with goal t without using any term of K as a key for decryption.
Then, we say that t is forged from E and we denote it by t ∈ Dy(E,K). Moreover, if D = D′.Lc(t) then
t ∈ Dyc(E,K), otherwise t ∈ Dyd(E,K).
We interpret the mpair( , ) operator in the standard Dolev-Yao signature by defining a translation function
that replaces any mpair by a sequence of pair applications. The number of such applications is given as a
parameter e to the translation function. The integer represents the common length of lists of terms represented
by any mpair(, ).
Definition 5 (Translation of terms). Let TDY be the set of terms without any mpair(, ). Given some integer
e, the function −e from T to TDY is defined as follows:
mpair(i, t)
e
= 〈τi,1(t)
e
, .., τi,v(t)
e
〉 and f(s1, .., sk)
e
= f(s1
e, .., sk
e), for any f 6= mpair
INRIA
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We can now define attacks on protocols in our model, based on Dy predicate.
Definition 6 (Attack). Given a protocol P = {R′ı ⇒ S
′
ı|ı ∈ J}, a secret Sec and assuming the intruder has
as initial knowledge S0, an attack is described by a ground substitution σ, an Index-Substitution τ , an integer
e, and a correct execution order π : J −→ 1, . . . , k s.t. ∀i = 1, . . . , k, we have:
Riτσ
e
∈ Dy(S0
e
, S1
e
τσ, . . . , Si−1
e
τσ, ∅)
Sec
e
∈ Dy(S0
e
, S1
e
τσ, . . . , Sk
e
τσ, ∅)
where Ri = R
′
π−1(i) and Si = S
′
π−1(i).
2.5 Undecidability and Well-Tagged Protocols
Unfortunately, the insecurity problem (i.e. the existence of an attack) is undecidable in the general case. This
can be shown by encoding Post Correspondance Problem (PCP) with two letters. Note that this requires only
atomic keys.
Definition 7 (PCP protocol). Let J = {(α1, β2) , .., (αp, βp)} be an instance of PCP on the alphabet {a, b}.
We define the protocol specification P (J) coding J as the following, with C = {a, b, 0, t, u}, X = {Z},
−→
X =
{−→
A,
−→
B,
−→
X,
−→
Y
}
and only one honest participant :
1. Init ⇒ a, b, 0, {〈0, 0〉}t
2. mpair(i, 〈Ai, Bi〉) ⇒ mpair(i, {〈Ai, Bi〉}t)
3. mpair(i, {〈Xi, Yi〉}t) ⇒ mpair(i, {〈α1 (Xi) , β1 (Yi)〉}u), . . .
mpair(i, {〈αp (Xi) , βp (Yi)〉}u)
4. mpair(i, {〈Ai, Bi〉}u), {〈Z, Z〉}u ⇒ Sec
At Step 1, we provide the alphabet as constants to the intruder, as well as a termination symbol 0. At Step
2, the intruder is asked to construct a list (or mpair) of pairs of words over a, b. The following of the protocol
will consist in testing if each of these pairs can be obtained from an other one increased with one of the PCP
words (αj , βj). Since the initial pair of empty words represented by {〈0, 0〉}t, cannot be obtained this way, it
is provided to the intruder separately at Step 1. We fix the intruder choice at step 2 by encrypting it with key
u. Then, at Step 3 the intruder selects some of the pairs of words encrypted by t that he got at step 1 and 2,
and receives each of them back extended with one of the pairs of words of the PCP instance and encrypted
by u. We expect the intruder to select all of the pairs he has chosen at Step 2 minus the longest one, replaced
by the pair of empty words. Finally, at Step 4 we perform two verifications: first, we test that for any pair of
words chosen at Step 2, there exists an extended pair of words received at Step 3, i.e. by recursion that each
pair of terms chosen at Step 2 is a concatenation of words of J , the instance of PCP from which we build this
protocol; second, we test that one of the extended pair of words is a solution to PCP problem, i.e. a pair of
identical words.
Theorem 1. An instance J of PCP has a solution iff P (J) has an attack on Sec.
The proof of this theorem follows from Lemmas 1 and 2.
Lemma 1. If for some integer n there is a run of P (J), then J has a solution.
Proof. According to the protocol definition, all we need to do is to backtrack recursively the creation of
extended pairs at Step 2 and 3: for any term {〈a, b〉}t known by the intruder, including {〈Aj , Bj〉}u for any
j ∈ 1..n or {〈Z, Z〉}u, there exists i ∈ 1..n and k ∈ 1..p such that a = αk(Xi) and b = βk(Yi). Therefore,
either Xi = Yi = 0, or there exists i
′ ∈ 1..n such that a = αk(Ai′) and b = βk(Bi′), and the intruder
knows {〈Ai′ , Bi′〉}t. By iteration on Ai′and Bi′ , starting from {〈Z, Z〉}u, and since |〈a, b〉| > |〈Ai′ , Bi′〉|, it
appears that there exists a list [j1, .., jr] of indexes in 1..p such that αj1(αj2(..αjr (0)..)) = βj1(βj2(..βjr (0)..)),
i.e. αj1 ..αjr = βj1 ..βjr .
Lemma 2. If there is a solution to J , there exists n such that P (J) admits a run.
Proof. Let [j1, .., jr] be a list of indexes in 1..p such that αj1 ..αjr = βj1 ..βjr . We chose n = r. We also choose
the following values for variables Ai, Bi :
∀i ∈ 1..n− 1, σ(Ai) = αji(σ(Ai+1)) and σ(Bi) = βji(σ(Bi+1))
σ(An) = αjn(0) and σ(Bn) = βjn(0)
RR n° 6712
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This is the set of pairs of words chosen by the intruder at step 2. Then, at step 3 we chose :
∀i ∈ 2..n, σ(Xi) = σ(Ai) and σ(Yi) = σ(Bi)
σ(X1) = σ(Y1) = 0
i.e. we keep all the pairs of words chosen at step 2 except that we replace the longest (final) one, A1, B1 by
the pair of empty words. We can now easily pass the two tests of step 4, since :
∀i ∈ 1..n− 1, ∃k ∈ 1..p, ∃j ∈ 1..n s.t. σ(Ai) = αk(σ(Xj)) and σ(Ai) = βk(σ(Xj))
σ(An) = αjn(0) and σ(Bn) = βjn(0)
σ(A1) = αj1(..αjr (0)..) = βj1(..βjr (0)..) = σ(B1)
Consequently, finding an attack to PCP with two letters is no more difficult than finding a run in a
parameterized protocol as defined in this paper. Since finding a run is no more difficult than finding an attack
(the secret can be released at the end), it follows that the insecurity problem of parameterized protocol without
further restrictions is undecidable.
We will therefore introduce the class of Well-Tagged protocols for which decidability is expected. To do
this, we first introduce the notion of autonomy:
Definition 8 (Autonomy). A term mpair(i, u) is autonomous when V arI(u) ⊆ {i}. A term t ∈ TDY is
autonomous if #V arI(t) ≤ 1 and ∀t
′ < t, t′ is autonomous. A protocol P = {Rı ⇒ Sı|ı ∈ J} is autonomous
iff for all ı ∈ J , Rı and Sı are autonomous and V arI(Rı) = ∅ and V arI(Sı) = ∅.
For instance, the term t = mpair(i, mpair(j, {ai}cj )) is not autonomous. We remark that the autonomy
property alone is not enough to guarantee decidability, since the PCP protocol of Definition 7 is autonomous.
Definition 9. (Well-Tagged protocols)
A protocol P = {Rı ⇒ Sı|ı ∈ J} is Well-Tagged iff:
1. ∀ı ∈ J , ∀Xi ∈ XI ∩ Subterm(Rı) ∩
⋃
ı′<ı Subterm(Rı′), Xi is tagged;
2. ∀ı ∈ J , ∀Xi ∈ XI ∩ Subterm(Sı), Xi is tagged;
3. ∀ı ∈ J , ∀t = f(s1, .., sk) ∈ Subterm(Rı ∪ Sı) with f 6= mpair, if ∃j = 1..k s.t. sj is tagged, then t is
tagged too;
4. ∀ı ∈ J , ∀t ∈ Subterm(Rı) tagged, ∀Xi ≤ t where Xi ∈ XI , Xi is tagged.
5. P is autonomous.
In this definition, Conditions 1 and 2 state that any indexed variable of the protocol must be tagged,
except for its first occurrence w.r.t. the partial step ordering. Moreover, Condition 3 (when combined with
Conditions 1 and 2) states that, for any subterm t of the protocol, if an indexed variable is accessible from t
by decompositions without opening any mpair, then t must be tagged. Note that as a consequence of mpair
autonomy, an indexed variable Xi can only appear tagged by its index (as in Xi
i) or untagged. Condition 4
states that every indexed variable subterm of a tagged term of Rı is tagged.
The idea underlying the tagging of variables is to add enough information on terms in mpair so that the
protocol cannot be used to test or guarantee relations between elements of the same mpair, such as ∀i = 2..n,
∃i′ = 1..n s.t. Xi = f(Xi′). This is precisely the kind of relations that the encoding of PCP is able to exploit.
Thus, adding tags to the PCP-encoding protocol will generate a new protocol that cannot be run.
We introduce the notion of protocols with autonomous keys that will be used to prove the termination for
those protocols.
Definition 10. (Protocol with Autonoumous Keys)
A protocol P = {Rı ⇒ Sı|ı ∈ J} is called with autonomous keys iff ∀ı ∈ J t ∈ Subterm(Rı ∪Sı) s.t t = {u}v,
V arI(v) = ∅.
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3 Constraints for Protocol Verification
We will use a symbolic constraint system to represent all runs of a protocol given a step ordering. This system
uses (universal or existential) quantifiers on index variables and includes an (implicit) universal quantification
on the number n of elements in any mpair. Before defining our constraint system, some basic notions have to
be introduced. For terms s, s′ (resp. sets of terms E,E′) we note s ∼ s′ (resp. E ∼ E′) if they are equal once
we erase their tags.
Definition 11 (Relation 6LE for accessible subterms). We consider a relation 6 on T × 2
T × 2T × T . We
write s6LEt for s, t terms in T and E and L finite subsets of T . Note that this can be used for Ts too. This
relation is defined as the smallest relation such that:
t6∅∅t ∀t ∈ T
s6LEt iff s
′6L
′
E′t
′ where s ∼ s′, t ∼ t′, E ∼ E′, L ∼ L′
If {m}pk6
L
Et then m6
L′
E,k−1
t where L′ = L ∪ {{m}pk}
If {m}sb6
L
Et then m6
L′
E,bt where L
′ = L ∪ {{m}sb}
If 〈t1, . . . , tn〉6
L
Et then ∀i ≤ n, ti6
L′
E t where L
′ = L ∪ {〈t1, . . . , tn〉}
If m6LE′t and E
′ ⊂ E then m6LEt
We note u6Et when u6
L
Et for some L. Remark that by construction, u6Et implies u ∈ Subterm(t). We
say that u is a subterm of t that is accessible, i.e. can be obtained from t by decompositions using keys in E.
For simplicity, we note 6b1,..,bk instead of 6{b1,..,bk}. We define also the set of strict accessible terms by s<F t
(resp. s<LF t) if s6F t (resp. s6
L
F t) and s 6= t. Given t 6
L
F u or t <
L
F u), we call length of t 6
L
F u or (resp t <
L
F u)
the number of elements of L.
Before defining constraint systems, we need to introduce the environment and elementary constraints.
Definition 12 (Environment). We call an environment a finite set of equalities X = u whose left-hand sides
are variables (X ∈ X ∪ XI). We usually denote it by E.
Definition 13 (Elementary Constraint). An elementary constraint is an expression (t ∈ Forge(E,K)), (t = t′),
(t ∈ Sub(t′, E, E ,K)), (t ∈ Subd(t
′, E, E ,K)) or (t ∈ Forgec(E,K)) with t, t
′ ∈ T , E ⊂ T and an environment
E.
An elementary constraint represents a basic relation on terms: t ∈ Forge(E,K) if the term t is derivable
from the knowledge E without using any element from K as a key for decryption; t ∈ Forgec(E,K) if t is
derived by composition; t ∈ Sub(t′, E, E ,K) if t is an accessible subterm from t′ with knowledge E with none
of keys of the intermediate terms between t and t′ in K, and this modulo replacements using equations of E ;
t ∈ Subd(t
′, E, E ,K) if t is accessible by decomposition of t′, also modulo replacements using E ; and t = t′ if t
and t′ are equal.
Definition 14 (Negative Constraint). A negative constraint is an expression (∀i Xm 6= u) or (Xm /∈ Forgec(E,K))
with Xm ∈ XI , u ∈ T , E,E
′ ⊂ T and i ∈ V arI(u).
The set of solutions of a constraint S, denoted by |[S ]|eτ where e is a value of n and τ is an Index-
Substitution is a set of ground substitutions to be defined in the following. We define GS to be the set of all
ground substitutions.
Definition 15 (Solutions of an Elementary Constraint).
|[ t = t′ ]|eτ = {σ ∈ GS | t
e
τσ = t′
e
τσ}
|[ t ∈ Forge(E,K) ]|eτ = {σ ∈ GS | t
e
τσ ∈ Dy(E
e
τσ,K
e
τσ)}
|[ t ∈ Forgec(E,K) ]|
e
τ = {σ ∈ GS | t
e
τσ ∈ Dyc(E
e
τσ,K
e
τσ)}
|[ t ∈ Sub(w, E, E ,K) ]|eτ = {σ ∈ GS | ∃u ∃F,L s.t. u 6
L
F w
eτ, Fσ ⊆ Dy(E
e
τσ,K
e
τσ),
Fσ ∩ K
e
τσ = ∅, and either uσ = t
e
τσ or ∃v, δ, k, τ ′ s.t














either u ∈ X , (u = v) ∈ E , δ = ∅, and τ ′ = τ
or ∃
−→
Z ∈
−→
X , i, j ∈ I s.t u = Ziτ
′, (Zj = v) ∈ E ,
or δ = δkj,i, τ ⊆ τ
′ and Dom(τ ′) = Dom(τ) ∪ {k, i}
k, i /∈ V arI({t, w, E}), uσ /∈ Dyc(E
e
τσ,K
e
τσ)
uσ = veδτ ′σ, and σ ∈ |[ t ∈ Sub(vδ, E, E ,K) ]|eτ ′∪{k, i}}
|[ t ∈ Subd(w, E, E ,K) ]|
e
τ is defined in a similar way as |[ t ∈ Sub(w, E, E ,K) ]|
e
τ with the difference that for the
first case (when uσ = t
e
τσ), we have u <LF w
eτ .
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Definition 16 (Solutions of a Negative Constraint).
|[Xm /∈ Forgec(E,K) ]|
e
τ = GS \ |[Xm ∈ Forgec(E,K) ]|
e
τ
|[ (∀i Xm 6= u) ]|
e
τ = GS \
⋃
x=1...e
|[Xm = u ]|
e
[i←x],τ
We describe our constraint system by blocks in the following way:
Definition 17 (Constraint System). First, we define a constraints block B as a conjunction of constraints
together with an environment E:
B = (ctr1 ∧ . . . ∧ ctrl, E)
We will sometimes handle blocks as set of elementary or negative constraints for ease of notations. For instance
we write c ∈ B to express that the elementary constraint c is a conjunct of B.
We can now define the constraint system that we will use to represent protocol runs. Given two finite lists
of index variables Q = i1, . . . , ik and R = j1, . . . , jl, we write the quantifier prefix ∀i1 · · · ∀ik∃j1 · · · ∃jl in short:
∀Q ∃R.
A constraint system, denoted by S, is a disjunction of blocks with a quantifier prefix:
S = ∀Q ∃R (B1 ∨ . . . ∨Bp)
Now, we define the set of solutions of the constraint system as follows:
Definition 18 (Solutions of the Constraint System). Consider a constraint system S, Bi, for i = 1 . . . p (blocks
of S) and ctri,j, for j = 1 . . . li (constraints of the block Bi) given in Definition 17. The set of solutions of a
constraint system CS is defined inductively using the following cases:
|[∀i S ]|eτ = ∩x=1,...,e|[S ]|
e
[i←x],τ |[S ]|
e
τ =
⋃
i=1...p
|[Bi ]|
e
τ
|[∃i S ]|eτ = ∪x=1,...,e|[S ]|
e
[i←x],τ |[Bi ]|
e
τ =
⋂
j=1...li
|[ ctri,j ]|
e
τ
The idea will be to use a constraint system based on blocks to represent all possible ways the intruder can
construct a list of terms represented by an mpair. Roughly, there will be one block in the system for each way.
Note also that blocks are extended to admit labeled constraints:
Notation 1. (labels of constraints)
A constraint ctr may be equiped with a label (ctr)m or (ctr)sm or (ctr)f to denote respectively a master
constraint or a submaster constraint or a final constraint. The tow first labels allow us to keep track of the
”official” formal value of some indexed or non-indexed variable. For example, we will prove that we have
exactly one master constraint for every indexed variable in each block, and we will use master or sub master
constraints to instanciate variables when needed; The third label will be used to prevent any further rewriting
on some constraint. We introduce also the notation (ctr)

to refer to labeled or non labeled constraint. The
solutions of labeled constraints are the solutions of the constraints obtained by removing labels.
To simplify the use of (sub)master constraints, we group them into sets:
Definition 19 (Set of (sub)master constraints). Let S = ∀Q∃R B1 ∨ .. ∨ Bp be a constraint system,
Y ∈ X , W ⊆ X and
−→
X ∈
−→
X . We define M(S,
−→
X ) = {ctr | ∃i (ctr)m ∈ Bi and ∃j ∈ Q s.t ctr =
(Xj ∈ Forgec(E,K)) or ctr = (Xj = u)} and ∀i SM(Bi, W ) = {ctr | (ctr)
sm ∈ Bi, Y ∈W and ctr = (Y = u)}.
Also, SM(Bi, Y ) = SM(Bi, {Y }).
When S is clear from the context we omit it inM(S,
−→
X ) and write simplyM(
−→
X ).
4 Normalisation of a Constraint System
In this section we present the rules applied in the normalization function over constraint systems. After
applying a rule to a constraint system, the result is put in disjunctive normal form and existential quantifiers
are moved up to the prefix of the system using first order logic. We introduce some definitions used to define
our rules.
First, we extend the blocks of constraints to include an history, that is, a sorted list of rules that have
occured at some step in this block:
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Definition 20. (Block History)
Any block B = ctr1 ∧ ..ctrp is equiped with a sorted list of rules Hist = [r1, . . .] named the history of the
block B denoted by Hist(B). Hist(B)(i) denotes the ith rule of the history. The block is then denoted by
B = (ctr1 ∧ ..ctrp, E , Hist), and constraint systems are extended to blocks with history.
Any rule application will implicitly update the history of the block in which it is applied. Therefore, in
what follows, we will not write the history (Hist) of the block each time it is not relevant for the discussion.
We also introduce the notion of anteriority between index variables in the same block that will be used in
the definition of Rule 25 and in proofs.
Definition 21 (anteriority of indexes). Let B = (ctr1 ∧ ..ctrp, E , Hist) be a block.
Let i and j be two index variables.
We define the function ant(, ) from I × I to I such that
ant(i, j) = i if ∃ı s.t i ∈ post(Hist(B)(ı)) and ∀ı′ ≤ ı j /∈ post(Hist(B)(ı′)).
We then define the function awake that allows to remove the label for dull constraints. This is used when a
master constraint is introduced in the block or a master constraint of type Forge is changed to a new Equality
master constraint.
Definition 22. (Function awake) We define the function awake as follows:
awake((ctr)d) = ctr
awake((ctr)

) = (ctr)

for (ctr)
 6= (ctr)d
The function awake is extended in a natural way to constraints blocks and constraints system:
Let B = ctr1 ∧ . . . ∧ ctrm be a constraints block and S = B1 ∨ . . . ∨Bl be a constraints system. Then:
awake(B) = awake(ctr1) ∧ . . . ∧ awake(ctrm)
awake(S) = awake(B1) ∨ . . . ∨ awake(Bl)
Finally, we define the dependency graph of a block that will be used to define the notion of accessibility of
variables used in Rule 3.
Definition 23 (Dependency graph of a block). We define the dependency graph GB of a block B to be the
graph where X ∪ XI is the set of nodes and we have an oriented edge from X to Y iff there is (X = u) ∈ B
with Y < u. We write X ⊏Y when there exists a path in GB from X to Y . We also note X ⊏l Y if X ⊏Y
and l is the minimal length of a path from X to Y .
Now, we present our rules system. They are organized in six groups G1, . . . , G6.
G1: Group of prioritary rules
G1 aims at maintaining syntactic properties over a constraint system. Any rule in this group is applied eagerly
with priority higher than any other rule applicable from another group. Moreover the rules in this group are
given in strictly decreasing priority order.
t = X −→ X = t where X ∈ X ∪ XI and t /∈ X ∪ XI (1)
(X = u)sm ∧ (Y = X) −→ (X = u)sm ∧ (Y = u) for X,Y ∈ X (2)
X = u −→ ⊥ if there is Y < u s.t Y ⊏X for X, Y ∈ X ∪ XI (3)
∀Q.i ∃R S ∨ (ctr ∧B) −→ ∀Q.i ∃R awake(S) ∨ ((ctr)m ∧ awake(B)) (4)
where ctr ∈ {Xi ∈ Forgec(E,K), Xi = u} and B ∩M(
−→
X ) = ∅
∀Q.i.j ∃R S ∨ ((Xi ∈ Forgec(E,K))
m ∧Xj = u ∧B) −→ ∀Q.i.j ∃R awake(S) (5)
∨(Xi ∈ Forgec(E,K) ∧ (Xj = u)
m ∧awake(B))
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(Yj = Z)
 ∧X = u −→ (Yj = Z)
 ∧X = uλ where Yj < u and λ = [Yj ← Z] (6)
B ∧X = u −→ B ∧X = uλ ∧ Yj = Z where Yj < u, and λ = [Yj ← Z] (7)
if for all Z ′, E′ we have (Yj = Z
′) /∈ B
B ∧X = u −→ B ∧ (X = u)sm where SM(B, X) = ∅ (8)
Some rules handle labelling of master constraints by adding new labels or transfering existing ones. Indeed,
Rule 4 labels master constraints for a vector variable
−→
X ∈
−→
X in a block B when B does not contain yet a
master constraint for
−→
X . We note that Rule 4 is applied only once for each variable vector in a block. Rule 5
transfers master constraints labels from forge constraints to equality ones whenever possible. Intuitively, an
equality constraint being more precise than a forge one, has to be favoured. Note that the index itself, i.e. i
or j in Rule 5 is not relevant.
Other rules format constraints in order to get preferably variables on their left hand-side (Rule 1), or replace
indexed variables by non-indexed ones (Rules 6 and 7).
Finally, Rule 8 manages submaster constraints by ensuring that if some block contains at least one equality
fixing a value for a variable X, then exactly one of them is labelled as submaster constraint for X.
G2: Group of Forge reduction rules
G2 aims at enumerating all possible ways a term can be built by the intruder. Here, we consider a constraints
block (B′, E).
t ∈ Forge(E,K) −→ t ∈ Forgec(E,K) ∨
∨
w∈E
t ∈ Sub(w, E, E ,K) (9)
〈t1, . . . , tm〉 ∈ Forgec(E,K) −→
∧
i=1...m
ti ∈ Forge(E,K) (10)
{t}b ∈ Forgec(E,K) −→ (b ∈ Forge(E,K) ∧ t ∈ Forge(E,K)) (11)
h(t) ∈ Forgec(E,K) −→ t ∈ Forge(E,K)) (12)
∀Q ∃R S ∨ (B ∧mpair(k, t) ∈ Forgec(E,K)) −→ (13)
∀Q ∃R S ∨ (B ∧ tδ ∈ Forge(E,K)) if Hy13
∀Q.k′ ∃R S ∨ (B ∧ tδk,k′ ∈ Forge(E,K)) otherwise where k
′ fresh
and Hy13 = ((mpair(k, t) ∈ Forgec(E,K) −→ tδ ∈ Forge(E,K)) ∈ Hist(B))
c ∈ Forgec(E,K) −→ ⊥, for c ∈ C ∪ CI (14)
Rule 9 is a generic rule that illustrates the two possible ways for forging a term t: either by composing or
by decomposing one of the knowledge. The other rules enumerate all possible ways a term can be composed
by the Intruder: we have exactly one rule for decomposing each kind of operator in the signature G (Rules 10
to 13). In particular, Rule 13 operates for the mpair operator where mpair autonomy is used to justify the
quantification.
G3: Group of Sub reduction rules
G3 is similar to G2, but they decompose Intruder knowledge.
t ∈ Sub(u, E, E ,K) −→ (t = u) if u = {v}b and b ∈ K (15)
(t = u) ∨ (t ∈ Subd(u, E, E ,K)) otherwise
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t ∈ Subd(〈t1, . . . , tm〉, E, E ,K) −→
∨
i=1...m
(t ∈ Sub(ti, E, E ,K)) (16)
t ∈ Subd({u}
s
b, E, E ,K) −→ t ∈ Sub(u, E, E ,K) ∧ b ∈ Forge(E,K ∪ {b}) (17)
t ∈ Subd({u}
p
K , E, E ,K) −→ t ∈ Sub(u, E, E ,K) ∧K
−1 ∈ Forge(E,K ∪ {K}) (18)
t ∈ Subd(mpair(k, u), E, E ,K) −→ (t ∈ Sub(uδ, E, E ,K)) if Hy19 (19)
∃k′ (t ∈ Sub(uδk,k′ , E, E ,K)) otherwise
where k′ fresh and Hy19 = ((t ∈ Subd(mpair(k, u), E, E ,K) −→ t ∈ Sub(uδ, E, E ,K)) ∈ Hist(B))
t ∈ Subd(c, E, E ,K) −→ ⊥, for c ∈ C ∪ CI (20)
Rule 15 is a generic rule that follows precisely the intruder deduction rules: a term t is an accessible subterm
of u iff t = u or there exists a direct subterm u′ of u, derivable from u, with t being an accessible subterm of
u′. Therefore, there exists exactly one rule for decomposing each kind of operator in G (apart from variables
and constants).
G4: Group of simplification rules for equalities
G4 encodes unification algorithm for terms in our system, and thus, the resolution of equality constraints. Let
us note t̂ the root symbol of a term t.
c = c −→ ⊤ where c ∈ C ∪ CI (21)
t = t′ −→ ⊥ where {t̂, t̂′} ⊂ C ∪ CI ∪ G and t̂ 6= t̂′ (22)
f(u1, .., um) = f(w1, .., wm) −→
∧
i=1...m
ui = wi where f ∈ {{}
p, {}s, 〈〉, [], h} (23)
∀Q ∃R S ∨ (B ∧ (mpair(k, u) = mpair(l, w))) −→ (24)
∀Q ∃R S ∨ (B ∧ (uδ = wδl,kδ)) if Hy24
∀Q.k′ ∃R S ∨ (B ∧ (uδk,k′ = wδl,k′)) otherwise
where k′ fresh and Hy24 = (((mpair(k, u) = mpair(l, w)) −→ (uδ = wδl,kδ)) ∈ Hist(B))
∀Q ∃R S ∨ (B ∧ cj = ci) −→ ∀Q ∃R S ∨ (Bδ) where ci, cj ∈ CI (25)
and δ = δi,j if j ∈ Q
and δ = δj,i if i ∈ Q
and δ = δ{i,j},ant(i,j) otherwise
These rules simply consist in testing recursively the compatibility of each top operator in each term.
Therefore, the only equality constraints remaining after an iteration of these rules are those assigning a value
to a variable, i.e. X = u with X ∈ X ∪ XI .
G5: Group of interleaving rules inside a block
These rules aim at replacing variables by their value, inside one block. These rules manage the interaction
between two constraints in the same block. Rules in G5 have priority on rules in G6. Moreover, in G5, Rule 32
has weaker priority than other rules in the same group.
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B ∧ (Xi = u)
 ∧ (Xi = v)
 −→ B ∧ (Xi = u)
 ∧ (Xi = v)
 ∧ u = v (26)
if (B ∧ (Xi = u)
 ∧ (Xi = v)
 −→ B ∧ (Xi = u)
 ∧ (Xi = v)
 ∧ u = v) /∈ Hist(B)
(X = u)sm ∧ (X = v) −→ (X = u)sm ∧ (u = v) (27)
(Xi = u)
 ∧Xi ∈ Forgec(E
′,K) −→ (Xi = u)
 ∧ u ∈ Forgec(E
′,K) (28)
(X = u)sm ∧X ∈ Forgec(E
′,K) −→ (X = u)sm ∧ u ∈ Forgec(E
′,K) (29)
(A ∈ Forgec(E,K))
 ∧A ∈ Forgec(E
′,K) −→ (A ∈ Forgec(E,K))

(30)
where E ⊆ E′ and A ∈ X ∪ XI
(X = w)sm ∧ t ∈ Subd(X, E
′, E ,K) −→ (X = w)sm ∧ t ∈ Subd(w, E
′, E ,K) (31)
∧X /∈ Forgec(E,K) where (X = w)
sm ∈ E
A ∈ Forgec(E,K) ∧ t ∈ Subd(A, E
′, E ,K) −→ ⊥ where A ∈ X ∪ XI (32)
Rule 32 says that it is not necessary to decompose a variable. While a bit more complex than expected,
our semantics of Subd(, , ,) has been defined to prevent useless actions like this, thus ensuring the validity of
G6.
G6: Group of interleaving rules between different blocks
G6 generalizes G5 by allowing variable replacements from one block to an other one. Therefore, these rules are
the ones that define interactions between blocks, and solve constraints between multiple indexes of the same
variable in a formal way.
Given some vector variable
−→
X ∈
−→
X , we assume thatM(
−→
X ) = {Xio = uo}o=1..p∪{Xjr ∈ Forgec(E
′
r, Kr)}r=1..q.
Then the rewriting rules in this group for constraints over
−→
X are the following, with δo = δ
k′o
Q,m, k
′
o ∈ I a fresh
index variable :
t ∈ Subd(Xm, E
′, E ,K) −→
∨
(Xi = u)∈E
∃k′ t ∈ Subd(uδ, E
′, E ,K) ∧ (Xm = uδ)
f (33)
∧Xm /∈ Forgec(E
′,K)with δ = δk
′
i,m
Xm ∈ Forgec(E
′,K) −→ ((Xm ∈ Forgec(E
′,K))d ∧
∧
o=1...p
(∀k′0 Xm 6= uoδo)) ∨ (34)
∨
o=1...p
∃k′0 uoδo ∈ Forgec(E
′,K) ∧ (Xm = uoδo)
f
Xm = v −→
∨
r=1...q
(v ∈ Forgec(E
′
r,Kr)) ∧ (Xm = v)
d ∧
∧
o=1...p
(∀k′0 Xm 6= uoδo) ∨ (35)
∨
o=1...p
∃k′o (uoδo = v) ∧ (Xm = uoδo)
f
The structure of these rules is essentially the same as for interleaving in only one block: Given a constraint
containing a variable Xi that must be replaced by its value, we enumerate a finite number of ”candidate” terms
representing all possible values of this variable according to the whole constraint system. These values are
provided by master constraints. For instance, in Rule 33, only the case where master constraints are equality
ones are taken into account since Forge ones leads to ⊥. This rule adds an (extra) equality representing the
master constraint it used. It adds also negative constraints to eliminate the case of Forge master constraints.
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Let B the block that we focus on for Rules 33, 34 and 35. For Rule 33, if
(t ∈ Subd(Xm, E, E ,K) −→ ∃k
′ t ∈ Subd(uδ, E
′, E ,K) ∧ (Xm = uδ)
f ∧Xm /∈ Forgec(E
′,K)) ∈ Hist(B), then
we preserve the same index k′ for uδ. That is, we generate the same Sub constraint that was generated before
and which belongs to Hist(B). Otherwise, i.e. the constraint (t ∈ Subd(Xm, E, E ,K)) was not treated with
Rule 33 by the interleaving with the master constraint (Xi = u), then k
′ will be a fresh index.
The same reasoning is valid for Rule 34. Indeed, if the constraint (Xm ∈ Forgec(E
′,K)) was not already treated
with Rule 34 by the interleaving with the master constraint (Xio = uo), then the index k
′
o is fresh. Otherwise,
we preserve the same index that was generated before by Rule 34 for the constraint (Xm ∈ Forgec(E
′,K))
considering the master constraint (Xio = uo) and which belongs to Hist(B).
We reason similarly for Rule 35. Indeed, if the constraint (Xm = v) was already treated by Rule 35 by the
interleaving with a master constraint (Xio = uo) and then
(Xm = v −→ ∃k
′
o (uoδo = v) ∧ (Xm = uoδo)
f ) ∈ Hist(B), we preserve the same index variable as the one
generated before. Otherwise, k′o will be a fresh index.
Simplification rules with Tagging We have defined our constraints simplification for untagged terms.
Nevertheless, these rules deal also with tagged terms following the definition of our signature. Indeed, for
decomposition in Forge or Sub constraints, our rules behave similarly with tagged terms as for untagged
terms. Moreover, for equality constraint, the constraint (Xi)
i = u leads to ⊥ when u is untagged, since
(Xi)
i = [ei, Xi]. Besides, for replacement in Forge or Sub constraints, tagged variables behave as ’special’
variable. For example, given a constraint (t ∈ Sub(Xi
i, E, E ,K)), we search for master constraints for the
vector
−→
X . Then, assuming (Xo = u)
m is one of them, the replacement result would (t ∈ Sub((uδ)i, E, E ,K))
for this master constraint. The same reasoning is valid for a Forge constraint.
Definition 24 (Solved Constraint). A solved constraint is of type: (Xi ∈ Forgec(E,K))

, X ∈ Forgec(E,K),
(Xi = u)

, (X = u)sm, (∀j Xi 6= u) (Y /∈ Forgec(E,K)), where X ∈ X , Y ∈ X ∪ XI , Xi ∈ XI , u ∈ T ,
j ∈ V arI(u), E ⊂ T and K ⊂ T
We will prove that at each step of our algorithm, the normalized constraint system contains only solved
constraints.
Application to the Asokan-Ginzboorg Protocol
Consider the constraint system to normalize given in Section 10.1. We only focus on the first step of this
protocol : mpair(i, 〈L, {Ei}p〉) ∈ Forge(E1,K1) where E1 = {mpair(t, 〈l, {e}p〉)}, and E = ∅.
mpair(i, 〈L, {Ei}p〉) ∈ Forge(E1, ∅)
−→ (mpair(i, 〈L, {Ei}p〉) ∈ Forgec(E1, ∅))
∨(mpair(i, 〈L, {Ei}p〉) ∈ Sub(mpair(t, 〈l, {e}p〉), E1, E , ∅)) by Rule 9
−→ ∀i ((〈L, {Ei}p〉 ∈ Forge(E1, ∅)) ∨ (mpair(i, 〈L, {Ei}p〉) = mpair(t, 〈l, {e}p〉))
∨(mpair(i, 〈L, {Ei}p〉) ∈ Subd(mpair(t, 〈l, {e}p〉), E1, E , ∅))) by Rules 13, 15
−→ ∀i ∀j ((〈L, {Ei}p〉 ∈ Sub(mpair(t, 〈l, {e}p〉), E1, E , ∅)) ∨ (〈L, {Ej}p〉 = 〈l, {e}p〉)
∨(mpair(i, 〈L, {Ei}p〉) ∈ Subd(〈l, {e}p〉, E1, E , ∅)) ∨ (〈L, {Ei}p〉 ∈ Forgec(E1, ∅)))
by Rules 9, 19, 15, 22, 24
−→ ∀i ∀j ((L ∈ Forge(E1, ∅) ∧ {Ei}p ∈ Forge(E1, ∅)) ∨ ((L = l)
sm ∧ Ej = e)
∨(〈L, {Ei}p〉 ∈ Sub(〈l, {e}p〉, E1, E , ∅))) by Rules 10, 15, 22, 19, 16, 20, 23
−→ ∀i ∀j ((L ∈ Forge(E1, ∅) ∧ Ei ∈ Forge(E1, ∅) ∧ p ∈ Forge(E1, {Ei}p))
∨(L ∈ Forge(E1, ∅) ∧ {Ei}p ∈ Subd(mpair(t, 〈l, {e}p〉), E1, E , ∅))
∨((L = l)sm ∧ Ei = e) ∨ ((L = l)
sm ∧ Ej = e)) by Rules 9, 11, 15, 22, 23, 16, 17, 20
−→ ∀i ∀j ((L ∈ Forge(E1, ∅) ∧ Ei = e) ∨ ((L = l)
sm ∧ Ei = e) ∨ ((L = l)
sm ∧ Ej = e))
by Rules 15, 19, 16, 17, 20, 22, 23
−→ ∀i ∀j ((L ∈ Forge(E1, ∅) ∧ (Ei = e)
m) ∨ ((L = l)sm ∧ (Ei = e)
m)
∨((L = l)sm ∧ (Ej = e)
m)) by Rule 4
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5 Verification of Well-Tagged Protocols
We introduce here the verification algorithm and the results that state the correctness and the completeness
of the inference rules of Section 4 and decidability for protocols without mpair(, )’s and indexed variables.
Given a set R of inference rules and a formula F we say that R(F ) is a closure of F by R if it is derived by a
finite number of applications of rules in R and no rule can be further applied to R(F ). First of all, we define
a reduction of equalities chain in an environment:
Notation 2. (⌈E⌉) We note ⌈E⌉ the closure of E by the following rules:
X = Y ∧ Y = u −→ X = u ∧ Y = u
Xi = Yi ∧ Yj = u −→ Xi = uδ
k′
Q,i ∧ Yj = u
for X, Y ∈ X ∪ XI , Xi, Yj ∈ XI and u /∈ X ∪ XI .
Second, we introduce the normalisation function denoted by S 7→ (S)

y. A normalisation of a constraint
system can be defined when some closures can be computed as follows using a subset of the inference rules.
This normalization operates in two main phases:
Definition 25 (Normalization function). Let S be a block system. We denote by SR the whole set of inference
rules except Rule 4. We assume that we can compute:
Phase 1: S1, a closure of S through SR except Rules 26 and 27;
Labelling: S2, a closure of S1 through Rules 4 and 5 only;
Phase 2: S3, a closure of S2 through SR. This closure is denoted by (S)

y.
The Labelling step adds labels for creating master constraints (Rule 4), making sure to always favour
labelling of equality constraints to a forge constraints (Rule 5). While Phases 1 and 2 are similar by the
rules they use, their behaviors differ: when used in our algorithm for a step Ri ⇒ Si, Phase 1 will never
use any constraint interleaving rule with a master constraint M(
−→
X ) with L(X) = Ei−1. This means that
during Phase 1, the variables with maximum level cannot be replaced yet from a block to an other, simply
because none of them have master constraints yet. However, the second phase do not have this limitation.
The verification algorithm is the following:
Algorithm 1. Let P = {R′ı ⇒ S
′
ı|ı ∈ J} be Well-Tagged, Sec ∈ T , and S0 ⊂ Tg.
1. Guess a correct execution order π : J → 1..k.
2. Let Ri , R
′
π−1(i) and Si , S
′
π−1(i) ∀i ∈ 1..k. Let Rk+1 , Sec.
3. Let CBS0 , ∀Q∃R⊤, with Q = R = ∅, be the initial constraint system.
4. For i from 1 to k + 1 :
(a) Assume that CBSi−1 , ∀Q∃R B1 ∨B2 ∨ .. ∨Bp;
(b) Let ctri , Ri ∈ Forge(S0, S1, .., Si−1, ∅);
(c) Let Ei =
⋃
−→
X
M(CBSi−1,
−→
X ) and for all j = 1, ..p, X,Y ∈ X∪XI , Ei,j = ⌈Ei ∪ SM(Bj ,X )⌉\{(X = Y )};
(d) Let CBSi , (∀Q∃R (B1 ∧ ctri, Ei,1) ∨ .. ∨ (Bp ∧ ctri, Ei,p) )

y
5. Test Satisfiability of CBSk+1 (return insecure iff satisfiable).
Note that sets Ei, Ei,j denotes respectively the set of master constraints for vector variables and the set of
submaster constraints for variables of block Bj , both with variables of level strictly included in Ei−1. Notation
⊤ represents true. The algorithm chooses a “possible” protocol run represented by π, and tests if after this
run Sec is derivable by the intruder for some length e of mpair(, ). We test this by increasing the initial con-
straint system CBS0 with each protocol step successively, and by normalising the resulting constraint system
at each step. This step-by-step normalisation is required by our inference rules which assumes that master and
sub-master constraints for previous steps have been already computed.
Results obtained for our inference system are the followings:
Theorem 2. The insecurity problem for Well-Tagged protocols with Autonomous Keys is decidable.
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The proof of Theorem 2 follows from Lemmas 3, 4 and 5.
Lemma 3. (Correctness and Completeness of Normalization)
Let CBSi and ctri (i = 1..k + 1) be as in the verification algorithm, for some Well-Tagged protocol P . Then
for all e, |[CBSi−1 ∧ ctri ]|
e
∅ =
∣
∣
[
(CBSi−1 ∧ ctri)

y
]∣
∣
e
∅
Lemma 4. (Termination of Normalization)
Algorithm 1 terminates for Well-Tagged protocols with Autonomous Keys.
Lemma 5. (Satisfiability of normalized form)
When Algorithm 1 is applied to a Well-Tagged protocol P with autonomous keys, the satisfiability of the resulting
normalised constraint system can be decided.
The proof of Lemma 3 is in Section 6. The proof of Lemma 4 is in Section 8. The proof of Lemma 5 is in
Section 9. It is worth also to notice that our algorithm always terminates for protocols without mpair(, )’s and
without index variables (See Section 7), thus showing that our procedure is an extension of protocol analysis
in the basic case. Also, note that the satisfiability of CBSk+1 will be trivial to check for protocols without
mpair(, ). Moreover, the satisfiability of CBSk+1 is also trivial to check in our example, the Asokan-Ginzboorg
protocol.
6 Correctness and completeness
The aim of this section is to show that the different reduction rules preserve the set of solutions. That is, we
say that a rule F1 → F2 over a constraint system is complete when ∀e, |[F1 ]|
e
∅ ⊆ |[F2 ]|
e
∅, and correct when ∀e,
|[F1 ]|
e
∅ ⊇ |[F2 ]|
e
∅. Note also for a rule r, post(r) denotes the right hand side of r and pre(r) denotes the left
hand side of r.
We first need a notion of variable level :
Definition 26 (Variable Level, Vector Level). Assuming that P , Sec, S0 are as in Definition 6 and π is a
correct execution order for the protocol, we denote by Ei = S0, S1, .., Si for any i ∈ 1..k. Let A ∈ X ∪ XI .
Then, L(A) is the smallest set Ei for i = 1 . . . k such that A ≤ Ri+1. We extend the notion of level to variable
vector in the following way: Let
−→
X ∈
−→
X . Then, L(
−→
X ) is the smallest set Ei for i = 1 . . . k such that ∃m ∈ I
with Ei = L(Xm).
We give some properties that are preserved by our constraint solving rules and permit us to prove the
correctness and the completeness of the algorithm.
6.1 Properties of the Rules System
We show invariants that state properties satisfied by terms or constraints occuring in any constraint system
derived at some step in the normalization.
Invariant 1. #V arI(t) ≤ 1 for t ∈ T .
Invariant 1 will be used for the correctness and completeness proof of Rule 35.
Proof. Initially constraints are of the form t ∈ Forge(E,K). According to the property of mpair autonomy
over P (See Definition 8), we have V arI(t) = ∅. Thus Invariant 1 is satisfied by the initial constraints. We
show that the application of any rule of SR preserves this invariant.
Rules 1, 4, 5, 6 and 8 do not change any constraint then Invariant 1 remains satisfied.
Rule 2 changes a constraint into another one using the same terms as for the left-hand side of the rule. Then,
Invariant 1 is preserved. Rule 3 eliminates the whole block. Then, the invariant still holds. Rule 7 adds a new
constraint Yj = Z to the block and this constraint satisfies the Invariant.
Rule 9 transforms a constraint t ∈ Forge(E,K) to either a Forge constraint t ∈ Forgec(E,K) conserving the
same t or to a Sub constraint using the two terms t and w ∈ E. By induction hypothesis we have #V arI(t) ≤ 1.
Besides, according to the property of mpair autonomy over P, we have V arI(w) = ∅ and then #V arI(w) = 0.
Therefore, the invariant is preserved.
Rule 10 decomposes the term 〈t1, . . . , tm〉 to be forged into its subterms ti, i = 1 . . . m.
Since #V arI(〈t1, . . . , tm〉) ≤ 1 (by induction hypothesis the invariant is satisfied on the block system to be
rewritten), we have #V arI(ti) ≤ 1 ∀i = 1 . . . m.
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A similar reasoning applies to Rules 11 and 12.
For Rule 13, according to the property of mpair autonomy over terms we have V arI(t) = {k}. Thus the
invariant is satisfied.
Rule 14 eliminates the whole block. Then, the invariant still holds. Rule 15 transforms a Sub constraint either
to another Sub constraint or Equality one while preserving the two terms t and u. The invariant is then
preserved in the two cases.
In Rule 16, the Sub constraint is transformed into a Sub constraint with the same term t and subterm ti of
〈t1, . . . , tm〉. Since #V arI(〈t1, . . . , tm〉) ≤ 1 (by induction hypothesis), we have #V arI(ti) ≤ 1 ∀i = 1 . . . m.
A similar reasoning applies to Rules 17 and 18 (with addition of Forge constraint with a subterm of the initial
term t).
For Rule 19, according to the property of mpair autonomy over terms we have V arI(u) = {k}. Thus, the
invariant is satisfied. Rule 20 eliminates the whole block. Then, the Invariant remains valid. Rules 21 and 22
eliminate either the constraint (⊤) or the block (⊥). Then, the invariant is preserved.
Rule 23 transforms an Equality constraint with two terms t and t′ into equality constraints with subterms of
t and t′. Then, the invariant is preserved.
For Rule 24, according to the property of mpair autonomy over terms we have V arI(u) = {k} and V arI(v) =
{l}. Thus, the invariant is satisfied.
Rule 25 replaces an index variable by another index variable in a block. Thus, the invariant remains satisfied.
In Rules 26, 27, 28, 29, 30 and 31, the block system resulting from the rewriting has the same terms as the
one that is reduced. Thus the invariant is satisfied.
Rule 32 eliminates the block and the invariant obviously holds.
Rules 33, 34 and 35, transforms a block system into one built with the same terms as the initial one, reduced
modulo some index replacement. Thus the invariant is satisfied.
Invariant 2. We say that a constraint ctr is a constraint for X (or X has a constraint ctr) if ctr =
(X ∈ Forgec(E,K)) or ctr = (X = u).
∀X ∈ X ∪XI , for any rule r in SR∪{Rule 4}, if X has a constraint in pre(r), then it has a constraint in any
B with B ∈ post(r)
Invariant 2 is used in the proof of Corollaries 1 and 2.
Proof. We show that the application of any rule of SR ∪ {Rule 4} preserves Invariant 2.
Rule 2 transforms a constraint for Y into another constraint for Y without elliminating the other constraints.
Thus, we still have constraints for both X and Y . Rule 3 eliminates the block. Then, the invariant holds.
Rules 4, 5, and 8 do not change constraints. Rule 6 transforms a constraint for X into another constraint for X
without elliminating other constraints. Thus, we still have constraints for both X and Yj . Rule 7 transforms a
constraint for X into another constraint for X, while adding a new constraint for Yj . We conclude that control
rules satisfies the invariant.
Rule 9 may add a constraint for a variable but can not eliminate ones. Thus, the invariant holds. The other
rules of Group G2 do not treat constraints for variables. Then, the invariant remains valid. Rule 15 may add
a constraint for a variable but can not eliminate ones. Then, the invariant is satisfied. The other rules of
Group G3 do not treat constraints for variables. Thus, Group G3 preserves the invariant. Rule 23 may add a
constraint for a variable but can not eliminate ones. Thus, the invariant holds. The other rules of Group G4
do not manage constraints for variables. Thus, Group G4 preserves the invariant.
Rules 26, 27, 30 and 31, do not eliminate constraints for variables. Rule 28 eliminates a constraint for Xi
(Xi ∈ Forgec(E
′,K)) but it remains another constraint for Xi : Xi = u. We reason similarly for Rule 29.
Rule 32 eliminates the block. We conclude that interleaving rules inside a block preserve Invariant 2.
In Rule 34, the constraint for Xm: Xm ∈ Forgec(E
′,K) would be transformed in either Xm ∈ Forgec(E
′,K)
or Xm = u0δ0. Then, in both cases, we still have a constraint for Xm. In Rule 35, the constraint for Xm:
Xm = v is either preserved or transformed into another constraint : Xm = u0δ0. Then, in both cases, we still
have a constraint for Xm. We conclude that interleaving rules between different blocks preserve Invariant 2,
and therefore it is preserved by SR ∪ {Rule 4}.
Invariant 3. For a constraint (t ∈ Sub(w, E, E ,K)), we have ∀X ≤ w where X ∈ X ∪ XI , L(X) ⊂ E.
Invariant 3 is used in the proof of Proposition 21.
Proof. Initially, Sub constraints are obtained from Forge ones by Rule 9. We get a constraint t ∈ Sub(w, E, E ,K)
where w ∈ E. Then, ∀X ≤ w and according to the notion of correct execution, and the definition of L(X),
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we have L(X) ⊂ E. We only focus on rules treating Sub constraints. Rule 15 transforms a constraint
t ∈ Sub(u, E, E ,K) into a constraint t ∈ Subd(u, E, E ,K) without modifying neither u nor E. Then, Invari-
ant 3 remains satisfied. In Rule 16, since the invariant is satisfied for 〈t1, . . . , tm〉 and E, then it remains
satisfied for a subterm of 〈t1, . . . , tm〉: ti and E. The same reasoning is valid for Rules 17, 18 and 19. Rules 20
and 32 eliminate the whole block, then, the invariant remains valid. Rule 32 eliminates the whole block. Then,
Invariant 3 is satisfied. In Rule 31, we get a Sub constraint t ∈ Sub(w, E′, E ,K) where w is given by the
constraint X = w which belongs to E . However, by construction of E , L(w) ⊂ E′. Finally, for Rule 33, we
reason similarly to Rule 31.
In what follows, properties and lemmas introduced are limited to the first phase of the computation of a
certain CBSi.
Invariant 4. ∀ctr in the computation of some CBSi at phase 1, ∀X ∈ X ∪ XI s.t L(X) = Ei−1, if ctr =
t ∈ Sub(w, E, E ,K) s.t X ≤ t and ∀Y ≤ w then L(Y ) ⊂ L(X).
Invariant 4 is used in the proof of Proposition 1.
Proof. Initially, constraints are Forge ones. Then, the invariant is satisfied. We prove that Invariant 4 is
preserved at each application of a rule of our inference rules. The first group does not manage Sub constraints.
Then, the invariant remains satisfied. Rule 9 manages a constraint t ∈ Sub(w, E, E ,K) where w ∈ E. However,
according to the notion of correct execution, and by definition of L(Y ), E ⊂ Ei and L(Y ) ⊆ E. Thus,
L(Y ) ⊂ L(X), which satisfies the invariant. The other rules of Group G2 do not manage Sub constraints.
Therefore, Group G2 satisfies the invariant. Rules 15 transforms a Sub constraint into another Subd constraint
with the same t and u. Thus, the invariant still holds. Rule 20 eliminates the whole block. Then, the invariant
remains valid. The other rules of Group G3 decompose the term inside the Sub constraint. Then, the invariant
still holds. Thus, Group G3 satisfies the invariant. Group G4 does not treat Sub constraints. Then, the
invariant still holds. Rule 31 generates a constraint t ∈ Subd(w, E, E ,K). However, w comes from a sub-master
constraint (X = w) ∈ E . By construction of the environment, L(Y ) ⊂ L(X), which satisfies the invariant.
The other rules of Group G5 do not manage Sub constraints. Then, Group G5 satisfies the invariant. Rule 33
generates a constraint t ∈ Subd(uδ, E
′, E ,K). However, uδ comes from a master constraint Xi = u ∈ E . By
construction of E , L(Y ) ⊂ L(X), which satisfies the invariant. The other rules of Group G6 do not treat Sub
constraints. Thus, Group G6 satisfies the invariant. We conclude that Invariant 4 is satisfied by our inference
rules.
Definition 27. We say that a constraint ctr′ has type (1), (1′),(2),(2′) or (3) for a variable X if
ctr′ = (t ∈ Forge(E,K)) where X ≤ t, (1)
or ctr′ = (t ∈ Forgec(E,K)) where X ≤ t, (1
′)
or ctr′ = (t ∈ Sub(u, E, E ,K)) where X ≤ t (2)
or ctr′ = (t ∈ Subd(u, E, E ,K)) where X ≤ t (2
′)
or ctr′ = (u = v) where X ≤ u or X ≤ v (3)
Invariant 5. For any rule r in SR except Rules 26 and 27 (ie. Rules of the phase 1), ∀X ∈ X ∪ XI s.t
L(X) = Ei−1, if pre(r) contains a constraint of type (1), (1
′), (2), (2′) or (3) for X then ∀B ∈ post(r), B
contains a constraint of type (1), (1′), (2), (2′) or (3) for X.
Proof. Rules 3, 14, 20,22, 32 eliminate the whole block. Then the invariant is valid. Rules 1, 2, 4, 5 and 8 do
not change constraints. Then, the invariant remains valid.
In Rule 6 and 7, constraints for other variables than Yj do not change. For Yj , there exists a constraint of type
(3). Thus, the invariant still holds.
For Rule 9, we obtain either a constraint of type (1′) or a constraint pf type (2) for X. For Rules 10, 11, 12
and 13, the term t is decomposed. We obtain as a result, a constraint of type (1) for X. We conclude that
Forge constraints validate the invariant.
For Rule 15, we obtain either a constraint of type (3) or a constraint of type (2′) for X. For Rules 16, 17, 18
and 19, the term t is decomposed. We obtain as a result, a constraint of type (2) for X. We conclude that
Sub constraints validate the invariant.
In Rules 21 and 25, pre(r) does not contain a constraint of type (1), (1′),(2),(2′) or (3) for X. For Rules 23
and 24, the term t is decomposed. We obtain as a result, a constraint of type (3) for X. We conclude that
Equality constraints validate the invariant.
For Rule 28, (Xi ∈ Forgec(E,K)) is tranformed to (u ∈ Forgec(E,K)) but it still exists a constraint of type
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(3) for Xi which is (Xi = u)

. The same reason is valid for Rule 29. In Rule 30, there is a constraint of type
(1′) for A. We conclude that rules for interleaving in the same block preserve the invariant.
Rules 33 and 34 preserve the same constraint given in pre(r). Rule 35 uses the same terms in equality
constraints. Then, it transforms a constraint of type (3) for variables in v or Xm into other constraints of the
same type. We conclude that rules for interleaving in different blocks preserve the invariant.
Proposition 1. At the end of Phase 1 in the computation of CBSi, for all X ∈ X ∪XI , for all blocks B there
is a constraint ctr ∈ B such that ctr = (X ∈ Forgec(E,K)) or ctr = (X = u).
Proof. We first introduce the following claim:
Claim 1. ∀ctr in the computation of some CBSi at phase 1, ∀X ∈ X ∪XI s.t L(X) = Ei−1, if ctr = (Y = u)
and X ≤ u then L(Y ) < L(X).
Proof. We show by contradiction that if ctr = (Y = u) and X ≤ u then L(Y ) < L(X). Let ctr = (Y = u) such
that L(Y ) = L(X). Consider a derivation d = d′j .Lj .dj such that (Y = u) ∈ post(Lj). Then, ∃l < j such that
(u′ = v′) ∈ post(Ll) where Y ≤ v
′ and u ≤ u′ and pre(Ll) 6= (u” = v”) where u
′ < u” and v′ < v”. (u′ = v′) is
obtained either by transforming a Sub constraint to an Equality one by Rule 15, or by interleavings (Rule 35).
Note that Rules 33 and 34 generates equality contraints bu not suitable for our case since they may not contain
X since they are in E and L(X) = Ei−1.
1. Case pre(Ll) = (u
′ ∈ Sub(v′, E, E ,K)).
Since X < u′, L(X) = Ei−1 and we compute CBSi, according to Invariant 4, we have L(Y ) ⊂ L(X) which
contradicts the hypothesis: L(Y ) = L(X). The same reasoning is valid if pre(Ll) = (v
′ ∈ Sub(u′, E, E ,K)).
2. case Ll = R 35, then pre(Ll) = (Xm = u
′) and as master constraint we have (Xi = v
′). Since we are
in the first phase, that is before labeling master or submaster constraints for variables of level Ei−1, then
L(v′) ⊂ Ei−1. Since L(X) = Ei−1 and Y < v
′ then L(Y ) ⊂ L(X) which is in contradiction with our
hypothesis L(Y ) = L(X).
Note that at the end of Phase 1 in the computation of CBSi, we only have solved constraints (Hypothesis
H1). We show by contradiction that there exists a constraint ctr for X in each block of the constraint system S.
Let B be a block of S such that ∄ctr ∈ B for X (Hypothesis H2). According to Invariant 5, ∃ctr′ ∈ B such that
ctr′ has type (1), (1′), (2), (2′) or (3) for X. There are five cases. In the first one, ctr′ = (t ∈ Forge(E,K))
where X < t, otherwise (when t ∈ X ∪ XI) ctr = ctr
′ which is in contradiction with hypothesis H1. Then,
Rule 9 may be applied which is in contradiction with hypothesis H1.
In the second case, ctr′ = (t ∈ Forgec(E,K)) where X < t. Then, Rules 10, 11, 12 and 13 may be applied
which is in contradiction with hypothesis H1.
In the third case, ctr′ = (t ∈ Sub(u, E, E ,K)) where X ≤ t. Then, Rule 15 may be applied which contradicts
hypothesis H1. In the fourth case, ctr
′ = (t ∈ Subd(u, E, E ,K)) where X ≤ t. There are two cases. In the first
one, u /∈ X ∪ XI . Then, Rules 16, 17, 18, 19 and 20 may be applied what contradicts hypothesis H1. In the
second case, u = Y ∈ X ∪ XI . Then, according to Invariant 4, we have L(Y ) ⊂ L(X). Thus, ∃ctr3 ∈ E such
that ctr3 = (Y ∈ Forge(E3,K
′)) or ctr3 = (Y = u3) (by construction of E). Therefore, Rules 31, 32 and 33
may be applied which contradicts hypothesis H1. In the fifth case, ctr
′ = (u = v) where X ≤ v or X ≤ u.
There are two cases. In the first one, u /∈ X ∪XI . Then, Rules 22, 23 and 24 may be applied what contradicts
hypothesis H1. In the second case, u ∈ X ∪ XI . If u = X then ctr
′ = ctr which contradicts hypothesis H2.
If u = Y and X ≤ v then according to Claim 1, L(Y ) ⊂ L(X). Then, ∃ctr” ∈ E for Y and therefore Rules 27
and 35 may be applied which contradicts hypothesis H1.
Corollary 1. At the end of every phase, for every block B, ∀Xi ∈ XI , there exists a single master constraint
(ctr)m ∈ B such that ctr = (Xi ∈ Forgec(E,K)) or ctr = (Xi = u).
Proof. For Phase 1 this is an immediate consequence of Proposition 1. The unicity of the master constraint is
guaranteed by the condition B ∩M(
−→
X ) = ∅ of Rule 4. At the begining of Phase 2, for a block B, ∀Xi ∈ XI ,
there exists a single constraint (ctr)m ∈ B such that ctr = (Xi ∈ Forgec(E,K)) or ctr = (Xi = u) since
Invariant 1 is preserved by Phase 1.
According to Invariant 2, our system of rules preserve constraints for Xi (Forge or Equality constraints for
Xi) which are potential master constraints for Xi. Our rules never eliminate a master constraint for a variable.
They can change a master constraint for a variable after introducing new candidate constraints (Equality
constraints for the variable). This is managed by Rule 5. Rule 5 labels a new master constraint for
−→
X
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(Xj = u) while eliminating the label of the old master constraint. Thus, in that case we still have a single
master constraint for
−→
X .
Corollary 2. At the end of every phase, for every block B, ∀X ∈ X , there exists a constraint ctr ∈ B such
that ctr = (X ∈ Forgec(E,K)) or ctr = (X = u).
Proof. The proof follows directly from Proposition 1 and Invariant 2.
6.2 Correctness and Completeness of Rules
We prove correctness and completeness of each rule of our system for an index substitution τ and a value e for
n. Correctness and completeness of Rules 1, 6, 7, 21 and 22 is trivial. For Rules 4, 5 and 8, since the semantics
of a constraint is the same with or without the label, and since these rules only modify labels then they are
complete and correct.
Proposition 2. Rule 2 is correct and complete.
Proof.
σ ∈ |[ (X = u)sm ∧ (Y = X) ]|eτ iff X
e
τσ = ueτσ ∧ Y
e
τσ = X
e
τσ iff
X
e
τσ = ueτσ ∧ Y
e
τσ = ueτσ iff σ ∈ |[ (X = u)sm ∧ (Y = u) ]|eτ
Proposition 3. Rule 3 is correct and complete.
Proof. Let B be a block with (X = u) ∈ B, Y < u, and Y ⊏X in B. Then, ∀τ , ∀e, ∀σ ∈ |[B ]|eτ , we have
Y
e
τσ < X
e
τσ thanks to Y ⊏X and Y
e
τσ < X
e
τσ thanks to Y < u and (X = u) ∈ B. This is impossible,
and therefore, |[B ]|eτ = |[⊥ ]|
e
τ
Correctness and completeness of Rule 9 follows from Propositions 4 and 5 below.
Proposition 4.
|[B ∧ t ∈ Forge(E,K) ]|eτ ⊆
∣
∣
[
(B ∧ t ∈ Forgec(E,K)) ∨
∨
w∈E(B ∧ t ∈ Sub(w, E, E ,K))
]∣
∣
e
τ
.
Proof. Let σ ∈ |[B ∧ t ∈ Forge(E,K) ]|eτ . Then, σ ∈ |[B ]|
e
τ ∩ |[ t ∈ Forge(E,K) ]|
e
τ . But, |[ t ∈ Forge(E,K) ]|
e
τ =
|[ t ∈ Forgec(E,K) ]|
e
τ ∪ (|[ t ∈ Forge(E,K) ]|
e
τ\|[ t ∈ Forgec(E,K) ]|
e
τ ). Thus, we will prove that ∃w ∈ E s.t.
σ ∈ |[ t ∈ Sub(w, E, E ,K) ]|eτ if σ ∈ (|[ t ∈ Forge(E,K) ]|
e
τ\|[ t ∈ Forgec(E,K) ]|
e
τ ). We first prove some lemmas.
We will prove this proposition by using the following lemma that follows from Proposition 2 from [RT03].
Lemma 6. Let t ∈ Dy(E,K) and γ ∈ Dyc(E,K) be given with Dγ(E) ∈ NRD. Then, there is a derivation
D′t(E) ∈ NRD verifying Ld(γ) /∈ D
′.
Proof. The proof is exactly the same as mentioned in [RT03] with the difference that Dγ(E) is not a minimal
derivation but rather a non-redundant derivation. The proof remains valid as we have no useless rules in Dγ(E)
since it is a non-redundant derivation. Moreover, D′t(E) as it is constructed in [RT03] is a general derivation.
However, according to Remark 1, there exists an equivalent non-redundant derivation for D′t(E).
In our context, Lemma 6 says that for any term t, a set of terms E, a set of terms K and a variable
X ∈ X ∪XI , and for any e, τ and σ, if t
e
τσ ∈ Dy(Eτσ,K
e
τσ) and Xτσ ∈ Dyc(E
e
τσ,K
e
τσ) then there exists
a derivation D′ building t
e
τσ from E
e
τσ where Xτσ is never decomposed. This can be easily generalized from
singleton {X} to any set of variables instead of X.
Lemma 7. If t
e
τσ ∈ Dyd(E
e
τσ,K
e
τσ), then there exists w ∈ E s.t. t
e
τσ6LFσw
eτσ with Fσ ⊆ Dy(E
e
τσ,K
e
τσ),
K
e
τσ ∩ Fσ = ∅ and ∀X, if Xτσ ∈ L then Xτσ /∈ Dyc(E
e
τσ,K
e
τσ).
Proof. Assume that t
e
τσ ∈ Dyd(E
e
τσ,K
e
τσ). Then thanks to the Lemma 6 iterated as described above, there
exists a derivation D from E
e
τσ to t
e
τσ such that ∀X, if Ld(Xτσ) ∈ D then Xτσ /∈ Dyc(E
e
τσ,K
e
τσ).
Moreover, t
e
τσ /∈ Dyc(E
e
τσ,K
e
τσ) by definition of t
e
τσ ∈ Dyd(E
e
τσ,K
e
τσ), and thus, that D ends with
a decomposition rule. Now, by iteration on the length of D starting from this last decomposition, and fol-
lowing the same idea as Lemma 2 in [RT03], we see that there exists w′ ∈ Eτσ such that t
e
τσ 6LFσ w
′ with
Fσ ⊆ Dy(E
e
τσ,K
e
τσ), K
e
τσ ∩Fσ = ∅ and ∀X, if Xτσ ∈ L then Xτσ /∈ Dyc(E
e
τσ,K
e
τσ). This is the term
in Eτσ which is decomposed down to t
e
τσ without using any term of K
e
τσ as a key for decryption. Finally,
there exists w ∈ E s.t. wτσ = w′ necessarily, and the lemma follows.
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Now we can finish the proof of Proposition 4. Since t
e
τσ ∈ Dyd(E
e
τσ,K
e
τσ) thanks to Lemma 7, there
exists w ∈ E such that t
e
τσ 6LFσ w
eτσ with Fσ ⊆ Dy(E
e
τσ,K
e
τσ), K
e
τσ∩Fσ = ∅ and ∀X, if Xτσ ∈ L then
Xτσ /∈ Dyc(E
e
τσ,K
e
τσ). We prove that If t
e
τσ 6LFσ w
eτσ without any Xτσ ∈ L such that Xτσ ∈ Dyc(E
e
τσ,K
e
τσ)
and with Fσ ⊆ Dy(E
e
τσ,K
e
τσ) and K
e
τσ∩Fσ = ∅, then σ ∈ |[ t ∈ Sub(w, E, E ,K) ]|eτ by recurrence over (l, d)
with l the length of t
e
τσ 6LFσ w
eτσ and d = 1 if w ∈ X ∪ XI , otherwise 0.
Base case: Assume that l = 0 and an arbitrary d. Then t
e
τσ = weτσ, and thus σ ∈ |[ t ∈ Sub(w, E, E ,K) ]|eτ
according to the semantics of Sub.
Induction step: Assume that the formula above is true for any instance strictly smaller than (l, d), with
l ≥ 1. We have two cases:
-Either w /∈ X ∪XI , and thus there exists a direct subterm w
′ of w, and there exist G, H, L1, L2 such that
t
e
τσ 6L1G w
′eτσ 6L2H w
eτσ, with G ∪H ⊆ Dy(E
e
τσ,K
e
τσ) and the length of t
e
τσ 6L1G w
′eτσ strictly smaller
than l. Therefore, σ ∈ |[ t ∈ Sub(w′, E, E ,K) ]|eτ , and thus σ ∈ |[ t ∈ Sub(w, E, E ,K) ]|
e
τ according to the semantics
of Sub.
-Or w = X for some X ∈ X ∪XI , and thus Xτσ /∈ Dyc(E
e
τσ,K
e
τσ) since l ≥ 1 and therefore Xτσ ∈ L.
Indeed, according to corollaries 1 and 2 and by construction of E we know that either ∃v /∈ X ∪ XI s.t.
(X = v) ∈ E , and Xτσ = veδτσ or Xτσ ∈ Dyc(E
e
τσ,K
e
τσ). However, the latter is impossible since we
already have Xτσ /∈ Dyc(E
e
τσ,K
e
τσ). Therefore, we have t
e
τσ 6LFσ v
eτσ since weτσ = Xτσ = veτσ.
It follows by induction that σ ∈ |[ t ∈ Sub(v, E, E ,K) ]|eτ since v /∈ X ∪ XI and (l, 0) < (l, 1). Thus, σ ∈
|[ t ∈ Sub(w, E, E ,K) ]|eτ thanks to the second case in the definition of Sub.
Proposition 5.
∣
∣
[
(B ∧ t ∈ Forgec(E,K)) ∨
∨
w∈E(B ∧ t ∈ Sub(w, E, E ,K))
]∣
∣
e
τ
⊆ |[B ∧ t ∈ Forge(E,K) ]|eτ .
Proof. In order to prove Proposition 5, we need to prove Lemma 8. To do this, we first prove Proposition 6:
Proposition 6. If σ ∈ |[ t ∈ Sub(X, E, E ,K) ]|eτ , then, either t
e
τσ = Xτσ or ∃v, δ, k, τ ′ such that k /∈ {t, X, E},
Xτσ = veδτ ′σ, vδ /∈ X ∪ XI and σ ∈ |[ t ∈ Sub(vδ, E, E ,K) ]|
e
τ ′ .
Proof. Since σ ∈ |[ t ∈ Sub(X, E, E ,K) ]|eτ , then, ∃u ∃F,L s.t u 6
L
F X
e
τ , K
e
τσ ∩ Fσ = ∅, Fσ ⊆ Dy(E
e
τσ,K
e
τσ).
However, since X ∈ X ∪ XI , then, u =X
e
τ . Besides, we have the two cases of the semantics of Sub. In the
first one, uσ = t
e
τσ. Then, X
e
τσ = t
e
τσ and therefore Proposition 6 holds. In the second case, ∃v, δ, k, τ ′ such
that k /∈ {t, X, E}, Xτσ = veδτ ′σ and σ ∈ |[ t ∈ Sub(vδ, E, E ,K) ]|eτ ′ . However, by construction of E , v /∈ X ∪XI
which concludes the proof.
Lemma 8. If σ ∈ |[ t ∈ Sub(w, E, E ,K) ]|eτ , then, t
e
τσ ∈ Dyd(E
e
τσ ∪ {weτσ},K
e
τσ).
Proof. We proceed by recurrence over |weτσ|.
Base case: |weτσ| = 1. Then, either w ∈ C ∪ CI or w ∈ X ∪ XI . If w ∈ C ∪ CI , then, w
eτσ = t
e
τσ.
Thus, t
e
τσ ∈ Dyd(E
e
τσ ∪ {weτσ},K
e
τσ). If w = X ∈ X ∪ XI , and since σ ∈ |[ t ∈ Sub(w, E, E ,K) ]|
e
τ , then,
according to Proposition 6, we have either (1) or (2) where:
(1) ∃v, δ, k, τ ′ s.t k /∈ {t, X, E}, Xτσ = veδτ ′σ, vδ /∈ X ∪ XI and σ ∈ |[ t ∈ Sub(vδ, E, E ,K) ]|
e
τ ′
(2) t
e
τσ = Xτσ
If (1) then vδ ∈ C ∪ CI since |v
eδτ ′σ| = |weτσ| = 1. However, veδτ ′σ = t
e
τ ′σ and t
e
τ ′σ = t
e
τσ
since k, i /∈ V arI(t) and Dom(τ
′) = Dom(τ) ∪ {k, i} (by definition of the semantics of Sub). Therefore,
t
e
τσ ∈ Dyd(E
e
τσ ∪ {weτσ},K
e
τσ) since veδτσ = t
e
τσ = weτσ.
If (2) then since w = X, we have t
e
τσ ∈ Dyd(E
e
τσ ∪ {weτσ},K
e
τσ).
Induction step: Assume Lemma 8 is true for term of size strictly smaller than |weτσ|.
Since σ ∈ |[ t ∈ Sub(w, E, E ,K) ]|eτ , we have ∃u ∃F,L such that u 6
L
F w
eτ , K
e
τσ ∩ Fσ = ∅, Fσ ⊆ Dy(E
e
τσ,K
e
τσ)
and u,F validate one of the two cases in the definition of Sub constraint solutions:
In the first case, uσ = t
e
τσ and uσ 6LσFσ w
eτσ since u 6LF w
eτ (by iteration over u following the definition
of 6 ). Moreover, we have Fσ ⊆ Dy(E
e
τσ,K
e
τσ), which leads to t
e
τσ ∈ Dyd(E
e
τσ ∪ {weτσ},K
e
τσ).
In the second case, ∃v, δ, k, τ ′ s.t k /∈ V arI(t, w, E), σ ∈ |[ t ∈ Sub(vδ, E, E ,K) ]|
e
τ ′ and uσ = v
eδτ ′σ. We
can suppose that vδ /∈ X ∪ XI . Otherwise, by Proposition 6, there exists another choice for v, δ, k, τ
′ such
that either vδ /∈ X ∪ XI or t
e
τσ = vδτσ. The last case leads to t
e
τσ ∈ Dyd(E
e
τσ ∪ {weτσ},K
e
τσ) since
Fσ ⊆ Dy(E
e
τσ,K
e
τσ) and t
e
τσ 6LσFσ w
eτσ. Thus, assuming that vδ /∈ X ∪ XI , we have two cases.
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• In the first case, u = weτ and then veδτσ = weτσ. If vδ ∈ C ∪ CI then, |v
eδτσ| = 1 which follows
from the initial case of recurrence. Otherwise, ∃w′ such that vδ = f(w′) where f ∈ G. Let F0 = {b} if
vδ = {w′}b and F0 = ∅ otherwise. Note that F0 ⊆ F . Besides, since σ ∈ |[ t ∈ Sub(vδ, E, E ,K) ]|
e
τ ′ , then,
∃u′,∃F ′ such that u′6L
′
F ′ vδ
e
τ ′, K
e
τ ′σ ∩ F ′σ = ∅, F ′σ ⊆ Dy(E
e
τ ′σ,K
e
τ ′σ) and the two possibilities for
u′. We have two cases: u′= vδ
e
τ ′ or u′<L
′
F ′ vδ
e
τ ′.
In the first case, since vδ /∈ X ∪ XI , vδ
e
τ ′σ = t
e
τ ′σ = t
e
τσ. Then, weτσ = t
e
τσ and therefore it follows
that t
e
τσ ∈ Dyd(E
e
τσ ∪ {weτσ},K
e
τσ).
In the second case, u′6L
′
F ′ w
′eτ ′<L
′
F0
e
τ ′
vδ
e
τ ′. Then, σ ∈ |[ t ∈ Sub(w′, E, E ,K) ]|eτ ′ .
Since
∣
∣
∣
w′
e
τ ′σ
∣
∣
∣
< |weτσ|, it follows that t
e
τ ′σ ∈ Dyd(E
e
τσ ∪ {w′
e
τ ′σ},K
e
τ ′σ).
Note that E
e
τ ′ = E
e
τ = E
e
.
Besides, w′
e
τ ′σ ∈ Dyd(E
e
τσ ∪ {weτσ},K
e
τσ) since w′
e
τ ′σ <L
′σ
F0
e
τ ′σ
vδ
e
τ ′σ , vδ
e
τ ′σ = weτσ, K
e
τ ′σ ∩ F0
e
τ ′σ =
∅ and F0
e
τ ′σ ⊆ Dy(E
e
τσ,K
e
τσ) (F0
e
τ ′ ⊆ F ′).
Thus, t
e
τσ ∈ Dyd(E
e
τσ ∪ {weτσ},K
e
τσ).
• In the second case, veδτ ′σ <LσFσ w
eτσ and t
e
τσ ∈ Dyd(E
e
τσ ∪ {veδτ ′σ},K
e
τσ) since |veδτ ′σ| < |weτσ|.
Besides, veδτ ′σ ∈ Dyd(E
e
τσ ∪ {weτσ},K
e
τσ) thanks to the definition 6 and since veδτ ′σ <LσFσ w
eτσ,
K
e
τ ′σ ∩ Fσ = ∅ and Fσ ⊆ Dy(E
e
τσ,K
e
τσ). Thus, t
e
τσ ∈ Dyd(E
e
τσ ∪ {weτσ},K
e
τσ).
Let us go back to the proof of Proposition 5.
Let σ ∈
∣
∣
[
(B ∧ (t ∈ Forgec(E,K)) ∨
∨
w∈E(B ∧ t ∈ Sub(w, E, E ,K))
]
∣
∣
e
τ
.
If σ ∈ |[B ∧ t ∈ Forgec(E,K) ]|
e
τ then σ ∈ |[B ∧ t ∈ Forge(E,K) ]|
e
τ by definition of Forge and Forgec. Let
σ ∈
∣
∣
[
∨
w∈EB ∧ t ∈ Sub(w, E, E ,K)
]∣
∣
e
τ
. Then, ∃w ∈ E such that σ ∈ |[ t ∈ Sub(w, E, E ,K) ]|eτ∩|[B ]|
e
τ . According
to Lemma 8, t
e
τσ ∈ Dyd(E
e
τσ ∪ {weτσ},K
e
τσ). However, weτσ ∈ E
e
τσ. Thus, t
e
τσ ∈ Dyd(E
e
τσ, t
e
τσ).
Thus, Proposition 5 follows.
Proposition 7. Rules 10, 11 and 12 are correct and complete.
Proof. Correctness of Rule 10 is trivial. For the completeness of Rule 10, let σ ∈ |[ 〈t1, . . . , tm〉 ∈ Forgec(E,K) ]|
e
τ .
Then, 〈t1
e
τσ, . . . , tm
e
τσ〉 ∈ Dyc(E
e
τσ,K
e
τσ) since we have 〈t1, . . . , tm〉
e
τσ ∈ Dyc(E
e
τσ,K
e
τσ). By definition
of Dyc, ∃D a derivation with goal 〈t1
e
τσ, . . . , tm
e
τσ〉 without using any term of K
e
τσ as a key for decryption
and ending with a composition rule. Then, subterms of 〈t1
e
τσ, . . . , tm
e
τσ〉 have to be in D, and therefore
∧
i≤m(ti
e
τσ ∈ Dy(E
e
τσ,K
e
τσ)). Finally, the proof of correctness and completeness of Rules 11 and 12 is
similar to the one of Rule 10.
In order to prove Proposition 8, we first prove Lemma 9.
Lemma 9. |[mpair(k, t) ∈ Forgec(E,K) ]|
e
τ = |[∀k t ∈ Forge(E,K) ]|
e
τ
Proof. Let σ ∈ |[mpair(k, t) ∈ Forgec(E,K) ]|
e
τ . Then, mpair(k, t)
e
τσ ∈ Dyc(E
e
τσ,K
e
τσ) leading to 〈τk,1(t)
e
τσ, . . . , τk,e(t)
e
τ
Then, σ ∈ |[∀k t ∈ Forge(E,K) ]|eτ since
∧
i≤e(τk,i(t)
e
τσ ∈ Dy(E
e
τσ,K
e
τσ)).
Proposition 8. Rule 13 is correct and complete.
Proof. According to our semantics, we have : |[∀Q ∃R S ∨ (B ∧mpair(k, t) ∈ Forge(E,K)) ]|e
=
⋂
Q
⋃
R|[S ∨ (B ∧mpair(k, t) ∈ Forge(E,K)) ]|
e
τ
=
⋂
Q
⋃
R|[S ]|
e
τ ∪ (|[B ]|
e
τ ∩ |[mpair(k, t) ∈ Forge(E,K) ]|
e
τ )
=
⋂
Q
⋃
R|[S ]|
e
τ ∪ (|[B ]|
e
τ ∩ |[∀kt ∈ Forge(E,K) ]|
e
τ ) (according to Lemma 9)
=
⋂
Q
⋃
R
⋂
k|[S ]|
e
τ ′ ∪ (|[B ]|
e
τ ′ ∩ |[ t ∈ Forge(E,K) ]|
e
τ ′) (since k fresh, τ
′ = τ.[k ← nk])
=
⋂
Q
⋂
k
⋃
R|[S ]|
e
τ ′ ∪ (|[B ]|
e
τ ′ ∩ |[ t ∈ Forge(E,K) ]|
e
τ ) (thanks to mpair autonomy)
=
⋂
Q.k
⋃
R|[S ∨ (B ∧ t ∈ Forge(E,K)) ]|
e
τ
= |[∀Q.k ∃R S ∨ (B ∧ t ∈ Forge(E,K)) ]|eτ
Correctness and completeness of Rule 14 is trivial. Completeness and correctness of Rule 15 follow from
Proposition 9 and Proposition 10.
Proposition 9. Rule 15 is complete.
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Proof. Let σ ∈ |[ t ∈ Sub(w, E, E ,K) ]|eτ and W = |[ (t = w) ∨ (t ∈ Subd(w, E, E ,K)) ]|
e
τ . We show that either
σ ∈ |[ (t = w) ]|eτ if w = {v}b and b ∈ K or σ ∈ W otherwise. We know that ∃u, ∃F,L such that u 6
L
F w
eτ ,
K
e
τσ ∩ Fσ = ∅, Fσ ⊆ Dy(E
e
τσ,K
e
τσ) and the two cases of the semantics of the Sub. We distinguish two
cases depending whether (w = {v}b and b ∈ K) or not:
• (w = {v}b and b ∈ K). By definition of < , we have w
eτ ∈ L and b
e
∈ F , However, K
e
τσ ∩ Fσ = ∅.
Thus, u 6LF w
eτ leads to u = weτ . We can suppose that w /∈ X ∪ XI , otherwise u6
L
F w leads to
u<LF w. Therefore, we only have the first case of the semantic of Sub that is uσ = t
e
τσ which leads to
weτσ = t
e
τσ.
• (w 6= {v}b or b /∈ K). Then, we have the two cases of the semantics of Sub:
– In the first case, uσ = t
e
τσ. Moreover, u 6LF w
eτ . Then, either u <LF w
eτ which leads to σ ∈
|[ (t ∈ Subd(w, E, E ,K)) ]|
e
τ or u =w
eτ . In the last case, we have uσ =weτσ. However, uσ = t
e
τσ.
Then, weτσ = t
e
τσ which leads to σ ∈ |[ (t = w) ]|eτ . Thus, for both cases, σ ∈W .
– The second case is the same for the semantics of Sub or Subd. Therefore σ ∈ W since σ ∈
|[ t ∈ Subd(w, E, E ,K) ]|
e
τ .
Thus Rule 15 is complete.
Proposition 10. Rule 15 is correct.
Proof. There are two cases whether (w = {v}b and b ∈ K) or not:
• Suppose (w = {v}b and b ∈ K). Let σ ∈ |[ (t = w) ]|
e
τ . Then, w
eτσ = t
e
τσ. Let u = weτ . We have
u 6∅∅ w
eτ , ∅ ⊆ Dy(E
e
τσ, ∅) and uσ = weτσ = t
e
τσ. Thus, σ ∈ |[ (t ∈ Sub(w, E, E ,K)) ]|eτ .
• Suppose (w 6= {v}b or b /∈ K). Let σ ∈ |[ (t = w) ∨ (t ∈ Subd(w, E, E ,K)) ]|
e
τ . There are two cases:
– σ ∈ |[ (t = w) ]|eτ . We show in a similar way as the first case (w = {v}b and b ∈ K) that σ ∈
|[ (t ∈ Sub(w, E, E ,K)) ]|eτ .
– σ ∈ |[ (t ∈ Subd(w, E, E ,K)) ]|
e
τ . By definition of Subd (the same as Sub with the difference that
u <LF w
eτ if uσ = t
e
τσ) and since if u <LF w
eτ then we have u 6LF w
eτ , then σ ∈ |[ (t ∈ Sub(w, E, E ,K)) ]|eτ .
Thus Rule 15 is correct.
Proposition 11. Rule 16 is correct and complete.
Proof. Let W = |[
∨
i=1...m(t ∈ Sub(ti, E, E ,K)) ]|
e
τ
.
Let σ ∈ |[ t ∈ Subd(〈t1, .., tm〉, E, E ,K) ]|
e
τ . Then, ∃u, ∃F,L such that u <
L
F 〈t1, .., tm〉
e
τ , K
e
τσ ∩ Fσ = ∅,
Fσ ⊆ Dy(E
e
τσ,K
e
τσ) and the two possibilities for u (the two cases of the semantics of Sub). Then ∃i = 1 . . . m.
such that u 6LF ti
e
τ <
〈t1,..,tm〉
e
τ
∅ 〈t1, .., tm〉
e
τ since u <LF 〈t1, .., tm〉
e
τ . Thus, σ ∈W .
Let σ ∈ W . Let i = 1 . . . m such that σ ∈ |[ (t ∈ Sub(ti, E, E ,K)) ]|
e
τ . Then, ∃u, ∃F,L such that u 6
L
F ti
e
τ ,
K
e
τσ ∩ Fσ = ∅, Fσ ⊆ Dy(E
e
τσ,K
e
τσ) and the two possibilities for u (the two cases of the semantics of
Sub). Moreover, since ti <∅ 〈t1, .., tm〉, then ti
e
τ <
〈t1,..,tm〉
e
τ
∅ 〈t1, .., tm〉
e
τ . Then, u <
L∪{〈t1,..,tm〉
e
τ}
F 〈t1, .., tm〉
e
τ
and K
e
τσ ∩ Fσ = ∅ which leads to σ ∈ |[ t ∈ Subd(〈t1, .., tm〉, E, E ,K) ]|
e
τ .
Proposition 12. Rules 17 and 18 are correct and complete.
Proof. First focus on Rule 17. Let W = |[ t ∈ Sub(w, E, E ,K) ∧ b ∈ Forge(E,K ∪ {b}) ]|eτ .
Let σ ∈ |[ t ∈ Subd({w}
s
b, E, E ,K) ]|
e
τ
. Then, ∃u, ∃F,L s.t u <LF {w}
s
b
e
τ , K
e
τσ ∩ Fσ = ∅, Fσ ⊆ Dy(E
e
τσ,K
e
τσ)
and the two possibilities for u (the two cases of the semantics of Sub). Since u <LF {w}
s
b
e
τ , then u 6LF w
eτ <
{w}s
b
e
τ
b
e
τ
{w}sb
e
τ .
Thus, σ ∈ |[ t ∈ Sub(w, E, E ,K) ]|eτ . Moreover, since u <
L
F {w}
s
b
e
τ , then b
e
τ ∈ F , and therefore b
e
τσ ∈ Dy(E
e
τσ,K
e
τσ).
By minimality of the derivation of goal b
e
τσ, b
e
τσ has not to be used as a key for a decryption and then
b
e
τσ ∈ Dy(E
e
τσ,K ∪ {b}
e
τσ). Thus, σ ∈ |[ b ∈ Forge(E,K ∪ {b}) ]|eτ . Therefore, σ ∈W .
Let σ ∈ W . Let σ ∈ |[ t ∈ Sub(w, E, E ,K) ]|eτ . Then, ∃u, ∃F,L such that u 6
L
F w
eτ , K
e
τσ ∩ Fσ =
∅, Fσ ⊆ Dy(E
e
τσ,K
e
τσ) and the two possibilities for u (the two cases of the semantics of Sub). Be-
sides, since weτ <
{{w}s
b
e
τ}
b
e
τ
{w}sb
e
τ , we have u <
L∪{{w}s
b
e
τ}
F∪{b
e
τ}
{w}sb
e
τ . However, b /∈ K (du to the condition of
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Rule 15). Then, Fσ ∩ ({b
e
τσ} ∪ K
e
τσ) = ∅. Moreover, since σ ∈ |[ b ∈ Forge(E,K ∪ {b}) ]|eτ , we have
b
e
τσ ∈ Dy(E
e
τσ,K ∪ b
e
τσ). Then, b
e
τσ ∈ Dy(E
e
τσ,K
e
τσ), and therefore Fσ ∪ {b
e
τσ} ⊆ Dy(E
e
τσ,K
e
τσ).
Thus, σ ∈ |[ t ∈ Subd({w}
s
b, E, E ,K) ]|
e
τ
.
Finally, correctness and completeness of Rule 18 is similar as Rule 17.
Proposition 13. Rule 19 is correct and complete.
Proof. First focus on completeness. Let σ ∈ |[ t ∈ Subd(mpair(k,w), E, E ,K) ]|
e
τ . Then, ∃u ∃F,L such that
u <LF mpair(k,w)
e
τ , K
e
τσ ∩ Fσ = ∅, Fσ ⊆ Dy(E
e
τσ,K
e
τσ) and the two possibilities for u. Therefore,
u <LF 〈τk,1(w)
e
τσ, . . . , τk,e(w)
e
τσ〉. Then, ∃x ∈ {1, . . . , e} s.t u 6LF τk,1(w)
e
τσ which leads to σ ∈
⋃
x=1...e |[ t ∈ Sub(w, E, E ,K)
Thus, σ ∈ |[∃k (t ∈ Sub(w, E, E ,K)) ]|eτ .
Second, focus on correctness. Let σ ∈ |[∃k (t ∈ Sub(w, E, E ,K)) ]|eτ .
Then, σ ∈
⋃
x=1...e |[ t ∈ Subd(w, E, E ,K) ]|
e
τ,[k←x]. Let x ∈ {1, . . . , e} and τ
′ = τ, [k ← x]. We have σ ∈
|[ t ∈ Subd(w, E, E ,K) ]|
e
τ ′ . Then, ∃u ∃F,L such that u 6
L
F w
eτ ′, K
e
τσ ∩ Fσ = ∅, Fσ ⊆ Dy(E
e
τ ′σ,K
e
τ ′σ) and
the two possibilities for u. However, weτ ′ = τk,x(w)
e
τ . Then, u 6LF τk,x(w)
e
τ <
〈τk,1(w)
e
τ,...,τk,e(w)
e
τ〉
∅ 〈τk,1(w)
e
τ, . . . , τk,e(w)
e
τ〉
Thus, u <
L∪{〈τk,1(w)
e
τσ,...,τk,e(w)
e
τ〉}
F mpair(k,w)
e
τ andK
e
τσ∩Fσ = ∅ which leads to σ ∈ |[ t ∈ Subd(mpair(k, w), E, E ,K) ]|
e
τ .
Proposition 14. Rule 20 is correct and complete.
Proof. Correctness of Rule 20 is trivial. Let σ ∈ |[ t ∈ Subd(c, E, E ,K) ]|
e
τ where c ∈ C ∪ CI . Then, ∃u ∃F,L
such that u <LF c
eτ , K
e
τσ ∪ Fσ = ∅, Fσ ⊆ Dy(E
e
τσ,K
e
τσ) and the two possibilities for u. In the first case,
uσ = t
e
τσ and u <LF c
eτ . However, the last condition is impossible since cτ ∈ C∪CI (c
eτ = cτ), and therefore
u = cτ . In the same way, the second case of Sub treats the case where u ∈ X ∪ XI which is in contradiction
with u = cτ ∈ C ∪ CI . We conclude that in the two cases, we have σ ∈ |[⊥ ]|
e
τ .
Proposition 15. Rule 23 is correct and complete.
Proof. This follows directly from our semantics: σ ∈ |[ f(u1, .., um) = f(w1, .., wm) ]|
e
τ iff f(u1, .., um)
e
τσ =
f(w1, .., wm)
e
τσ iff f(u1
eτσ, .., um
eτσ) = f(w1
eτσ, .., wm
eτσ) iff
∧
i = 1...m(ui
eτσ = wi
eτσ) iff σ ∈ |[
∧
i=1...mui = wi ]|
e
τ
.
In order to prove Proposition 16, we first prove Lemma 10.
Lemma 10. |[mpair(k, u) = mpair(l, w) ]|eτ = |[∀k u = wδl,k ]|
e
τ
Proof.
σ ∈ |[mpair(k, u) = mpair(l, w) ]|eτ iff mpair(k, u)
e
τσ = mpair(l, w)
e
τσ iff
〈τk,1(u)
e
, . . . , τk,v(u)
e
〉τσ = 〈τl,1(w)
e
, . . . , τl,v(w)
e
〉τσ iff
〈τk,1(u)
e
τσ, . . . , τk,v(u)
e
τσ〉 = 〈τl,1(w)
e
τσ, . . . , τl,v(w)
e
τσ〉 iff
∧
i=1,...,e(τk,i(u)
e
τσ = τl,i(w)
e
τσ) iff
∧
i=1,...,e(τk,i(u)
e
τσ = τk,i(wδl,k)
e
τσ) iff
∧
i=1,...,e(u
eττk,iσ = wδl,k
e
ττk,iσ) iff σ ∈
⋂
i=1,...,e |[u = wδl,k ]|
e
τ,τk,i
iff
σ ∈ |[∀k u = wδl,k ]|
e
τ
Proposition 16. Rule 24 is correct and complete.
Proof. According to our definitions, we have: |[∀Q ∃R S ∨ (B ∧ (mpair(k, u) = mpair(l, w))) ]|e
=
⋂
Q
⋃
R|[S ∨ (B ∧ (mpair(k, u) = mpair(l, w))) ]|
e
τ (where τ assigns values to Q and R)
=
⋂
Q
⋃
R(|[S ]|
e
τ ∪ (|[B ]|
e
τ ∩ |[mpair(k, u) = mpair(l, w) ]|
e
τ ))
=
⋂
Q
⋃
R(|[S ]|
e
τ ∪ (|[B ]|
e
τ ∩ |[∀k u = wδl,k ]|
e
τ
)) (according to Lemma 10)
=
⋂
Q
⋃
R
⋂
k(|[S ]|
e
τ ′ ∪ (|[B ]|
e
τ ′ ∩ |[u = wδl,k ]|
e
τ ′
)) (since k is fresh, τ ′ = τ.[k ← nk])
=
⋂
Q
⋂
k
⋃
R(|[S ]|
e
τ ′ ∪ (|[B ]|
e
τ ′ ∩ |[u = wδl,k ]|
e
τ ′
)) (thanks to mpair autonomy, V arI(u)∩R = V arI(w)∩R = ∅))
=
⋂
Q.k
⋃
R(|[S ∨ (B ∧ (u = wδl,k)) ]|
e
τ ′
) = |[∀Q.k ∃R S ∨ (B ∧ (u = wδl,k)) ]|
e
τ
.
Proposition 17. Rule 25 is correct and complete.
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Proof. This follows directly from the fact that each two constants ci and cj are different.
Proposition 18. Rules 26 and 27 are correct and complete.
Proof. Correctness of Rule 26 is trivial. For it’s completeness, let σ ∈
∣
∣
[
B ∧ (Xi = u)
 ∧ (Xi = v)

]∣
∣
e
τ
. Then,
Xiτσ = u
eτσ and Xiτσ = v
eτσ. Thus, σ ∈
∣
∣
[
B ∧ (Xi = u)
 ∧ (Xi = v)
 ∧ u = v
]
∣
∣
e
τ
since ueτσ = veτσ. Also,
correctness and completeness of Rule 27 is similar as Rule 26.
Proposition 19. Rules 28, 29 and 30 are correct and complete.
Proof. First focus on Rule 28. According to our semantics, we have:
σ ∈
∣
∣
[
(Xi = u)
 ∧Xi ∈ Forgec(E
′,K)
]∣
∣
e
τ
iff σ ∈
∣
∣
[
(Xi = u)

]∣
∣
e
τ
∩ |[Xi ∈ Forgec(E
′,K) ]|eτ iff
Xiτσ = u
eτσ and Xiτσ ∈ Dyc(E
e
τσ,K
e
τσ) iff Xiτσ = u
eτσ and ueτσ ∈ Dyc(E
e
τσ,K
e
τσ) iff
σ ∈
∣
∣
[
(Xi = u)
 ∧ u ∈ Forgec(E
′,K)
]∣
∣
e
τ
.
Second, correctness and completeness of Rule 29 follows in a similar way. Moreover, this is trivial for Rule 30 as
it follows direclty from the fact that E ⊂ E′ and since Aτσ ∈ Dyc(E
e
τσ,K
e
τσ), then Aτσ ∈ Dyc(E′
e
τσ,K
e
τσ).
Proposition 20. Rule 31 is correct and complete.
Proof. correctness: Let σ ∈ |[ (X = w)sm ∧ t ∈ Sub(w, E′, E ,K) ∧X /∈ Forgec(E,K) ]|
e
τ . Let u = X, δ = ∅,
τ ′ = τ . Then, uσ = Xσ = weδτ ′σ that leads to uσ /∈ Dyc(E′
e
τσ,K
e
τσ), and σ ∈ |[ t ∈ Sub(wδ, E′, E ,K) ]|eτ ′ .
Moreover, u<∅∅X and ∅ ⊆ Dy(E
′eσ, ∅), thus proving σ ∈ |[ t ∈ Subd(X, E
′, E ,K) ]|eτ according to the definition.
Completeness: let σ ∈ |[ (X = w)sm ∧ t ∈ Subd(X, E
′, E ,K) ]|eτ where (X = w)
sm ∈ E . Let u, F, L be the
objects defined by u6LF X, Fσ ∩ K
e
τσ = ∅ and Fσ ⊆ Dy(E′
e
σ,K
e
σ) in the definition of t ∈ Subd(X, E
′, E ,K).
Since Subd ensures that u<
L
F X in case uσ = t
e
τσ and since u<LF X is impossible, then we have uσ 6= t
e
τσ
and u = X. Thus, u and F validates the second case of the semantics of Sub with u ∈ X , and therefore,
∃v, δ, k, τ ′ such that (X = v) ∈ E , δ = ∅, τ ′ = τ , k, i /∈ {t, X, E}, X /∈ Forgec(E,K), uσ = v
eδτ ′σ and
σ ∈ |[ t ∈ Sub(vδ, E′, E ,K) ]|eτ . However, since (X = u)
sm ∈ E , then we choose v = w which lead to σ ∈
|[ (X = w)sm ∧ t ∈ Sub(w, E′, E ,K) ∧X /∈ Forgec(E,K) ]|
e
τ .
Proposition 21. Rule 32 is correct and complete.
Proof. Correctness of Rule 32 is trivial, so we focus on completeness.
Let σ ∈ |[A ∈ Forgec(E,K) ∧ t ∈ Subd(A, E
′, E ,K) ]|eτ . Let u, F be such that u6
L
F A and Fσ ⊆ Dy(E
′eσ,K
e
σ).
Since Subd ensures that u<
L
F A in case uσ = t
e
τσ and since u<LF A is impossible, then we have uσ 6= t
e
τσ
and u = A. Thus, u and F validates the second case of the semantics of Sub and therefore, ∃v, δ, k, τ ′
such that uσ /∈ Dyc(E′
e
τ ′σ,K
e
τ ′σ). Nevertheless, uσ = Aσ. Then, Aσ /∈ Dyc(E′
e
σ,K
e
τ ′σ). Moreover,
Aσ ∈ Dyc(E
e
σ,K
e
τ ′σ). However, E ⊆ E′. Indeed, according to Invariant 3, L(A) ⊆ E′. Then, either
L(A) = E or L(A) ⊆ E. In the last case, there are two possibilities. In the first one, A ∈ Forgec(E,K) would
be simplified to A ∈ Forgec(L(A),K) if at level L(A) we have A ∈ Forgec(L(A),K) as constraint for A. In
the second possibility, A ∈ Forgec(E,K) would be eliminated if at level L(A) we have A = u as constraint
for A. This is due to the fact that for the level L(A) we have a constraint Forge or Equality according to
the Proposition 1. We conclude that E ⊆ E′. Therfore, Aσ /∈ Dyc(E′
e
σ,K
e
τ ′σ) and Aσ ∈ Dyc(E′
e
σ,K
e
τ ′σ)
proving that σ ∈ |[⊥ ]|eτ .
Proposition 22. Rule 33 is correct and complete.
Proof. Completeness: if σ ∈ |[ t ∈ Subd(Xm, E
′, E ,K) ]|eτ , then ∃(Xj = v) ∈ E , ∃k /∈ {t, Xm, E}, ∃nk s.t. τ
′ =
τ.[k ← nk], σ ∈ |[ t ∈ Sub(vδ, E
′, E ,K) ]|eτ ′ , σ ∈ |[Xm = vδ ]|
e
τ ′ and σ /∈ |[Xm ∈ Forgec(E
′,K) ]|eτ ′ , with δ = δ
k
j,m.
To show this, let u, F, L be the u 6LF Xmτ , Fσ ∩ K
e
τσ = ∅ and Fσ ⊆ Forge(E′
e
τσ,K
e
τσ) from the semantics
of Subd proving that σ ∈ |[ t ∈ Subd(Xm, E
′, E ,K) ]|eτ ′ . Note that Subd is more restrictive than Sub in the sence
that it ensures u <LF Xmτ in case uσ = t
e
τσ. However u <LF Xmτ is impossible, so uσ 6= t
e
τσ and u = Xmτ
necessarily. This means that u, F validate the second case of the semantics of Sub, and thus that ∃v, δ, k, i, j, τ ′
s.t. k, i /∈ {t, Xm, E}, Dom(τ
′) = Dom(τ)∪{k, i}, u = Xiτ
′, (Xj = v) ∈ E , δ = δ
k
j,i, uσ /∈ Forgec(E
′eτσ,K
e
τσ),
uσ = veδτ ′σ, and σ ∈ |[ t ∈ Sub(vδ, E′, E ,K) ]|eτ ′ . We remark that τ(m) = τ
′(i) since Xmτ = u = Xiτ
′, and so
the proposition follows by replacing i by m.
Correctness: if ∃(Xj = v) ∈ E , ∃k /∈ {t, Xm, E}, ∃nk s.t. τ” = τ.[k ← nk], σ ∈ |[ t ∈ Sub(vδ, E
′, E ,K) ]|eτ”,
σ ∈ |[Xm = vδ ]|
e
τ” and σ /∈ |[Xm ∈ Forgec(E
′,K) ]|eτ”, with δ = δ
k
j,m, then σ ∈ |[ t ∈ Subd(Xm, E
′, E ,K) ]|eτ .
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Assume that the precondition above is true for the objects Xj , v, E , k, τ” = τ.[k ← nk]. Let u = Xmτ , thus
uσ = Xmτ”σ, and let i be a fresh index, δ
′ = δkj,i, and let τ
′ = τ”.[i ← τ(m)]. Then we have u = Xiτ
′,
(Xj = v) ∈ E , k, i /∈ {t, Xm, E}, uσ = v
eδ′τ ′σ, uσ /∈ Forgec(E′
e
σ,K
e
σ) and σ ∈ |[ t ∈ Sub(vδ′, E′, E ,K) ]|eτ ′ .
Moreover, we have u 6∅∅Xmτ and ∅ ⊆ Forge(E
e
σ,K
e
σ), thus proving σ ∈ |[ t ∈ Subd(Xm, E
′, E ,K) ]|eτ according
to the definition.
Proposition 23. Rule 34 is correct and complete.
Proof. We first focus on completeness, i.e. assume that σ ∈ |[Xm ∈ Forgec(E
′,K) ]|eτ , and assume we have
M(
−→
X ) defined as in Rule 34. We denote by Rhs the right-hand side of Rule 34. Then we have two cases :
• Either ∃o = 1..p ∃nko s.t. σ ∈ |[Xm = uoδo ]|
e
τ ′ with τ
′ = τ.[k′o ← nko ]. Then, we have uo
eδoτ
′σ = Xmτ
′σ
which leads to uo
eδoτ
′σ ∈ Dyc(E′
e
σ,K
e
σ) and thus, σ ∈ |[Rhs ]|eτ ;
• Or there exists no such o, i.e. ∀o = 1..p, ∀nko , σ /∈ |[Xm = uoδo ]|
e
τ ′ with τ
′ = τ.[k′o ← nko ] i.e.
uo
eδoτ
′σ 6= Xmτ
′σ, and thus σ ∈
∣
∣
∣
[
∧
o=1..p ∀k
′
o Xm 6= uoδo
]∣
∣
∣
e
τ
. Then, σ ∈ |[Rhs ]|eτ ;
Second, for the correctness let Rhs be the right-hand side of Rule 34, and assumeM(
−→
X ) defined as in the rule.
Assume also that σ ∈ |[Rhs ]|eτ because the second part of Rhs is validated (otherwise, the proposition is trivial).
It means that ∃o = 1..p, ∃nko s.t. uo
eδoτ
′ ∈ Dyc(E′
e
σ,K
e
σ) and Xmτ
′σ = uo
eδoτ
′σ with τ ′ = τ.[k′o ← nko ].
It follows that Xmτσ ∈ Dyc(E′
e
σ,K
e
σ) since Xmτ = Xmτ
′.
Proposition 24. Rule 35 is correct and complete.
Proof. Correctness of Rule 35 is trivial. For completeness, assume that σ ∈ |[Xm = v ]|
e
τ , i.e. Xmτσ = v
eτσ,
and M(
−→
X ) according to the definitions of Rule 35. Let us write F = (∀Q∃R B1 ∨ .. ∨ Bs) the whole formula
in which Rule 35 is used, and assume that σ ∈ |[F ]|e. We denote by Rhs the right-hand side of Rule 35. Then
we have two cases :
• Either ∃o = 1..p ∃nko s.t. σ ∈ |[Xm = uoδo ]|
e
τ ′ with τ
′ = τ.[k′o ← nko ]. Then, we have uo
eδoτ
′σ = veτ ′σ
which leads to σ ∈ |[Rhs ]|eτ ;
• Or there exists no such o, i.e. ∀o = 1..p, ∀nko , σ /∈ |[Xm = uoδo ]|
e
τ ′ with τ
′ = τ.[k′o ← nko ] i.e.
uo
eδoτ
′σ 6= Xmτ
′σ, and thus σ ∈
∣
∣
∣
[
∧
o=1..p ∀k
′
o Xm 6= uoδo
]
∣
∣
∣
e
τ
. Moreover, thanks to corollary 1, we
know that for any block in B1 ∨ .. ∨ Bs, there exists a master constraint for
−→
X in this block. Besides,
∃τ” with ∀i ∈ Q τ”(i) = τ ′(m) such that ∃j σ ∈ |[Bj ]|
e
τ”. Thus, σ validates at last one of the master
constraints for
−→
X for τ”. However, by hypothesis ∀o = 1..p, σ /∈ |[Xm 6= uoδo ]|
e
τ”. Thus, ∃r = 1..q such
that σ ∈ |[Xjr ∈ Forgec(E
′
r,Kr) ]|
e
τ”. Since τ”(jr) = τ
′(m) = τ(m), it follows that σ ∈ |[Rhs ]|eτ .
7 Termination For Protocols Without mpair’s and Without Indexed
Variables
This section aims at proving the termination of rules presented in Section 4 for protocols without mpair(, ) and
without index variables. Note that for autonomous protocols without mpair(,s), a constraint system would
contain neither quantifiers, nor indexed variables and consequently no master constraints.
We first define a weight ‖ ‖ for terms, elementary constraints, blocks and constraint systems. Then, we
show that each rule decreases this weight.
In order to define the weight of a term, we need to introduce some definitions:
Definition 28 (Row of a term). A row of a term t is defined as follows:
• r(X) = max{l |X ⊏l Y , Y ∈ X} for X ∈ X
• r(t) = max{r(Y ) |Y < t, Y ∈ X}
Definition 29 (Size of a term t). We define the size of a term t denoted by |t| as follows:
RR n° 6712
28 Chridi & Turuani & Rusinowitch
• |t| = 1 for t ∈ X ∪ C
• |f(u1, .., um)| = 1 + |u1|+ .. + |um|
• |h(u)| = 2 + |u| for h ∈ H
We extend this definition to sets of terms by: |E| = Σt∈E |t| for E ⊂ T .
Now, we can define the weight for terms, then, for elementary constraints and finally for constraint blocks
and constraint system.
Definition 30 (Weight of a term t). Let p be the size of the protocol, i.e. the sum of sizes of messages. We
define the weight of a term t denoted by ‖t‖ as follows:
• ‖X‖ = pr(X) + 1 for X ∈ X
• ‖c‖ = 1 for c ∈ C
• ‖f(u1, .., um)‖ = 1 + ‖u1‖+ .. + ‖um‖
• ‖h(u)‖ = 2 + ‖u‖ for h ∈ H
We extend this definition in the natural way to sets of terms: ‖E‖ = Σt∈E‖t‖ for E ⊂ T .
Definition 31 (Weight of an elementary constraint). Let st be the number of the protocol subterms. We define
the weight of an elementary constraint ctr denoted by ‖ctr‖ as follows:
• ‖t ∈ Forge(E,K)‖ = 〈st−#K, ‖t‖+ ‖E‖+ |E|+ 1〉
• ‖t ∈ Forgec(E,K)‖ = 〈st−#K, ‖t‖+ ‖E‖+ |E|〉
• ‖t ∈ Sub(w, E, E ,K)‖ = 〈st−#K, ‖t‖+ ‖w‖+ |E|+ 1〉
• ‖t ∈ Subd(w, E, E ,K)‖ = 〈st−#K, ‖t‖+ ‖w‖+ |E|〉
• ‖t = u‖ = 〈0, ‖t‖+ ‖u‖〉
Definition 32 (Weight of a constraint block). Let NcE be the maximum number of Equality constraints of
the form X = u where X ∈ X and NcN be the maximum number of Negative constraints of type Forge.
Consider a constraint block: B = ctr1 ∧ ..ctrl. We denote by NcB the number of of negative constraints in
B, ScB the number of submaster constraints in B and by EcB the number of equality constraints of the form
X = u (X ∈ X ) in B. We denote also the lexicographic order by 〈〉 and the multiset by []. We define the
weight of B as follows:
‖B‖ =
〈
NcN −NcB , NcE − ScB , [‖ctri‖]ctri∈B , NcE − EcB
〉
Definition 33 (Weight of a constraint System). Consider a constraint system: S = B1 ∧ ..Bl. We define the
weight of S as follows:
‖S‖ = [‖Bi‖]Bi∈S
Proposition 25. Algorithm 1 terminates for protocols without mpair(, ) and without index variables.
Proof. Proof. We prove Proposition 25 by showing that each rule of Section 4 which is related to non indexed
variables decreases the weight of the whole constraint system S. That is, considering a rule r, ‖post(r)‖ <
‖pre(r)‖. First, note that our rules do not eliminate negative constraints. Then, ∀B ∈ S, NcN −NcB either
remains unchanged or decreases for the case of Rule 31. Thus, Rule 31 decreases ‖S‖. Rules 3, 14, 20, 22, 32
eliminate one block of the constraint system since they lead to ⊥. Then, they decrease ‖S‖. Rule 22 eliminates
one constraint of a certain block of S since they lead to ⊤. Then, it decreases ‖S‖. Rule 1 changes an equality
constraint ctr ∈ B into another one of the form (X = u) where X ∈ X. Both the number of submaster
constraints and the weight of constraints in B remain unchanged. Besides, NcE − EcB decreases since EcB
increases. Then, ‖B‖ decreases and so does ‖S‖.
Rule 8 adds a submaster constraint to a block B ∈ S. Then, ‖S‖ decreases.
For Rule 2, since (X = u)sm ∈ B, ‖X‖ > ‖u‖. Indeed, ‖u‖ ≤ |u| ∗ pmax{r(Y )|Y <u,Y ∈X} ≤ pr(X)+1. Then,
‖Y = X‖ = ‖Y ‖+ ‖X‖ > ‖Y ‖+ ‖u‖ = ‖Y = u‖. Besides, the number of submaster constraints remains un-
changed. Thus, ‖S‖ decreases.
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For Rule 9, ‖pre(R 9)‖ > ‖post(R 9)‖. Indeed, ‖pre(R 9)‖ = 〈k, ‖t‖+ ‖E‖+ |E|+ 1〉 and ‖post(R 9)‖ =
[〈k, ‖t‖+ ‖E‖+ |E|〉, 〈k, ‖t‖+ ‖w‖+ |E|+ 1〉], where k = st − #K and w ∈ E. Moreover, Rule 9 do not
change the number of submaster constraints. Then, ‖S‖ decreases.
For Rule 10, ‖pre(R 10)‖ = 〈k, 1 + ‖t1‖+ .. + ‖tm‖+ ‖E‖+ |E|〉 and ‖post(R 10)‖ = [〈k, ‖ti‖+ ‖E‖+ |E|+ 1〉]ti<〈t1..tm〉,
where k = st − #K. Moreover, Rule 10 do not change the number of submaster constraints. Then,
‖pre(R 10)‖ > ‖post(R 10)‖. Therefore, ‖B‖ decreases and so does ‖S‖.
We show in a similar way as Rule 10 that for Rule 11, ‖S‖ decreases.
For Rule 12, ‖pre(R 12)‖ > ‖post(R 12)‖. Indeed, ‖pre(R 12)‖ = 〈k, 2 + ‖t‖+ ‖E‖+ |E|〉 and ‖post(R 12)‖ =
〈k, 1 + ‖t‖+ ‖E‖+ |E|〉, where k = st−#K. Moreover, Rule 12 do not change the number of submaster con-
straints. Then, ‖B‖ decreases and so does ‖S‖.
For Rule 15, we have ‖pre(R 15)‖ = 〈k, 1 + ‖t‖+ ‖u‖+ |E|〉 and two cases for post(R 15). In the first one,
‖post(R 15)‖ = 〈k, ‖t‖+ ‖u‖〉. In the second case, ‖post(R 15)‖ = [〈k, ‖t‖+ ‖u‖〉, 〈k, ‖t‖+ ‖u‖+ |E|〉]. In
both the two cases, ‖pre(R 15)‖ > ‖post(R 15)‖. Besides, since this rule do not modify the number of sub-
master constraints, ‖S‖ decreases.
We show in a similar way as Rule 10 that for Rule 16, ‖S‖ decreases.
For Rule 17, first, ‖pre(R 17)‖ = 〈k, 1 + ‖t‖+ ‖u‖+ ‖b‖+ |E|〉 where k = st−#K. Second, ‖post(R 17)‖ =
[〈k, 1 + ‖t‖+ ‖u‖+ |E|〉, 〈k′, 1 + ‖b‖+ ‖E‖+ |E|〉] where k′ = st−#K ∪ {{u}pp}. Since k
′ < k, ‖pre(R 17)‖ >
‖post(R 17)‖.
We show in a similar way as Rule 17 that for Rule 18, ‖S‖ decreases.
For Rule 23, first, ‖pre(R 23)‖ = 〈k, 2 + ‖u1‖+ .. + ‖um‖+ ‖w1‖+ .. + ‖wm‖〉. Second, ‖pre(R 23)‖ =
[〈k, ‖ui‖+ ‖wi‖〉]i=1..m where k = st − #K. Then ‖pre(R 23)‖ > ‖post(R 23)‖ and since the number of
submaster constraints remains unchanged, ‖S‖ decreases.
We show in a similar way as Rule 2 that for Rule 27 ‖S‖ decreases since ‖X‖ > ‖u‖ and therefore ‖X = v‖ >
‖u = v‖.
We show in a similar way as Rule 27 that for Rule 29 ‖S‖ decreases since ‖X‖ > ‖u‖ and therefore
‖X ∈ Forgec(E
′,K)‖ > ‖u ∈ Forgec(E
′,K)‖.
Rule 30 eliminates one constraint. Then, ‖S‖ decreases.
8 Termination for Protocols with Autonomous keys
The aim of this section is to prove the termination for our inference system. For this, we need some definitions
of index variables.
Definition 34. (Index Variables)
V arI(t) the set of indexes of t
V arQI (t) the set of universal indexes of t
V arRI (t) the set of existential indexes of t
V arX ,RI (t) =
⋃
Xi 6m t
V arRI (Xi) where Xi ∈ XI
V arC,RI (t) =
⋃
ci 6m t
V arRI (ci) where ci ∈ CI
Then, we introduce some invariants in Section 8.1 that are used in the proofs of termination. The aim
of Section 8.2 is to prove that the set of indexes generated by our inference system is bounded. Once the
set of possible indexes to be generated is fixed, we can prove the termination for protocols with autonomous
keys by defining a weight for terms, constraints, a constraints block and a system constraint as it is given in
Section 8.3.
8.1 Invariants
Invariant 6. For a constraint (t ∈ Sub(t′, E, E ,K)) where ∃Xi ≤ t
′ we have ∀u ≤ t′ s.t Xi 6m u, u is tagged.
For a constraint (u = v) where ∃Xi < u, Yj < v s.t Xi, Yj ∈ XI , we have Xi or Yj is tagged.
Moreover, if Xi 6m u and Yj 6m v then i = j.
This invariant will be used in the proof of Invariant 7, Invariant 8 and Proposition 27.
Proof. The first group manages equality constraints that satisfy the invariant. Indeed, Rule 3 eliminates the
whole block. Then, the invariant is valid. Rules 6 and 7 transform equality rules and generate new ones.
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Nevertheless, these constraints do not fit the shape of constraints defined in Invariant 6, i.e. having two
indexed variables in the two terms forming the equality. The rest or rules of the group G1 does not modify
constraints since they only manage labelling. Thus, the invariant is satisfied.
Rules of the group G2 manage Forge constraints. Only Rule 9 generates a Sub constraint: (t ∈ Sub(w, E, E ,K))
where w ∈ E. However, according to the second condition of the definition of well-tagged protocols (See
Definition 9), w is tagged. Besides, according to the third condition of the same definition, each subterm of w
having an indexed variable as a subterm without crossing mpair operator is tagged. Thus, if ∃Xi ≤ t
′ then
∀u ≤ t′ s.t Xi 6m u, u is tagged, and then, the invariant follows. The other rules do not generate neither
equality constraintes, nor Sub ones. Then, the invariant still holds.
The Rule 15 of the group G3 transforms a Sub constraint into either a Subd constraint or an equality one.
The Subd constraint has the same u, and then, the invariant is still satisfied. The equality constraint is of the
form (t = u) where u is the term of the Sub constraint. However, by induction hypothesis, if ∃Xi ≤ u then
∀v ≤ u s.t Xi 6m v, v is tagged. Then, the first condition of the invariant for the constraint (t = u) is satisfied.
Moreover, if Xi 6m u and Yj 6m t, then u is tagged since Xi is tagged and according to the third condition
of the definition 9. Thus, t has to be tagged with the same tag as u. Thus, i = j. The other rules of the
group G3 transform a Subd constraint into new Sub constraints while decomposing the term inside the Subd
constraint. However, the invariant is satisfied for the constraint (t ∈ Subd(u, E, E ,K)) for the term u then it
still holds for a subterm u′ of u (u′ ≤ u). Indeed, if ∃Xi ≤ u
′ then, Xi ≤ u. However, by induction hypothesis,
∀v ≤ u s.t Xi 6m v, v is tagged. Therefore, ∀v ≤ u
′ ≤ u s.t Xi 6m v, v is tagged. We conclude that all the
rules of the group G3 satisfy the invariant.
Rules of the group G4 manage equality constraints. Rule 21 eliminates the constraint. Rule 22 eliminates the
whole block. Rule 25 replaces an index by another one in all the block. Thus, these rules satisfy the invariant.
Rule 23 decomposes an equality constraint of two terms (u = v) into an equality constraint of two subterms
(u′ = v′) where u′ ≤ u and v′ ≤ v. Thus, if ∃Xi < u
′, Yj < v
′ then ∃Xi < u, Yj < v. However, by induction
hypothesis, Xi or Yj is tagged. Moreover, if Xi 6m u
′ and Yj 6m v
′ then, Xi 6m u and Yj 6m v, and therefore,
i = j. Rule 24 decomposes an equality constraint of two terms (mpair(k, u) = mpair(l, w)) into an equality
constraint of two subterms (u = wδl,k). If ∃Xi < u < mpair(k, u), Yj < wδl,k < mpair(k, w) s.t Xi, Yj ∈ XI ,
then, Xi or Yj is tagged by induction hypothesis. Besides, V arI(u) ⊆ {k} and V arI(wδl,k) ⊆ {k}. Thus, if
Xi 6m u and Yj 6m wδl,k then i = k = j.
Rule 26 of the group G5 generates an equality constraint (u = v). Suppose Yj < u and Zk < v. By induction
hypothesis, for the constraint (Xi = u), Yj is tagged. In a similar way, Zk is tagged. Then, the first condition of
the invariant is satisfied. Suppose now that Yj 6m u and Zk 6m v. By induction hypothesis, for the constraint
(Xi = u), we have i = j. In a similar way, for the constraint (Xi = v), we have i = k. Thus, j = k.
Therefore, the second condition of the invariant is satisfied. For Rule 27, the equality constraint generated
(u = v) can not have Xi ≤ u or Yj ≤ v by priority of Rules 6 and 7 replacing indexed variables by non indexed
ones. In a similar way, Rule 31 can not generate a constraint (t ∈ Subd(w, E, E ,K)) having indexed variables
in w. Rules 28, 29 and 30 do not modify equality constraints. Rule 32 eliminates the whole block. Therefore,
the invariant is valid for all the rules of the group G5.
The Rule 33 of the group G6 generates a constraint (t ∈ Subd(uδ, E, E ,K)). However, u comes from a master
constraint: (Xi = u). By induction hypothesis, if ∃Yj < u then Yj is tagged. Moreover, since u is a term of
the protocol, according to the third condition of Definition 9, ∀u′ ≤ u s.t Yj 6m u
′, u′ is tagged. Then, the Sub
constraint generated satisfies the invariant. Rule 34 does not generate neither Sub constraints nor non final
equality ones Then, the invariant still holds. Rule 35 generates an equality constraint (uoδo = v). Suppose
that ∃Yj and Zk s.t Yj < uoδo and Zk < v. By induction hypothesis for the constraint (Xm = v), we have Zk
is tagged. Then, the first condition of the invariant is satisfied. Suppose now that Yj 6m uoδo and Zk 6m v. By
induction hypothesis for the constraint (Xm = v), we have m = k. By induction hypothesis for the constraint
(Xo = uo), where Yl < uo we have o = l. Then, V arI(uoδo) ⊆ {m} which leads to j = m. Thus, j = k and
therefore the invariant holds for Rule 35.
Invariant 7. For a constraint of the form (t ∈ Forgec(E,K)), (t ∈ Forge(E,K)), (t ∈ Sub(u, E, E ,K)), or
(t ∈ Subd(u, E, E ,K)), where ∃Xi 6m t, we have V arI(t) ⊂ Q.
For a non final constraint of the form u = v where ∃Yj and Zk s.t Yj 6m u and Zk 6m v, we have j, k ∈ Q.
This invariant will be used in the proof of Invariant 8, Proposition 27, Proposition 28, Lemma 11 and
Proposition 31.
Proof. Rules of the group G1 do not generate new constraints of the form Forge or Sub or equality constraints
of the form defined in Invariant 7. Then, the invariant still holds.
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Rule 9 of the group G2 generates from a Forge constraint either a Forgec constraint or a Sub constraint with
the same term t in both cases. However, by induction hypothesis, V arI(t) ⊂ Q. Then, the invariant is satisfied.
Rules 10, 11 and 12 transform a constraint t ∈ Forgec(E,K) into another constraint (t
′ ∈ Forge(E,K)) where
t′6m t. However, V arI(t
′) ⊆ V arI(t) and V arI(t) ⊂ Q. Thus, V arI(t) ⊂ Q which satisfies the invariant.
Rule 13 generates a new constraint (t ∈ Forge(E,K)) where V arI(t) ⊂ {k} and k ∈ Q. Thus, the invariant is
valid. Rule 14 eliminates the block. Thus, the group G2 validates the invariant.
Rule 15 transforms a Sub constraint into either a Subd constraint preserving the same t or an equality constraint.
For the new Subd constraint, by induction hypothesis we have V arI(t) ⊂ Q which satisfies the invariant. For
an equality constraint (t = u), suppose that ∃Xi, Yj s.t Xi 6m t and Yj 6m u. According to Invariant 6 for the
constraint (t = u) we have i = j. However, by induction hypothesis, V arI(t) ⊂ Q. Since we only replace
an universal index by another universal index, we have i, j ∈ Q. Rules 16 and 19 transform a Sub constraint
into another one while preserving the same t. However, by induction hypothesis, V arI(t) ⊂ Q. Then, the
invariant is satisfied. Rules 17 and 18 generate from a Sub constraint a Subd constraint with the same t and
a new constraint Forge for forging the key b. For the new constraint Subd, by induction hypothesis, we have
V arI(t) ⊂ Q which satisfies the invariant. For the Forge constraint, b is a key. According to the restriction
of autonomous keys, we have V arI(b) = ∅, which satisfies the invariant. Rule 20 eliminates the block. Thus,
the group G3 satisfies the invariant.
Rule 21 of the group G4 eliminates a constraint. Rule 22 eliminates the block. Rule 23 transfoms an equality
constraint (u = v) into a new one (u′ = v′) where u′6m u et v
′6m v. Then, if ∃Xi, Yj s.t Xi 6m u
′ and Yj 6m v
′,
then Xi 6m u and Yj 6m v. However, by induction hypothesis, i, j ∈ Q which satisfies the invariant. Rule 21
transforms an equality constraint into another constraint (u = wδl,k) where V arI(u) = V arI(v) ⊆ {k} and
k ∈ Q, which satisfies the invariant. Thus, the group G4 satisfies the invariant.
Rule 26 generates a new constraint (u = v). Suppose that ∃Zk, Yj s.t Zk 6m u and Yj 6m v. By induction
hypothesis for the constraint (Xi = u), we have i, k ∈ Q. By induction hypothesis for the constraint (Xi = v),
we have i, j ∈ Q. Then, j, k ∈ Q, which satisfies the invariant. Rule 27 generates an equality constraint
(u = v). However, u and v comes from constraints (X = u) and (X = v). Then, ∄Xi s.t Xi 6m u or Xi 6m v
by priority of Rules 6 et 7. In a similar way, Rule 29 does not generate a constraint (u ∈ Forgec(E,K)) where
Xi 6m u. Thus, Rules 27 and 29 satisfy the invariant. Rule 28 generates a new constraint (u ∈ Forgec(E,K)).
Suppose that ∃Yj s.t Yj 6m u. However, u comes from the constraint Xi = u. According to Invariant 6, i = j.
Moreover, by induction hypothesis, we have i ∈ Q and therefore j ∈ Q, which satisfies the invariant. Rule 30
does not generate new constraints. Rule 31 generates a new Sub constraint while preserving the same t. Rule 32
eliminates the block. Thus, the group G5 validates the invariant.
Rule 33 generates a new Sub constraint but preserving the same t. Then, the invariant still holds. Rule 34
generates a new constraint (uoδo ∈ Forgec(E
′,K)). Suppose that ∃Yj s.t Yj 6m uoδo. However, according to
Invariant 6 applied to the master constraint (Xo = uo) taking into account δo, we have j = m. Moreover,
by induction hypothesis applied to the constraint (Xm ∈ Forgec(E
′,K)), we have m ∈ Q, which satisfies the
invariant. Rule 35 generates two new constraints. The first constraint is (v ∈ Forgec(E
′
r,Kr)). Suppose that
∃Yj s.t Yj 6m v. According to the induction hypothesis applied to the constraint (Xm = v), we have m, j ∈ Q,
which satisfies the invariant. The second constraint generated is (uoδo = v). Suppose that ∃Yj , Zk s.t Yj 6m v
and Zk 6m uoδo. However, by induction hypothesis applied to both the master constraint (Xo = uo) taking
into account δo and the constraint (Xm = v), we have m, j, k ∈ Q which satisfies the invariant. Thus, the
group G6 validates the invariant.
Invariant 8. For a constraint (u = v), where Xi 6m u and cj 6m v, then i and j can not be both existential
indexes.
Proof. Groups G1 and G2 do not generate new equality constraints of the form (u = v) where ∃Xi ∈ XI and
cj ∈ CI s.t Xi 6m u and cj 6m v. Thus, the invariant still holds.
For the group G3, only Rule 15 can generate an equality constraint (t = u) from a constraint (t ∈ Sub(u, E, E ,K)).
Suppose that ∃Xi ∈ XI and cj ∈ CI s.t i, j ∈ R and either (Xi 6m u and cj 6m t) or (Xi 6m t and cj 6m u).
In the first case, i.e. (Xi 6m u and cj 6m t), according to Invariant 6, Xi is tagged. According to the third
condition of Definition 9, u is also tagged. Thus, v has to be tagged with the same tag as u and then i = j,
which contradicts our hypothesis. In the second case, i.e. Xi 6m t and cj 6m u, according to the Invariant 7,
we have i ∈ Q which contradicts the hypothesis: i ∈ R. Thus, for the two cases, i and j can not be both
existentials.
Rule 21 eliminates a constraint. Rule 22 eliminates the whole block. Rule 25 replaces an index by another one.
Nevertheless, it can not replace an universal index by an existential one. Thus, these three rules of the group
G4 satisfy the invariant. Rule 23 decomposes an equality constraint between two terms (u = v) into another
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equality contraint between two subterms ((u′ = v′) with u′ <m u and v
′ <m v) without generating indexes. By
induction hypothesis, if ∃Xi ∈ XI and cj ∈ CI s.t Xi 6m u
′ <m u and cj 6m v
′ <m v then i and j can not be
both existential. Rule 24 generates new equality constraint (u = wδl,k) with V arI(u) = V arI(wδl,k) ⊆ {k}
which satisfies the invariant.
Rule 26 of the group G5 generates an equality constraint (u = v). Suppose that ∃Zk ∈ XI and cj ∈ CI s.t
k, j ∈ R, Zk 6m u and cj 6m v. Nevertheless, according the invariant 6 applied to the constraint (Xi = u), we
have i = k. However, according to the induction hypothesis for the constraint (Xi = v), i and j can not be
both existential. Thus, k and j can not be both existential which satisfies the invariant. Rule 27 generates
an equality constraint (u = v). However, u and v come from constraints (X = u) and (X = v). The, ∄Xi s.t
Xi 6m u or Xi 6m v by priority of Rules 6 and 7. Thus, Rule 27 satisfies the invariant. The other rules of the
group G5 do not generate new equality constraints. Thus, the group G5 satisfies the Invariant 8.
Rules 33 and 34 of the group G6 do not generate new not final equality constraints. Thus, the invariant is
satisfied. Rule 35 generates a new equality constraint (uoδo = v). Suppose that ∃Zk ∈ XI and cj ∈ CI s.t
and either Zk 6m uoδo and cj 6m v, or Zk 6m v and cj 6m uoδo. In the first case, i.e. Zk 6m uoδo and cj 6m v,
according to Invariant 6 applied to the master constraint (Xo = uo) taking into account δo, we have k = m.
Moreover, by induction hypothesis for the constraint (Xm = v), m and j can not be both existential. Then, k
and j can not be both existential, which satisfies the invariant. In the second case, i.e. Zk 6m v and cj 6m uoδo,
according to the invariant 6 for the constraint (Xm = v), we have m = k. However, by induction hypothesis
for the master constraint (Xo = uo) taking into account δo, we have m and j can not be both existential and
then k and j can not be both existential, which satisfies the invariant. Thus, in both cases, the invariant is
valid.
Invariant 9. For a constraint t ∈ Sub(u, E, E ,K) or t ∈ Subd(u, E, E ,K) where V ar
R
I (u) = {i} we have either
i is fresh and (ant(i, j) = j if V arC,RI (t) = j ∈ R) or i ∈ V ar
R
I (E) .
This invariant is used for the proof of Invariant 10, Proposition 27 and Proposition 28.
Proof. we show that the different rules of our inference sytem satisfy the invariant. Rules of the first group does
not generate Sub constraints. Then, the invariant holds. Rule 9 generates a constraint (t ∈ Sub(w, E, E ,K))
where w ∈ E. and then, V arI(w) = ∅. The other rules of the second group do not generate Sub constraints.
Thus, the invariant is satisfied. Rule 15 transforms a Sub constraint into a Subd constraint while preserving
the same u. Then, the invariant still holds. Rules 16, 17, 18 transform a constraint (t ∈ Subd(u, E, E ,K)) into
one single constraint (t ∈ Sub(u′, E, E ,K)) where u′6m u. If V ar
R
I (u
′) = {i} then, V arRI (u) = {i}. However,
by induction hypothesis, either i is fresh and (ant(i, j) = j if V arC,RI (t) = j ∈ R) or i ∈ V ar
R
I (E) which
satisfies the invariant. For Rule 19, there are two cases. In the first one, it generates a new Sub constraint
with fresh index variable k and thus if V arC,RI (t) = j ∈ R then ant(i, j) = j. Therefore, the invariant
is satisfied. In the second case, it generates an old constraint that exists in Hist(B). Then, by induction
hypothesis, the invariant is satisfied. Rule 20 eliminates the whole block. We conclude that the third group
satisfies the invariant. Rules of the fourth group do not generate Sub constraints. Only Rule 25 may generate
a new Sub constraint with a new existential index inside the Sub. In this case we have (t ∈ Sub(u, E, E ,K))
or (t ∈ Subd(u, E, E ,K)) where V ar
R
I (u) = {i}. We must have also in the block (ci = ck) where i, k ∈ R in
order to have a constraint of the form (t ∈ Sub(u′, E, E ,K)) or (t ∈ Subd(u
′, E, E ,K)) where V arRI (u
′) = {k}.
However, by induction hypothesis, either i is fresh and (ant(i, j) = j if V arC,RI (t) = j ∈ R) or i ∈ V ar
R
I (E).
If i is fresh, then it is contradictory with (ci = ck) in the block. If i ∈ V ar
R
I (E), then ant(i, j) = {k} if
k ∈ E and ant(i, k) = {i} otherwise. In these two cases, we have V arRI (u
′) ∈ V arRI (E) which satisfies the
invariant. Only Rule 31 generatse a Subd constraint: (t ∈ Subd(w, E, E ,K)). However, w comes from a sub
master constraint. Then, V arRI (w) ∈ V ar
R
I (E) which satisfies the invariant. Only Rule 33 generate a Subd
constraint. There are two cases. In the first one, it generates a new Subd constraint with fresh index variable
k′ and then (ant(i, j) = j if V arC,RI (t) = j ∈ R). Thus, the invariant is satisfied. In the second case, it
generates an old constraint that already exists in Hist(B). Then, by induction hypothesis, the invariant is
satisfied.
8.2 Bound on Indexes Generated by the Inference System
The aim of this section is to bound the set of possible indexes generated by our inference system. For this, we
consider a derivation i.e a successive application of our rules on a constraint system. In this derivation, the
number of application of labelling rules and modification of sub-master constraints, i.e. Rules 4, 5 and 8 is
bounded. We consider a derivation where there is not modification or labelling of sub-master constraints (E is
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then fixed for all rules). Indexes in E are the most anterior indexes. The aim of this section is then to bound
the set of indexes generated by our inference system throught this derivation.
Theorem 3. The set of indexes generated by our inference system is bounded.
Proof. We first define this set of indexes useful for the proof:
Definition 35. Let:
V1 = V ar
C,R
I ({t|t ∈ Forge(E,K) ∨ t ∈ Forgec(E,K) ∨ t ∈ Sub(u, E, E ,K) ∨ t ∈ Subd(u, E, E ,K) ∈ B})
V2 = V ar
R
I ({u|t ∈ Sub(u, E, E ,K) ∨ t ∈ Subd(u, E, E ,K) ∈ B and ∃Xi s.t Xi 6m t})
V3 = V ar
C,R
I ({v|u = v ∨ v = u ∈ B and ∃X s.t X 6m u and X ∈ X ∪ XI})
V4 = V ar
R
I (E)
Then, V = V1 ∪ V2 ∪ V3 ∪ V4.
Then, the proof of Theorem 3 is structured as follows:
We bound first the set of universal indexes generated by our inference system (See Proposition 26).
Then, we bound the set of existential indexes generated by our inference system. First, considering a con-
straint (t ∈ Sub(v, E, E ,K)), while fixing t (by the condition Xi 6m t), we bound the set of existential indexes
generated by our inference system inside a Sub (in v). For this, we bound first the set of existential indexes
indexing variables inside a Sub (See Proposition 27). Once this set is bounded, we bound the set of existential
indexes indexing constants inside a Sub (See Proposition 28) permetting then to bound the set of existential
indexes inside a Sub. Then, we bound the set of existential indexes in V defined in Definition 35 (See Proposi-
tion 29). We can after bound the set of existential indexes in u for constraints of the form (t ∈ Sub(u, E, E ,K))
without any restrictions over the term t (See Proposition 30). Once the of existential indexes for Forge and
Sub constraints is bounded, we bound existential indexes for equality constraints (See Proposition 31 and
Proposition 32).
Thus, the proof of Theorem 3 follows from the following propositions:
Proposition 26. The set of universal indexes generated by our inference system is bounded.
Proposition 27. V arX ,RI ({v s.t (t ∈ Sub(v, E, E ,K)) or (t ∈ Subd(v, E, E ,K)) ∈ B and ∃Xi 6m t})∪ V ar
R
I (E)
is bounded.
Proposition 28. V arC,RI ({v | (t ∈ Sub(v,E, E ,K)) ∨ (t ∈ Subd(v, E, E ,K)) ∈ B and ∃Xi 6m t)} has a bound.
Proposition 29. The set of indexes in V (defined in Definition 35) is bounded.
Proposition 30. V arRI ({u | t ∈ Sub(u, E, E ,K) ∨ t ∈ Subd(u, E, E ,K) ∈ B}) is bounded.
Proposition 31. V arX ,RI ({u | (v = u) ∨ (u = v) ∈ B}) is bounded.
Proposition 32. V arC,RI ({u | (v = u) ∨ (u = v) ∈ B}) is bounded.
The dependency between these propositions is illustrated by Figure8.2.
Proposition 1
Proposition 2
Proposition 3
Proposition 4
Proposition 5
Proposition 6
Proposition 7
Before proving the propositions above, we need to prove the following invariant:
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Invariant 10. For a non final or dull constraint (u = v) where V arC,RI (u) = {i} and V ar
C,R
I (v) = {j}, we
have ant(i, j) ∈ V where V is defined in Definition 35.
This invariant will be used in Invariant 11, Proposition 31 and Proposition 32.
Proof. Rules of the first group and the second group do not generate constraints of the form defined in
Invariant 10. Then, the Invariant is satisfied.
Only Rule 15 generate an equality constraint (u = v) from a constraint (u ∈ Sub(v, E, E ,K)) where V arC,RI (u) =
{i} and V arC,RI (v) = {j}. However, according to Invariant 9, either j is fresh and ant(i, j) = i or j ∈ V ar
R
I (E).
There are then two cases. In the first case, j is fresh and ant(i, j) = i. However, i ∈ V since i ∈ V1. Thus,
ant(i, j) ∈ V and the invariant is satisfied. In the second case, j ∈ V arRI (E). Then, ant(i, j) = i if i ∈ V ar
R
I (E)
and ant(i, j) = j otherwise. In both cases, ant(i, j) ∈ V and the invariant follows. The same reasoning is
valid when the constraint (v ∈ Sub(u, E, E ,K)) is transformed into a constraint (u = v).
Rule 21 eliminates the constraint. Rule 22 eliminates the whole block. Rule 23 decomposes an equality
between two terms into an equality between two subterms while preserving the same indexes. Then, th invariant
still holds. Rule 24 generates an equality constraint (u = v) where V arI(u) = V arI(v). Then, the invariant
remains satisfied. Rule 25 replace an index by another in the whole block. It may lead to a generation of a
new constraint (u = v′) from a constraint (u = v) where V arI(v) = {j}, V arI(v
′) = {k}, V arI(u) = {i}
and i, j, k ∈ R. We must then have the constraint (cj = ck) in the block. Then, we have ant(j, k) = k. We
distinguish two cases concerning the constraint (u = v′). In the first one, ant(i, k) = k. However, by induction
hypothesis for the constraint (cj = ck) and since ant(j, k) = k, we have k ∈ V which satisfies the invariant.
In the second case, ant(i, k) = i. However, ant(j, k) = k. Then ant(i, j) = i and therefore by induction
hypothesis for the constraint (u = v) we have i ∈ V which satisfies the invariant. Thus, in both cases, the
invariant still holds.
Only Rules 26 and 27 of the fifth group may generate new constraints of the form (u = v). However, u
and v belongs to constraints of the form (Xi = u) or the form (X = u) whose existential indexes are already
counted in V . Thus,, Group G5 satisfies the invariant.
Only Rule 35 may generate a new equality constraint of the form (uoδo = v). Suppose V ar
C,R
I (uoδo) = {i}
and V arC,RI (v) = {j}. There are two cases. In the first one, it generates a new equality constraint (uoδo = v)
with fresh index variable i and then ant(i, j) = j. However, j ∈ V3. Then, ant(i, j) ∈ V . Thus, the invariant is
satisfied. In the second case, it generates an old constraint that already exists in Hist(B). Then, by induction
hypothesis, the invariant is satisfied.
Figure 8.2 details the dependency between the different propositions and invariants.
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Proposition 26. The set of universal indexes generated by our inference system is bounded.
This proposition will be used in the proof of Theorem 3, Proposition 28 and Lemma 11.
Proof. There are only two rules that may generate universal indexes in constraints, i.e. Rules 13 and 24. Then,
the number of universal indexes is bounded by the number of constraints of the form (mpair(i, t) ∈ Forgec(E,K))
and (mpair(j, u) = mpair(k, v)).
The number of constraints of the form (mpair(i, t) ∈ Forgec(E,K)) is bounded by (the number of mpairs
∗ the number of different E ∗ the number of different K). Let st the number of subterms of the protocol. The
INRIA
Verification of Parameterized Cryptographic Protocols 35
number of mpairs is bounded by st. The number of different E is bounded by 2st since terms in E have not
indexes outside mpairs according to the restriction of Well-Tagged protocols (See Definition 9). The number of
different K is bounded by 2keys which is bounded by 2st since keys have not indexes outside mpairs according
to the restriction of autonmous keys (See Definition 10).
The number of constraints of the form (mpair(j, u) = mpair(k, v)) is bounded by (the number of mpairs
∗ the number of mpairs) which is bounded by (st ∗ st). We conclude that the number of universal indexes is
bounded.
Proposition 27. V arX ,RI ({v s.t (t ∈ Sub(v,E, E ,K)) or (t ∈ Subd(v, E, E ,K)) ∈ B and∃Xi 6m t})∪ V ar
R
I (E)
is bounded.
This proposition will be used for the proof of Proposition 28 and Theorem 3.
Proof. Rule 19 generates a bounded set of indexes. Indeed, let st the number of subterms of the protocol.
Then, the number of existential indexes in v from constraints (t ∈ Sub(v, E, E ,K)) or (t ∈ Subd(v, E, E ,K))
is bounded by the number of constraints of this form which is bounded by: (the number of possible terms t
∗ the number of different E ∗ the number of different K) ∗ the number of existential indexes in v fixing the
other parameters. However, ∃Xi 6m t and according to Invariant 7, i ∈ Q. Then, the number of indexes in t is
bounded. Let b1 this bound. Thus, the number of possible terms t is bounded by 2
b1∗st. Besides, the number
of different E is bounded by 2st since terms in E have not indexes outside mpairs according to the restriction
of Well-Tagged protocols (See Definition 9). Moreover, the number of different K is bounded by 2keys which
is bounded by 2st since keys have not indexes outside mpairs according to the restriction of autonmous keys
(See Definition 10). Then, fixing t, E, K and E (which is fixed by the hypothesis on the derivation chosen),
the number of new existential indexes in v generating by Rule 19 is the number of mpairs which is bounded
by st.
We now prove Proposition 27 by proving the following invariant:
V arX ,RI ({v s.t (t ∈ Sub(v, E, E ,K)) or (t ∈ Subd(v, E, E ,K)) ∈ B and∃Xi 6m t})∪V ar
R
I (E) is stable or decreases
by our inference system except Rule 19.
We denote by V the set of indexes defined in Proposition 27. We recall that in the derivation that we consider,
E is fixed. Then, V arRI (E) is fixed. Rules of the group G1 does not generate Sub constraints. Then, the
invariant is valid.
Rule 9 of the group G2 generates a constraint (t ∈ Sub(w, E, E ,K)) with w ∈ E. Then, V arI(w) = ∅, which
satisfies the invariant. The other rules of the group G2 do not generate Sub constraints. Thus, the group G2
satisfies the invariant.
Rule 15 transforms a Sub constraint into either an other Subd constraint while preserving the same u and
then V is stable or an equality constraint and then V may decrease. Rules 16, 17 and 18 transform a Subd
constraint into a Sub constraint while decomposing the term inside a Sub without generating new indexes.
Then, V remains stable or decreases. Rule 20 eliminates the whole block, then V remains stable or decreases.
Rules of the group G4 do not generate new Sub constraints. Besides, Rule 25 does not replace an universel
index by an existential one. The only case where Rule 25 may generate new index inside a Sub is to transform
a constraint (t ∈ Sub(v, E, E ,K)) or (t ∈ Subd(v, E, E ,K)) where V arI(v) = {i} and i ∈ R into a constraint
(t ∈ Sub(v′, E, E ,K)) or (t ∈ Subd(v
′, E, E ,K)) where V arI(v
′) = {j} and j ∈ R by a replacement thanks
to the application of Rule 25 to the constraint (ci = cj). However, according to Invariant 9, i is fresh or
i ∈ V arRI (E). The first case (i is fresh) is contradictory with the existence of (ci = cj). In the second case
(i ∈ V arRI (E)), the only way to replace i by j is to have ant(i, j) = {j}. Since i ∈ V ar
R
I (E), this case is only
possible if j ∈ V arRI (E). Thus, V remains stable or decreases.
Rule 31 generates a constraint (t ∈ Subd(w, E, E ,K)). Suppose that ∃Xi s.t Xi 6m w and i ∈ R. However, this
is contradictary with the fact that Xi comes from the constraint (X = w) by priority of Rules 6 and 7. The
other rules of the group G5 do not generate Sub constraints. Then, V remains stable.
Rule 33 generates a constraint (t ∈ Subd(uδ, E, E ,K)). Suppose that ∃Yj s.t Yj 6m uδ and j ∈ R. However,
according to Invariant 6 for the master constraint taking into account δ, we have j = m and then V remains
stable. The other rules of the group G6 do not generate new Sub constraints. Thus, V remains stable.
Proposition 28. V arC,RI ({v | (t ∈ Sub(v, E, E ,K)) ∨ (t ∈ Subd(v, E, E ,K)) ∈ B and ∃Xi 6m t)} has a bound.
This proposition will be used for the proof of Theorem 3, Lemma 11, Invariant 11 and Proposition 30.
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Proof. We recall that we consider a derivation where we have E fixed. Then, let b2 be the number of constraints
of E and id = V arRI (E). Then, let st the number of subterms of the protocol.
The number of existential indexes in v from constraints (t ∈ Sub(v, E, E ,K)) or (t ∈ Subd(v, E, E ,K)) is
bounded by the number of constraints of this form which is bounded by: (the number of possible terms t ∗ the
number of different E ∗ the number of different K) ∗ the number of existential indexes in v fixing the other
parameters.
However, ∃Xi 6m t and according to Invariant 7, i ∈ Q. Then, the number of indexes in t is bounded. Let
b1 this bound. Thus, the number of possible terms t is bounded by 2
b1∗st. Besides, the number of different E is
bounded by 2st since terms in E have not indexes outside mpairs according to the restriction of Well-Tagged
protocols (See Definition 9). Moreover, the number of different K is bounded by 2keys which is bounded by 2st
since keys have not indexes outside mpairs according to the restriction of autonmous keys (See Definition 10).
Fixing t, E, E and K for the constraint (t ∈ Sub(v, E, E ,K)) or (t ∈ Subd(v, E, E ,K)) there are four possible
rules that may generate existential indexes in v, i.e. Rules 19, 31, 33 and 25. Then, we distinguish four cases
depending on the rule that leads to the generation of an existential index.
In the first case, i.e. Rule 19 is the rule that generates a new existential index. The number of possible
existential indexes in v is the number of mpairs which is bounded by st.
In the second case, i.e. Rule 31 is the rule that generates a new existential index. Then, the number of
possible existential indexes in v is the number of constraints of the form (X = v)sm which is bounded by b2.
In the third case, i.e. Rule 33 is the rule that generates a new existential index. Since we generate only
one existential index by indexed variable and by master constraint for this variable, the number of possible
existential indexes in v is the number possible replacement which is bounded by (the number of indexed
variables ∗ the number of master constraints). The number of master constraints is bounded by b2. The
number of indexed variables is bounded by (the number of vectors ∗ the number of indexes inside the Sub for
indexed variables). The number of vectors is fixed from the specification of the protocol. The number of indexes
inside the constraint Sub is the sum of the number of universal indexes which is bounded in Proposition 26
and the number of existential indexes (for indexed variables) which is bounded in Proposition 27. Thus, the
number of existential indexes in v generated by Rule 33 is bounded.
In the fourth case, i.e. Rule 25 is the rule that generates a new existential index inside the Sub. This is only
possible when it transforms a constraint (t ∈ Sub(v,E, E ,K)) or (t ∈ Subd(v, E, E ,K)) where V arI(v) = {i}
and i ∈ R into a constraint (t ∈ Sub(v′, E, E ,K)) or (t ∈ Subd(v
′, E, E ,K)) where V arI(v
′) = {j} and j ∈ R
by a replacement thanks to the application of Rule 25 to the constraint (ci = cj).
However, according to Invariant 9, i is fresh or i ∈ V arRI (E). The first case (i is fresh) is contradictory
with the existence of (ci = cj). In the second case (i ∈ V ar
R
I (E)), the only way to replace i by j is to have
ant(i, j) = {j}. Since i ∈ V arRI (E), this case is only possible if j ∈ V ar
R
I (E). Then, the number of indexes
generated inside the Sub in this case is bounded by id.
Proposition 29. The set of indexes in V (defined in Definition 35) is bounded.
This proposition will be used for the proof of Proposition 31 and Proposition 32.
Proof. The proof is a direct consequence of the following Invariant 11 and the following Lemma 11.
Lemma 11. The set of indexes in V (defined in Definition 35) generated by the following rules:
Rule 19 for a constraint (t ∈ Subd(u, E, E ,K)) when ∃Zj 6m t;
Rule 33 for a constraint (t ∈ Subd(Xm, E, E ,K)) when ∃Zj 6m t;
Rule 34;
Rule 35 for a constraint (Xm = v) when ∃Zm 6m v.
is bounded.
Proof. Rule 19 generates a new constraint t ∈ Sub(uδ, E, E ,K) that may contain a new existential index in
uδ. However, since ∃Zj 6m t and according to Proposition 28 and Proposition 27, the set of existential indexes
that may be generated by Rule 19 is bounded. In the same way, Rule 33 may generate a new existential index
inside the constraint Sub, but that are bounded according to both Proposition 28 and Proposition 27.
Rule 34 may generate new existential indexes in the constraint uoδo ∈ Forge(E
′,K). However the set of these
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indexes is bounded. Indeed, the number of existential indexes in uoδo is bounded by the number of constraints
of the form uoδo ∈ Forge(E
′,K) which is bounded by: (the number of different K ∗ the number of different
E′ ∗ the number of existential indexes in uoδo fixing E
′ and K).
However, the number of different E is bounded by 2st since terms in E have not indexes outside mpairs
according to the restriction of Well-Tagged protocols (See Definition 9). Besides, the number of different K
is bounded by 2keys which is bounded by 2st since keys have not indexes outside mpairs according to the
restriction of autonmous keys (See Definition 10).
Moreover, the number of existential indexes in uoδo fixing E
′ and K is the number of possible replacements
which is bounded by (the number of indexed variable in Forge constraints ∗ the number of master constraints)
since we have exactly one fresh index per indexed variable per master constraint. The number of master
constraints is bounded by the number of constraints in E which is fixed. The number of indexed variables
in Forge constraints is bounded by (the number of vectors ∗ the number of indexes in variables for Forge
constraints). However, according to Invariant 7, these indexes are universal. Then, according to Proposition 26,
the set of universal indexes is bounded. Besides, the number of vectors is fixed from the specification of the
protocol.
For Rule 35, considering a constraint (Xm = v) and since ∃Zm 6m v, we have m ∈ Q according to Invariant 7.
Then, for this rule, we have existential indexes only in uoδo. Therefore, the number of fresh indexes generated
by this rule is bounded by the number of constraints of the form (uoδo = v) which is bounded by ((st ∗ the
set of universal indexes) ∗ the set of existential indexes in uoδo fixing v). However, the set of universal indexes
is bounded according to Proposition 26. Besides, the set of existential indexes in uoδo fixing v is bounded by
(the number of indexed variables in equality constraints ∗ the number of master constraints) since we have
exactly one fresh index per indexed variable in equality constraint per master constraint. However, the number
of master constraints is bounded by the number of constraints in E which is fixed. Moreover, the number of
indexed variables in equality constraints of the form (Xm = v) is bounded by (the number of vectors ∗ the
number of indexes in variables for these equality constraints). Since m ∈ Q and the number of vectors is fixed
and according to Proposition 26, this number of indexed variables is bounded.
We conlude that the set of indexes in V generated by these rules is bounded.
Invariant 11. V is stable or decreases by application of our inference system except:
Rule 19 for a constraint (t ∈ Subd(u, E, E ,K)) when ∃Zj 6m t;
Rule 33 for a constraint (t ∈ Subd(Xm, E, E ,K)) when ∃Zj 6m t;
Rule 34;
Rule 35 for a constraint (Xm = v) when ∃Zm 6m v.
Proof. V4 is always stable by hypothesis on the chosen derivation. V2 is bounded according to Proposition 27
and Proposition 28. Then, in this proof, we consider this bound and show that, for each rule of our inference
system, the possible indexes that we may generate in V1 and V3 exist always either in V2 and V4 that are fixed
or in V1 and V3 before the application of the rule. Rules of the group G1 do not generate new Forge or Sub
constraints, then V1 remains stable. Moreover, rules of this group do not generate new equality constraints
u = v with ∃Xi, Yj ∈ XI s.t Xi 6m u and Yj 6m v. Thus, V remains stable or decreases by the group G1.
Rules of the group G2 do not generate equality constraints, then V3 remains stable. Rule 9 transforms a
Forge constraint either into a Forge constraint or a Sub constraint with the same t in both cases. Then,
V1 remains stable. Rule 13 generates a new constraint (t ∈ Forge(E,K)) with V arI(t) ⊆ {k} and k ∈ Q.
Then, V1 remains stable. Rule 14 eliminates the whole block. The other rules of the group G2 transform a
constraint (t ∈ Forgec(E,K)) into a constraint (t
′ ∈ Forge(E,K)) with mpair(t′, t) without generating new
indexes. Then, V1 remains stable. Thus, V is stable by the group G2.
Rule 15 transforms a constraint (t ∈ Sub(u, E, E ,K)) into either another Subd constraint with the same t and
then V1 remains stable or an equality constraint (t = u). Suppose that ∃Xi s.t Xi 6m t or Xi 6m u. We
distinguish two cases. In the first one, Xi 6m t. Suppose that ∃cj s.t cj 6m u and j ∈ R. However, j already
belongs to V2. Thus, V2 ∪ V3 remains stable and then V is stable. In the second case, Xi 6m u. Suppose that
∃cj s.t cj 6m t and j ∈ R. However, j already belongs to V1. Thus, V1∪V3 remains stable and then V is stable.
Rule 16 transforms a Subd constraint into another Sub constraint while preserving the same t but decomposing
the term inside the Sub without generating new indexes. Then, V1 remains stable. There are not new equality
constraint. Thus, V3 remains stable and then V remains stable. Rule 17 transforms a Subd constraint into a
RR n° 6712
38 Chridi & Turuani & Rusinowitch
Sub conctraint preserving the same t and generating a Forge constraint. The last constraint (the Forge one)
uses a key b. According to Definition 10 of autonomous keys, V arI(b) = ∅. Thus, V1 remains stable and then
V remains stable. The reasoning is the same for Rule 18. Rule 19 is applied when ∄Zj 6m t and then V2 does
not change for this rule. V1 remains stable since the rule preserve the same t. Rule 20 eliminates the block.
Thus, V remains stable by the group G3
Rule 21 eliminates the constraint. Rule 22 eliminates the whole block. Then, V remains stable or decreases.
Rule 23 decomposes an equality constraint without generating new indexes. Then, V3 remains stable. It does
not generate other new constraints. Then, V is stable. Rule 24 generates new equality constraint (u = wδl,k)
where V arI(u) = wδl,k ⊆ {k} and k ∈ Q. Thus, V3 remains stable and then V is stable. Therefore, V remains
stable by the group G4 . Rule 25 replace an index by another one which may lead to the generation of a new
index for V . In this case, we must have in the block a constraint (ci = cj) where i, j ∈ R, i ∈ V , j /∈ V and
ant(i, j) = j. However, according to Invariant 10 for the constraint (ci = cj), ant(i, j) ∈ V which contradicts
the fact that j /∈ V . Thus, V is stable by Rule 25.
Rule 26 generates a new equality constraint (u = v). If ∃cj s.t j ∈ R and cj 6m u or cj 6m v, then j belongs
either to the constraint (Xi = u) or (Xi = v) and then V3 does not change. The same reasoning is valid for
Rule 27. Rule 29 can add an index to V1. Nevertheless, this index comes from a sub-master constraint which
is already computed in V4. Then, V remains stable. The same reasoning is valid for Rule 31. Rule 30 does
not generate new constraints. Rule 32 eliminates the whole block. Thus, V remains stable or decreases by the
group G5
Rule 33 is authorized only if ∄Zj s.t Zj 6m t. Then, V2 does not change. Moreover, this rule generates a new
Sub constraint from a Subd constraint preserving the same t. Then, V1 is stable. Rule 35 is only authorized
when (Xm = v) and ∄Zm s.t Zm 6m v. Then, suppose this rule generates an equality constraint (uoδo = v)
that may add an index to V3, i.e. ∃Zm, cj s.t j ∈ R and Zm 6m uoδo. Then, j is already computed in V3
thanks to the constraint (Xm = v). Thus, V3 remains stable. In the same way, the existential index that may
be generated by the addition of the constraint (v ∈ Forgec(E
′
r,Kr)) is already computed in V3 thanks to the
constraint (Xm = v). Thus, V1 ∪ V3 remains stable. Therefore, V is stable or decreases by the group G6.
We conclude that the set of indexes in V is bounded.
Proposition 30. V arRI ({u | t ∈ Sub(u, E, E ,K) ∨ t ∈ Subd(u, E, E ,K) ∈ B}) is bounded.
This proposition will be used for the proof of Theorem 3, Proposition 31 and Proposition 32.
Proof. Considering a constraint of the form (t ∈ Sub(v, E, E ,K)) or (t ∈ Subd(v, E, E ,K)), since V arI(t) is now
bounded thanks to Proposition 29, we follow the same proof as the one of Proposition 27 in order to prove
that
V arX ,RI ({v s.t (t ∈ Sub(v, E, E ,K)) or (t ∈ Subd(v, E, E ,K)) ∈ B and∃Xi 6m t})∪V ar
R
I (E) is bounded. Then,
we follow the same proof as the one of Proposition 28 in order to prove that
V arC,RI ({v | (t ∈ Sub(v, E, E ,K)) ∨ (t ∈ Subd(v, E, E ,K)) ∈ B)} is bounded. We conclude that
V arRI ({u | t ∈ Sub(u, E, E ,K) ∨ t ∈ Subd(u, E, E ,K) ∈ B}) is bounded.
Proposition 31. V arX ,RI ({u | (v = u) ∨ (u = v) ∈ B}) is bounded.
This Proposition will be used for the proof of Theorem 3 and Proposition 32.
Proof. We prove Proposition 32 by proving the following invariant:
V arX ,RI ({u | (v = u) ∨ (u = v) ∈ B}) is stable or increases by a set of indexes which is already bounded.
The first group does not generate new equality constraint with new indexes. Rules of the second group do not
manage equality constraints. Then, the invariant is satisfied by G1 and G2.
The only rule of the third group that may generate an equality constraint is Rule 15. However, the possible
existential indexes that may be in this equality constraint already belong to the Sub equality. Then, the set
of these indexes is bounded according to Proposition 29 and Proposition 30 and thus, the invariant still holds.
Rule 21 eliminates the constraint. Rule 22 eliminates the whole block. If Rule 24 generates a new index, then
it would be an universal one. Thus, for these rules, the invariant is still satisfied. Rule 23 decomposes an
equality constraint between two terms into another equality constraint between two subterms while preserving
the same index variables. Then, the set of existential indexes remains stable and the invariant still holds.
Rule 25 replaces an index by another using the constraint (ci = cj). However, according to Invariant 10,
ant(i, j) ∈ V . Then, even if Rule 25 lead to the generation of a new index in other equality constraints, then,
this index belongs to a set which is already bounded since this index is in V and V is bounded according to
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Proposition 29. Thus, the invariant still holds.
Only Rules 26 and 27 of the fifth group may generate new equality constraints. However, the possible indexes
in these constraints already belongs to equality constraints in the left side of rules. Then, the set of indexes is
stable and therefore the invariant is satisfied.
Only Rule 35 of the sixth group may generate new equality constraints: (uoδo = v). If ∃Zj s.t j ∈ R and
Zj 6m v, then according to Invariant 7, j,m ∈ Q which is contradictory with j ∈ R. The same reason is valid
for the case where ∃Zj s.t j ∈ R and Zj 6m uoδo since uo belongs to tha master constraint (Xio = uo). Then,
the invariant still holds.
Proposition 32. V arC,RI ({u | (v = u) ∨ (u = v) ∈ B}) is bounded.
Proof. We prove Proposition 32 by proving the following invariant:
V arC,RI ({u | (v = u) ∨ (u = v) ∈ B}) is stable or increases by a set of indexes that is already bounded.
We only focus on equality constraints (v = u) that do not contain indexed variables. If ∃Xi s.t Xi 6m u or
Xi 6m v then V ar
C,R
I ({u | (v = u) ∨ (u = v) ∈ B}) according to Proposition 29. Suppose then that (v = u)
does not contain indexed variables.
The first group does not generate new equality constraint with new indexes. Rules of the second group do
not manage equality constraints. Then, the invariant is satisfied by G1 and G2.
The only rule of the third group that may generate an equality constraint is Rule 15. However, the possible
existential indexes that may be in this equality constraint already belong to the Sub equality. Then, the set
of these indexes is bounded according to Proposition 29 and Proposition 30 and thus, the invariant still holds.
Rule 21 eliminates the constraint. Rule 22 eliminates the whole block. If Rule 24 generates a new index, then
it would be an universal one. Thus, for these rules, the invariant is still satisfied. Rule 23 decomposes an
equality constraint between two terms into another equality constraint between two subterms while preserving
the same index variables. Then, the set of existential indexes remains stable and the invariant still holds.
Rule 25 replaces an index by another using the constraint (ci = cj). However, according to Invariant 10,
ant(i, j) ∈ V . Then, even if Rule 25 lead to the generation of a new index in other equality constraints, then,
this index belongs to a set which is already bounded since this index is in V and V is bounded according to
Proposition 29. Thus, the invariant still holds.
Only Rules 26 and 27 of the fifth group may generate new equality constraints. However, the possible indexes
in these constraints already belongs to equality constraints in the left side of rules. Then, the set of indexes is
stable and therefore the invariant is satisfied.
Only Rule 35 of the sixth group may generate new equality constraints: (uoδo = v). If ∃cj s.t j ∈ R and
cj 6m v, then it was already counted since this index belongs to the constraint (Xm = v) and according to
Proposition 31, the set of such indexes is bounded. If ∃cj s.t j ∈ R and cj 6m uoδo, then we have a fresh index
per indexed variable per master constraint. Thus, the number of possible existential indexes generated this
way is bounded by (the number of indexed variable ∗ the number master constraint). However, the number of
master constraints is bounded by the number of constraints in E which is fixed. Besides, the number of indexed
variables is bounded by (the number of vectors ∗ the number of indexes in varibales in equality constraints).
However, the number of vectors is defined by the specification of the protocol. Moreover, the number of
indexes in variables in equality constraints is the sum of universal indexes and the existential ones. The set of
universal indexes is bounded according to Proposition 26. The set of existential ones is bounded according to
Proposition 31. We conclude that the invariant is satisfied by Rule 35.
8.3 Termination For Protocols with Autonomous Keys
We first define a weight ‖ ‖ for terms, elementary constraints, blocks and constraint systems. Then, we show
that each rule decreases this weight.
In order to define the weight of a term, we need to introduce some definitions:
Definition 36 (Row of a term). A row of a term t is defined as follows:
• r(X) = max{l |X ⊏l Y , Y ∈ X ∪ XI} for X ∈ X ∪ XI
• r(t) = max{r(Y ) |Y < t, Y ∈ X ∪ XI}
For a variable X ∈ X ∪ XI , If ∄Y ∈ X ∪ XI , s.t X ⊏Y , then, r(X) = 0.
Definition 37 (Size of a term t). We define the size of a term t denoted by |t| as follows:
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• |t| = 1 for t ∈ X ∪ C
• |f(u1, .., um)| = 1 + |u1|+ .. + |um|
• |h(u)| = 2 + |u| for h ∈ H
• |mpair(k, u)| = 2 + |uδ| ∀δ
We extend this definition to sets of terms by: |E| = Σt∈E |t| for E ⊂ T .
Now, we can define the weight for terms, then, for elementary constraints and finally for constraint blocks
and constraint system.
Definition 38 (Weight of a term t). Let p be the size of the protocol, i.e. the sum of sizes of messages. We
define the weight of a term t denoted by ‖t‖ as follows:
• ‖X‖ = pr(X) + 1 for X ∈ X ∪ XI
• ‖c‖ = 1 for c ∈ C ∪ CI
• ‖f(u1, .., um)‖ = 1 + ‖u1‖+ .. + ‖um‖
• ‖h(u)‖ = 2 + ‖u‖ for h ∈ H
• ‖mpair(k, u)‖ = 2 + ‖uδ‖ ∀δ
We extend this definition to sets of terms in the following way: ‖E‖ = 1 + Σt∈E‖t‖ for E ⊂ T .
Definition 39 (Weight of an elementary constraint). Let st be the number of the protocol subterms. We define
the weight of an elementary constraint ctr denoted by ‖ctr‖ as follows:
• ‖t ∈ Forge(E,K)‖ = 〈st−#K, ‖t‖+ ‖E‖+ |E|+ 1〉
• ‖t ∈ Forgec(E,K)‖ = 〈st−#K, ‖t‖+ ‖E‖+ |E|〉
• ‖t ∈ Sub(w, E, E ,K)‖ = 〈st−#K, ‖t‖+ ‖w‖+ |E|+ 1〉
• ‖t ∈ Subd(w, E, E ,K)‖ = 〈st−#K, ‖t‖+ ‖w‖+ |E|〉
• ‖t = u‖ = 〈0, ‖t‖+ ‖u‖〉
Before defining the weight of a constraint block, we first prove this proposition:
Proposition 33. The number of application of Rule 26 is bounded.
Proof. Rule 26 is applied once for each pair of constraints of the form Xi = u and Xi = v (thanks to Hyp26).
However, according to Theorem 3, the set of indexes generated by our inference system is bounded. Then,
the number of pairs of constraints for the same variable Xi is bounded. Thus, the number of application of
Rule 26 is bounded.
Definition 40 (Weight of a constraint block). We recall that, according to Theorem 3, the set of indexes
generated by our inference system is bounded. Then, let Na be the maximum number of application of Rule 26
(See Proposition 33, this number is bounded). Let NcE be the maximum number of Equality constraints
of the form X = u where X ∈ X , NcEF be the maximum number of constraints of the form X = u or
X ∈ Forgec(E,K) where X ∈ X ∪ XI and NcN be the maximum number of Negative constraints of type
Forge or equality.
Consider a constraint block: B = ctr1 ∧ ..ctrl. We denote by FcB the number of final constraints in B,
NcB the number of of negative constraints in B, ScB the number of submaster constraints in B, MEcB the
number of master equality constraints in B, MFcB the number of master constraints in B of the type Forge,
EcB the number of equality constraints of the form X = u (X ∈ X ∪XI) in B and NRB the number of appli-
cation of Rule 26. We denote also the lexicographic order by 〈〉 and the multiset by []. We define the weight of
B as follows:
‖B‖ = 〈Na−NRB , NcEF − FcB , NcN −NcB , NcE − ScB , NcEF −MEcB ,
NcEF −MFcB , [‖ctri‖]ctri∈B , NcE − EcB〉
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Definition 41 (Weight of a constraint System). Consider a constraint system: S = B1 ∧ ..Bl. We define the
weight of S as follows:
‖S‖ = [‖Bi‖]Bi∈S
Proposition 34. Algorithm 1 terminates for protocols with autonomous keys.
Proof. We prove Proposition 34 by showing that each rule of our inference system decreases the weight of the
whole constraint system S. That is, considering a rule r, we show that ‖post(r)‖ < ‖pre(r)‖. We denote
always the block treated by these rules B. First, Rule 26 decreases the size of the block for which it is applied
since it decreases Na−NRB . Then, Rules 3, 14, 20, 22, 32 eliminate one block of the constraint system since
they lead to ⊥. Thus, they decrease ‖S‖. Moreover, Rules 21, 25 and 30 eliminate a constraint from the block
treated B since they lead to ⊤. Then, ‖B‖ decreases.
Rule 1 changes an equality constraint ctr ∈ B into another one of the form (X = u) where X ∈ X ∪ XI .
The only parameter that changes for the weight of B is EcB which increases and then NcE − EcB decreases.
Then, ‖B‖ decreases and so does ‖S‖.
For Rule 2, we have ‖X‖ > ‖u‖ since X = u ∈ B. Indeed, ‖u‖ ≤ |u| ∗pmax{r(Y )|Y <u,Y ∈X∪XI} ≤ pr(X)+1.
Then, ‖Y = X‖ = ‖Y ‖+ ‖X‖ > ‖Y ‖+ ‖u‖ = ‖Y = u‖. Thus, ‖Y = X‖ > ‖Y = u‖ and therefore ‖B‖
decreases and so does ‖S‖.
Rule 4 adds a new master constraint and changes only dull constraints. Then, the only parameter that
changes for the weight of B is either NcEF −MEcB or NcEF −MFcB . Then, ‖B‖ decreases and so does
‖S‖.
Rule 5 transforms a master constraint of the form Forge to a master equality constraint. Then, it increases
NcEF −MFcB but decreases NcEF −MEcB . Then, ‖B‖ decreases and so does ‖S‖.
For Rule 6, we have ‖uλ‖ < ‖u‖ where λ = [Yj ← Z]. Indeed, since Yj = Z ∈ B, we have r(Z) < r(Yj)
which leads to ‖Z‖ < ‖Yj‖. Then, ‖X = uλ‖ < ‖X = u‖ and therefore ‖B‖ decreases.
For Rule7, we reason similarly to Rule 6 to prove that ‖X = uλ‖ < ‖X = u‖. Moreover, ‖Yj = Z‖ <
‖X = u‖. Indeed, Yj < u. then, ‖Yj‖ < ‖u‖. Besides, Z is a fresh variable and since X = u ∈ B then
r(Z) < r(X). Thus, ‖Z‖ < ‖X‖ and therefore ‖Yj = Z‖ < ‖X = u‖. We conclude that ‖B‖ decreases since
the other parameters do not change.
Rule 8 adds a submaster constraint to the block B. Then, NcE − ScB decreases and therefore ‖B‖ de-
creases.
For Rule 9, ‖pre(R 9)‖ > ‖post(R 9)‖. Indeed, ‖pre(R 9)‖ = 〈k, ‖t‖+ ‖E‖+ |E|+ 1〉 and ‖post(R 9)‖ =
[〈k, ‖t‖+ ‖E‖+ |E|〉, 〈k, ‖t‖+ ‖w‖+ |E|+ 1〉], where k = st − #K and w ∈ E and therefore ‖w‖ < ‖E‖.
Moreover, Rule 9 do not change the other parameters of the weight of B. Then, ‖B‖ decreases.
For Rule 10, ‖pre(R 10)‖ = 〈k, 1 + ‖t1‖+ .. + ‖tm‖+ ‖E‖+ |E|〉 where k = st−#K. Moreover, ‖post(R 10)‖ =
[〈k, ‖ti‖+ ‖E‖+ |E|+ 1〉]ti<〈t1..tm〉. Then, ‖pre(R 10)‖ > ‖post(R 10)‖. Besides, Rule 10 do not change the
other parameters of the weight of B. Then, ‖B‖ decreases.
We show in a similar way as Rule 10 that for Rule 11, ‖B‖ decreases.
For Rule 12, ‖pre(R 12)‖ > ‖post(R 12)‖. Indeed, ‖pre(R 12)‖ = 〈k, 2 + ‖t‖+ ‖E‖+ |E|〉 and ‖post(R 12)‖ =
〈k, 1 + ‖t‖+ ‖E‖+ |E|〉, where k = st −#K. Moreover, Rule 12 do not change the other parameters of the
weight of B. Then, ‖B‖ decreases.
We show in a similar way as Rule 13 that for Rule 12, ‖B‖ decreases.
For Rule 15, we have ‖pre(R 15)‖ = 〈k, 1 + ‖t‖+ ‖u‖+ |E|〉 and two cases for post(R 15): either ‖post(R 15)‖ =
〈k, ‖t‖+ ‖u‖〉 or ‖post(R 15)‖ = [〈k, ‖t‖+ ‖u‖〉, 〈k, ‖t‖+ ‖u‖+ |E|〉]. In both cases, ‖pre(R 15)‖ > ‖post(R 15)‖.
Besides, since this rule do not change the other parameters of the weight of B. Then, ‖B‖ decreases.
We show in a similar way as Rule 10 that for Rule 16, ‖B‖ decreases.
For Rule 17, first, ‖pre(R 17)‖ = 〈k, 1 + ‖t‖+ ‖u‖+ ‖b‖+ |E|〉 where k = st−#K. Second, ‖post(R 17)‖ =
[〈k, 1 + ‖t‖+ ‖u‖+ |E|〉, 〈k′, 1 + ‖b‖+ ‖E‖+ |E|〉] where k′ = st−#K ∪ {{u}pp}. Since k
′ < k, ‖pre(R 17)‖ >
‖post(R 17)‖.
We show in a similar way as Rule 17 that for Rule 18, ‖S‖ decreases.
For Rule 19, first, ‖pre(R 19)‖ = 〈k, 2 + ‖t‖+ ‖uδ‖+ |E|〉 where k = st −#K. Second, ‖post(R 19)‖ =
〈k, 1 + ‖t‖+ ‖uδ‖+ |E|〉 . Then, ‖pre(R 19)‖ > ‖post(R 19)‖. Since this rule do not change the other pa-
rameters of the weight of B. Then, ‖B‖ decreases.
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For Rule 23, first, ‖pre(R 23)‖ = 〈k, 2 + ‖u1‖+ .. + ‖um‖+ ‖w1‖+ .. + ‖wm‖〉. Second, ‖post(R 23)‖ =
[〈k, ‖ui‖+ ‖wi‖〉]i=1..m where k = st−#K. Then ‖pre(R 23)‖ > ‖post(R 23)‖ and since the other parameters
of the weight of B do not change, ‖B‖ decreases.
For Rule 24, ‖pre(R 24)‖ > ‖post(R 24)‖. Indeed, ‖pre(R 24)‖ = 〈k, 4 + ‖uδ‖+ ‖wδl,kδ‖〉. Moreover,
‖post(R 24)‖ = 〈k, ‖uδ‖+ ‖wδl,kδ‖〉. Then, since the other parameters of the weight of B do not change, ‖B‖
decreases.
We show in a similar way as Rule 2 that for Rule 27 ‖B‖ decreases since ‖X‖ > ‖u‖ and therefore
‖X = v‖ > ‖u = v‖.
We show in a similar way as Rule 27 that for Rule 28 ‖B‖ decreases since Xi = u ∈ B and then ‖Xi‖ > ‖u‖
and therefore ‖Xi ∈ Forgec(E
′,K)‖ > ‖u ∈ Forgec(E
′,K)‖. The same proof is valid for Rule 29.
For Rule 31, since X = w ∈ B, ‖X‖ > ‖w‖. Then, ‖t ∈ Subd(X, E
′, E ,K)‖ > ‖t ∈ Subd(w, E
′, E ,K)‖.
Besides, this rule do not change the other parameters of the weight of B. Then, ‖B‖ decreases.
Rule 33 adds a new final constraint to the block treated B which decreases NcEF − FcB . Then, ‖B‖
decreases. Rule 34 either adds a negative constraint to the bloc treated B or adds a final constraint to B. In
both cases, ‖B‖ decreases. In a similar way, Rule 35 decreases ‖B‖.
9 Checking Satisfiability
Let F = ∀Q∃R B1∨ ..∨Bp be a normalized constraint system as created by our decision algorithm. We choose
two index variables q and r, fixed for all the following, that we will use as replacement for index in Q or R
respectively. We rewrite here the definitions given earlier and give precise the application of rules E1 and E2.
First, let us define patterns of a term and a constraint system :
Definition 42. We say that u is a pattern of v for index variable i, denoted u ≪i v, iff u 6m v and
V arI(v) ⊂ {i} or there exists mpair(k, t) 6m v such that u≪i tδk,i.
Definition 43. Given a constraint system F = ∀Q∃R B1 ∨ .. ∨ Bp, let δ̄q be δQ,R→q and δ̄r be δQ,R→r. We
denote by Patt(F ) the set of all patterns in F defined by :
Patt(F ) =
{
u | ∃v ∈ T in F s.t. u /∈ XI , V ar
X
I (u) ⊆ {q} and u≪q vδ̄q or u≪r vδ̄r
}
Second, we choose an order on Patt(F ), denoted ⊳ and fixed for all the following. For any u ∈ T , we denote
by uδ̄ the higher term in Patt(F ) between uδ̄q and uδ̄r w.r.t ⊳. Also, we define two extra deduction rules E1
and E2 ensuring that our system always uses the lower patterns w.r.t ⊳ with higher priority:
(Xm = u)
 →
∨
u′⊳uδ̄
∃k.
(
(Xm = u
′δkq,m)
 ∧
∧
v⊳u′
(
∀k′.Xm 6= vδ
k′
q,m
)
∧ u′δkq,m = u
)
(E1)
(Xm ∈ Forgec(E,K))
 →
∨
u′∈Patt(F )
∃k.
(
(Xm = u
′δkq,m)
 ∧
∧
v⊳u′
(
∀k′.Xm 6= vδ
k′
q,m
)
∧ u′δkq,m ∈ Forgec(E,K)
)
(E2)
∨(Xm ∈ Forgec(E,K))
 ∧
∧
v∈Patt(F )
(
∀k′.Xm 6= vδ
k′
q,m
)
To prevent cycles, the rule E1 cannot be used if the block already contains
∧
v⊳uδ̄
(
∀k′.Xm 6= vδ
k′
q,m
)
, and
the rule E2 cannot be used if the block already contains
∧
v∈Patt(F )
(
∀k′.Xm 6= vδ
k′
q,m
)
. Moreover, E1 and E2
implicitly update the environment E of each block in the constraint system by recomputing them the same
way as in Algorithm 1, except that only variables present in some Forgec(E,K) in F can get values in E .
This way, we can normalize again any constraint system computed by E1 or E2 using the phase 2 of the
normalization from definition 25. That is, we denote by ↓Ext the application of as many rules E1 and E2 as
possible (minimum one), followed by the phase 2 of the normalization. However, the normalisation may create
new constraints for which we need E1 and E2 again, and thus, we need to iterate ↓Ext. Hopefully, we remark
that :
Lemma 12. Patt(F ) = Patt(F ↓Ext), and |[F ]|e∅ =
∣
∣
[
F ↓Ext
]∣
∣
e
∅
.
Proof. This follows directly from the definition of patterns, which includes subterms, and from the rules which
always extract subterms, i.e. nothing else than subterms of patterns can appear during the normalization.
More precisely, Patt(F ) is stable by application of any rule since :
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• Implicit reformation rules have no effect on patterns;
• Prioritary rules do not create new patterns;
• Forge, Sub or equality reduction rules : create new constraints with only patterns inherited from previous
ones;
• Interleaving rules : do not create new patterns;
• E1 and E2 rules : do not create new patterns.
which shows the stability of Patt(..). Moreover, the rules E1 and E2 naturally preserves the semantics, since
it creates disjunctions based on an exhaustive enumeration of all possible values of Xm. Details are similar to
the correction and completeness of the block interleaving rules. This proves the lemma.
Proposition 35. If ↓Ext iterated on CBSk+1 terminates, then there exists emax computable such that :
∀e ≥ emax, |[CBSk+1 ]|
e
∅ = |[CBSk+1 ]|
emax
∅
Proof. As above, let F = ∀Q∃R B1 ∨ .. ∨ Bp be a normalized constraint system as created by our decision
algorithm, i.e. F = CBSk+1, and let q and r be the two index variables fixed at the beginig of this section.
Using lemma 12 and hypothesis on ↓Ext, we can iterate ↓Ext until a constraint system on which no E1 or E2
rule can be applied, that is, a system where :
• Any constraint (Xm = u)
 comes with
∧
v⊳uδ̄
(
∀k′.Xm 6= vδ
k′
q,m
)
in the same block;
• Any constraint (Xm ∈ Forgec(E,K))
 comes with
∧
v∈Patt(F )
(
∀k′.Xm 6= vδ
k′
q,m
)
in the same block.
Let F ′ be this constraint system obtained from F by iteration of ↓Ext.
Third, we transform F ′ into a system where we choosed values for any variable under a forge con-
straint. Let c be a ground term in E0, i.e a fixed message that the intruder knows from the start. Let
d =
∑
(X=u)∈F ′ Depth(u) be the sum of all depth of equalities in F
′. Note that d is bounded by the size of
F ′. For any
−→
X ∈
−→
X we choose a ground term b−→
X
= 〈c, .., c〉 such that ∀
−→
X,
−→
Y , b−→
X
6= b−→
Y
. Now, for any
−→
X ∈
−→
X
let t−→
X
=
{
..
{
b−→
X
}
c
..
}
c
be the term of depth (d + 1). Note that by construction, ∀
−→
X,
−→
Y , t−→
X
6= t−→
Y
and ∀
−→
X ,
t−→
X
∈ DYc(E0, ∅). Now, let F
′′ be the closure of F ′ by :
(Xi ∈ Forgec(E))
 →
(
Xi = t−→X
)
(E3)
Lemma 13. If ∃σ ∈ |[F ′ ]|e∅ then ∃σ
′ ∈ |[F ′′ ]|e∅.
Proof. Here, we do not guaranty that any solution of F ′ is preserved, but only that at last one survives. That
is, let σ ∈ |[F ′ ]|e∅ with F
′ = ∀Q∃R B1 ∨ .. ∨Bp. We define σ
′ such that :
• ∀X ∈ X , σ′(X) = σ(X);
• ∀
−→
X ∈
−→
X , ∀s ∈ {1..e}, if ∃u ∈ Patt(F ′), ∃τ with τ(q) = s such that σ(Xs) = σ(uτ) and u minimal w.r.t
⊳, then σ′(Xs) = σ
′(uτ);
Note that u is single by minimality w.r.t ⊳ and because V arXI (u) ⊆ {q}.
• ∀
−→
X ∈
−→
X , ∀s ∈ {1..e}, if ∀u ∈ Patt(F ′), ∀τ with τ(q) = s, we have σ(Xs) 6= σ(uτ), then σ
′(Xs) = t−→X .
We show that σ′ ∈ |[F ′′ ]|e∅ : Thanks to σ ∈ |[F
′ ]|e∅, we know that ∀τQ, ∃τ ⊇ τQ, ∃i ∈ {1..p}, ∀ctr ∈ Bi
σ ∈ |[ ctr ]|eτ . We examine all possible constraints ctr :
• If ctr = (X = u)
sm
or ctr = (X ∈ Forgec(E,K)), then σ
′ ∈ |[ ctr ]|eτ since σ
′(X) = σ(X);
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• If ctr = (Xm = u)

, then thanks to the definition of F ′, we have also σ ∈
∣
∣
∣
[
∧
v⊳uδ̄
(
∀k′.Xm 6= vδ
k′
q,m
) ]
∣
∣
∣
e
τ
.
Therefore, u′ = uδ̄q or u
′ = uδ̄r, with V ar
X
I (u
′) ⊆ {q}, is a pattern u′ ∈ Patt(F ). Moreover, it is
the minimal pattern w.r.t ⊳ (since V arXI (u) ⊆ {m}) such that σ(Xmτ) = σ(u
′τ ′) with τ ′(q) = τ(m),
τ ′(r) = τ(k) and k ∈ V arI(u)\V ar
X
I (u) if non-empty. Thus, u
′ matches the second point in the definition
of σ′, i.e. σ′(Xmτ) = σ
′(u′τ ′) = σ′(uτ) and σ′ ∈ |[ ctr ]|eτ .
• If ctr = (Xm ∈ Forgec(E,K))

, then again thanks to the definition of F ′, we have
σ ∈
∣
∣
∣
[
∧
v∈Patt(F )
(
∀k′.Xm 6= vδ
k′
q,m
) ]∣
∣
∣
e
τ
. Therefore, σ′(Xmτ) = t−→X and thus, σ
′ ∈
∣
∣
[
Xm = t−→X
]∣
∣
e
τ
.
• If ctr = (∀k Xm 6= u), we prove by recurrence a more general property of σ and σ
′. We do this in two
steps :
Claim 2. ∀u ∈ Patt(F ), ∀τ , ∀
−→
Z , t−→
Z
6= σ′(uτ)
Proof. We know that the value of some Xs through σ
′ is a pattern using only variables indexed by
s. Therefore, we have only two cases : either there exists some t−→
Y
subterm of σ′(uτ), and thus
Depth(σ′(uτ)) > d+1 since u /∈ XI , or there is no such t−→X subterm of σ
′(uτ), and thus Depth(σ′(uτ)) ≤ d
since the same patterns cannot appear twice in the same branch of σ′(uτ) without creating a cycle. In
both cases Depth(σ′(uτ)) 6= d + 1 which proves the claim.
Claim 3. ∀w, v ∈ Patt(F ) ∪ XI with u = wδr,r′ , ∀τ if σ(uτ) 6= σ(vτ) then σ
′(uτ) 6= σ′(vτ).
Proof. Assume that the property is true for Depth(u) + Depth(v) < n, n integer. Let u and v be two
terms as above with Depth(u) + Depth(v) = n. We have cases depending of the structure of u and v :
– If u = f({ui}) and v = g({vj}) then either f 6= g and thus σ
′(uτ) 6= σ′(vτ), or f = g and ∃i
σ(uiτ) 6= σ(viτ) with Depth(ui) + Depth(vi) < n, i.e. σ
′(uiτ) 6= σ
′(viτ) and thus σ
′(uτ) 6= σ′(vτ).
This case includes constants, i.e. f of g with no parameter.
– If u = Yq and v = Zq with σ
′(Yqτ) = σ
′(u′τ) and σ′(Zqτ) = σ
′(v′τ), it means that σ(Yqτ) = σ(u
′τ)
and σ(Zqτ
′) = σ(v′τ), with σ(u′τ) 6= σ(v′τ). Thus, similarly as in the case above, we have σ′(u′τ) 6=
σ′(v′τ) and thus σ′(uτ) 6= σ′(vτ).
– If u = Yq and v = Zq with σ
′(Yqτ) = t−→Y and σ
′(Zqτ) = t−→Z , then t−→Y 6= t−→Z and thus σ
′(Yqτ) 6=
σ′(Zqτ). Note that u = v is impossible.
– If u = Yq and v /∈ XI with σ
′(Yqτ) = t−→Y , then thanks to claim 2 above we have σ
′(Yqτ) = t−→Y 6=
σ′(vτ). The same holds with u and v reversed.
– If u = Yq and v = Zq with σ
′(Yqτ) = t−→Y and σ
′(Zqτ) = σ
′(v′τ), then thanks to claim 2 again we
have σ′(Yqτ) = t−→Y 6= σ
′(v′τ).
This proves the claim.
Consequently, since ctr = (∀k Xm 6= u) we have σ(Xmτ
′) 6= σ(uτ ′) with any τ ′ ⊇ τ such that Dom(τ ′) =
Dom(τ) ∪ {k}, and thus thanks to claim 2, σ′(Xmτ
′) 6= σ′(uτ ′) i.e. σ′ ∈ |[ ctr ]|eτ .
• If ctr = (Xm /∈ Forgec(E)), assuming X =
{
u ∈ X ∪ XI |V ar
X
I (u) ⊆ {q}
}
, we prove two more generic
properties by iteration:
Claim 4. ∀u ∈ Patt(F ), ∀τ , let d be (one of) the minimal derivation proving σ′(uτ) ∈ DY (E′σ′,K
e
τσ′)
s.t. no term in
{
t−→
X
}
−→
X∈
−→
X
is decomposed, with E′ = E ∪
{
t−→
X
}
. Then ∀t knowledge in d, ∃v ∈
Patt(F ) ∪ X ∃τ ′ s.t. t = σ′(vτ ′). Moreover, replacing each t by σ(vτ ′) and E′ by E′′ = E ∪
{σ(Xs) | ∀w ∈ Patt(F ), ∀τ
′, σ(Xs) 6= σ(wτ
′)} in d maintains the validity of each rule’s application.
Proof. We uses the structure of any minimal derivation, i.e. that any decomposed term is a subterm of
the initial knowledge, and that any composed term is a subterm of either the goal or a decomposed term
(otherwise there would be useles rules in the derivation). Knowing this, we remark that :
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– Let L = Ld(σ
′(wτ ′)) ∈ d such that w ∈ Patt(F ) ∪ X . Let t be the term generated by L. Then
either w = f({wi}), and thus ∃i such that t = σ
′(wiτ
′), i.e. ∃w′ ∈ Patt(F ) ∪ X ∃τ ′′ such that
t = σ′(w′τ ′′), since subterm of patterns are patterns too. Note that τ ′′ = τ ′ unless f is an mpair; Or
w ∈ X ∪ XI , and thus ∀
−→
X , σ′(wτ ′) 6= t−→
X
since such terms cannot be decomposed in d. Therefore,
∃v ∈ Patt(F ) ∃τ ′′ such that σ′(wτ ′) = σ′(vτ ′′), and since v /∈ X ∪ XI we can repeat the same
reasonning as with w = f({wi}).
– Let L = Lc(σ
′(wτ ′)) ∈ d such that w ∈ Patt(F ) ∪ X . Let {ti} be the set of terms used by L
to generate σ′(wτ ′). Then either w = f({wi}), and thus ∀i ∃w
′
i ∈ Patt(F ) ∪ X ∃τ
′′
i such that
ti = σ
′(w′iτ
′′
i ); Or w ∈ X ∪ XI with ∃v ∈ Patt(F ) ∃τ
′′ such that σ′(wτ ′) = σ′(vτ ′′), and thus the
same reasoning as for w = f({wi}) applies; Note that w ∈ X ∪XI with ∃
−→
X such that σ′(wτ ′) = t−→
X
is impossible by minimality, since each t−→
X
is already in E′.
Therefore, the first part of the claim follows by iteration of these two steps on the structure of d, starting
from Eσ or σ′(uτ). Moreover, we remark that all the patterns we chosed for knowledges in d validates
the subterm property for each rule, modulo renaming of index variables: that is, a decomposition rule
generates a term with a pattern that is a subterm of the pattern of it’s argument, module index renaming,
and reversly for composition rules. Therefore, replacing σ′ by σ cannot change the validity of each rule’s
application, provided that the values of variables with no pattern are still available in the initial knowledge
(i.e. E′′ replacing E′), which proves the claim.
We uses this claim on ctr = (Xm /∈ Forgec(E,K)), i.e. assume that σ
′(Xmτ) ∈ DYc(Eσ
′,K
e
τσ′) despites
the fact that σ(Xmτ) /∈ DYc(Eσ,K
e
τσ). Then there exists a derivation d defined as in Claim 4 with
E′ = E∪
{
t−→
X
}
, since ∀
−→
X t−→
X
∈ DYc(Eσ
′,K
e
τσ′), and thus d holds the same properties. Therefore, there
exists a (valid) derivation d′ obtained from d as described above, starting from E′′σ, with goal σ(uτ), and
with the same structure as d i.e. finishing by a composition rule. Moreover, E′′\E contains only terms
that that can be forged with (non-redundant) derivations finishing by a composition rule, too. Therefore,
it follows that σ(Xmτ) ∈ DYc(Eσ,K
e
τσ), thus contradicting σ(Xmτ) /∈ DYc(Eσ,K
e
τσ). Consequently,
the hypothesis was false, i.e. σ′(Xmτ) /∈ DYc(Eσ
′,K
e
τσ′) and thus, σ′ ∈ |[ ctr ]|eτ .
Since there are no other kind of constraint in a normalized constraint system, this proves the lemma, i.e.
σ′ ∈ |[F ′′ ]|e∅.
Moreover, we remark that naturally, if σ′ ∈ |[F ′′ ]|e∅ then σ
′ ∈ |[F ′ ]|e∅, since Xi = t−→X is strictly more
restrictive than Xi ∈ Forgec(E). Therefore, we have the following property :
|[F ′ ]|
e
∅ 6= ∅ iff |[F
′′ ]|
e
∅ 6= ∅
and thus, it is enough to check the satisfiability of F ′′ instead of F ′. However, F ′′ has a very interesting
property that will allow us to bound e with equivalent satisfiability. That is :
∀σ ∈ |[F ′′ ]|e∅, ∀s ∈ {1..e} , ∀
−→
X ∈
−→
X , either σ(Xs) = t−→X (P1)
or ∃u ∈ Patt(F ) ∃τ with τ(q) = s s.t. σ(Xs) = σ(uτ)
Note that this structure comes from rules E1, E2 and E3. From now on, let us fix some σ ∈ |[F ′′ ]|e∅ (assuming
there exists one), some pattern uXs ∈ Patt(F ) ∪ {t−→X} and τXs such that τXs(q) = s and σ(Xs) = σ(uXsτXs),
according to P1. We remark that since Patt(F ) and
−→
X are finite, i.e. bounded by a function in the size of
the protocol specification, there exists necessarily only a bounded number of possible choices for {uXs}−→X∈−→X ,
independently of s. Let e1 be this bound. Moreover, for each Xs there is also only a bounded number of
set of knowledges E from F ′′ and keys K such that σ(Xs) ∈ DYc(Eσ,Kσ). Let e2 be this bound. We write
emax = e1× e2×#
−→
X . Naturally, if e > emax then there exists s 6= s
′ such that {uXs}−→X∈−→X =
{
uXs′
}
−→
X∈
−→
X
and
∀ ( ∈ Forgec(E,K)) in F
′′, ∀
−→
X , σ(Xs) ∈ DYc(Eσ,Kσ) iff σ(Xs′) ∈ DYc(Eσ,Kσ). We will use this to prove
that there is no need to search for attacks with e > emax, i.e. :
Lemma 14. If e > emax and σ ∈ |[F
′′ ]|e∅, then ∃σ
′ ∈ |[F ′′ ]|e−1∅ .
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Proof. Let s, s′ be as defined above, i.e. s.t. {uXs}−→X∈−→X =
{
uXs′
}
−→
X∈
−→
X
and ∀ ( ∈ Forgec(E,K)) in F
′′, ∀
−→
X ,
σ(Xs) ∈ DYc(Eσ,Kσ) iff σ(Xs′) ∈ DYc(Eσ,Kσ). We remark that equality of patterns do not imply equality
of values w.r.t σ since index of constrants may change. However, equality of patterns will be sufficient to
guaranty that at indexes s and s′, variables validate the same unequalities. Thus, we will “remove” the index
s′ from σ and show that s can effectively replace s′ in any case. That is, with γ replacing any cv by cv−1 if
v > s′, and replacing any cs′ by cs, c ∈
−→
C , let σ′ be defined as :
• ∀i < s′, ∀
−→
X ∈
−→
X , σ′(Xi) = γ(σ(Xi));
• ∀i ≥ s′, ∀
−→
X ∈
−→
X , σ′(Xi) = γ(σ(Xi+1));
• ∀X ∈ X , σ′(X) = γ(σ(X)).
Assuming that F ′′ = ∀Q∃R B1 ∨ .. ∨ Bp, let τ
′
Q be any index substitution from Q to {1..e− 1}. Thus, let τQ
be the index substitution from Q to {1..e} such that :
• ∀i ∈ Q, if τ ′Q(i) < s
′ then τQ(i) = τ
′
Q(i), otherwise τQ(i) = τ
′
Q(i) + 1.
i.e. we “insert” a blank column at index s′. Now, by definition of σ, ∃τ ⊇ τQ such that σ ∈ |[B1 ∨ .. ∨Bp ]|
e
τ
.
Thus, we define τ ′ ⊇ τ ′Q such that :
• ∀r ∈ R, if τ(r) < s′ then τ ′(r) = τ(r); if τ(r) = s′ then τ ′(r) = s; otherwise τ ′(r) = τ(r)− 1.
i.e. we “remove” the column at index s′. We must prove that σ′ ∈ |[B1 ∨ .. ∨Bp ]|
e
τ ′
. However, ∃i ∈ {1..p}
such that σ ∈ |[Bi ]|
e
τ , thus ∀ctr ∈ Bi, σ ∈ |[ ctr ]|
e
τ . As usual, we have different cases depending on ctr :
• If ctr = (X = u)
sm
or ctr = (X ∈ Forgec(E,K)), then σ
′ ∈ |[ ctr ]|eτ ′ since σ
′(X) = σ(X);
• If ctr = (Xm = u)

, then :
– If τ(m) 6= s′ and V arXI (u) = {j} with τ(j) 6= s
′, then σ′(Xmτ
′) = γ(σ(Xmτ)) = γ(σ(uτ)) = σ
′(uτ ′)
since any indexed variable in u must have m as index, and ∀
−→
Y , σ′(Ymτ
′) = γ(σ(Ymτ)) since
τ(m) 6= s′; This includes j = m;
– If τ(m) = s′ and V arXI (u) = {m}, then σ
′(Xmτ
′) = γ(σ(Xs)). Since Xs and Xs′ share the same
pattern for σ, and since σ validates ctr, this pattern is necessarily u, i.e. γ(σ(Xs)) = γ(σ(u[m ←
s])) = σ′(uτ ′);
– If τ(m) = s′ and V arXI (u) = {j} 6= {m}, then as above σ
′(Xmτ
′) = γ(σ(Xs)), and Xs and
Xs′ share the same pattern u. Thus, σ(Xs) = σ(u[j ← τ(j)]). Now, either τ(j) 6= s
′ and thus
γ(σ(uτ)) = σ′(uτ ′), or τ(j) = s′ and thus γ(σ(uτ)) = σ′(u[j ← s]) = σ′(uτ ′). In both cases,
σ′(Xs) = γ(σ(Xs)) = σ
′(uτ ′), and thus, σ′ ∈ |[ ctr ]|eτ ′ .
• If ctr =
(
Xm = t−→X
)
, then σ′(Xmτ
′) = γ(σ(Xmτ)) = γ(t−→X ) = t−→X since Xs and Xs′ share the same
pattern, and in this case this pattern is t−→
X
. Thus, σ′ ∈ |[ ctr ]|eτ ′ ;
• If ctr = (∀k Xm 6= u), then :
– If τ(m) 6= s′, then ∀v ∈ {1..e}, σ′(Xmτ
′) = γ(σ(Xmτ)) 6= γ(σ(uτ [k ← v])), and thus ∀v ∈ {1..e− 1},
σ′(Xmτ
′) 6= σ′(uτ ′[k ← v]);
– If τ(m) = s′, then as above ∀v ∈ {1..e}, σ(Xs′) = σ(Xmτ) 6= σ(uτ [k ← v]). However, Xs and
Xs′ share the same patterns, and for both of them this is the minimal one w.r.t ⊳. Thus, u is
not the pattern of Xs, i.e. ∀v ∈ {1..e}, σ(Xs) 6= σ(uτ [k ← v]). It follows that ∀v ∈ {1..e− 1},
σ′(Xmτ
′) 6= σ′(uτ ′[k ← v]), i.e. σ′ ∈ |[ ctr ]|eτ ′ .
• If ctr = (Xm /∈ Forgec(E,K)), then by assumption on s and s
′ we know that σ(Xs) and σ(Xs′) are both
in ∈ DYc(E
′σ,Kσ) or none is, for any ( ∈ Forgec(E
′,K)) in F ′′, i.e. including E. Thus, σ′(Xmτ
′) /∈
DYc(Eσ
′,Kσ′) and σ′ ∈ |[ ctr ]|eτ ′ .
Since these are the only constraints available in F ′′, it follows that, as expected, σ′ ∈ |[Bi ]|
e
τ ′ . Therefore, for
any τ ′Q from Q to {1..e− 1}, we could find τ
′ ⊇ τ ′Q from Q ∪ R to {1..e− 1} such that σ
′ ∈ |[Bi ]|
e
τ ′ , thus
proving that σ′ ∈ |[F ′′ ]|e−1∅ . This ends the proof of the lemma.
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This claim shows naturally by iteration that |[F ′′ ]|e∅ has a solution with e > emax if and only if |[F
′′ ]|emax∅
has a solution. And since for any e, |[F ′′ ]|e∅ has a solution if and only if |[F ]|
e
∅ has a solution, this proves the
property.
10 Analysing Asokan-Ginzboorg
We have checked two scenarii of the synchronous version of the Asokan-Ginzboorg protocol (AG protocol).
Although this version of the AG protocol has not autonomous keys, the analysis of the two scenarii terminates
and gives two results. In the first one, we consider a ’normal’ execution of a single session. We show that this
execution is secure against a secrecy attack on the group key. In the second scenario, we consider two parallel
sessions. We have found an authentication attack. Note that for these scenarii, although the version of the
protocol does not only consider autonomous keys, the analysis terminates.
10.1 First Scenario: Asokan-Ginzboorg with a Single Session
Consider a single session of the tagged version of Asokan-Ginzboorg, specified as follows:
(L, 1) Init ⇒ mpair(t, 〈l, {e}p〉)
(S, 1) mpair(i, 〈L, {Ei}p〉) ⇒ mpair(j, (〈aj , ({〈rj , sj〉}(Ej)j )
j〉)j)
(L, 2) mpair(k, (〈ak, ({〈Rk, Sk〉}(e)k)
k〉)k) ⇒ mpair(m, ({〈mpair(o, (So)
o), s′〉}(Rm)m)
m)
(S, 2) mpair(q, ({〈mpair(u, (su)
u), S′〉}(rq)q )
q) ⇒
mpair(w, 〈aw, {〈(sw)
w, H(〈mpair(y, (sy)
y), S′〉)〉}F (〈mpair(y,(sy)y),S′〉)〉)
(L, 3) mpair(x, 〈ax, {〈(Sx)
x, H(〈mpair(z, (Sz)
z), s′〉)〉}F (〈mpair(z,(Sz)z),s′〉)〉) ⇒ End
The ordering on steps is: WL = 1, 2, 3, WS = 1, 2 with 1 <WL 2, 2 <WL 3, and 1 <WS 2. The execution
that we focus on is the following: 〈(L, 1), (S, 1), (L, 2), (S, 2), (L, 3)〉. The property we want to check is the
secrecy of the group key: Sec = F (〈mpair(z, (Sz)
z), s′〉). Then, the constraint system S that we have to solve
is specified below:
(step 1) mpair(i, 〈L, {Ei}p〉) ∈ Forge(E1, ∅)
(step 2) mpair(k, (〈ak, ({〈Rk, Sk〉}(e)k)
k〉)k) ∈ Forge(E2, ∅)
(step 3) mpair(q, ({〈mpair(u, (su)
u), S′〉}(rq)q )
q) ∈ Forge(E3, ∅)
(step 4) mpair(x, 〈ax, {〈(Sx)
x, H(〈mpair(z, (Sz)
z), s′〉)〉}F (〈mpair(z,(Sz)z),s′〉)〉) ∈ Forge(E4, ∅)
(step 5) Sec ∈ Forge(E5, ∅)
where Ei are defined as follows:
E1 = {mpair(t, 〈l, {e}p〉)}
E2 = E1 ∪ {mpair(j, (〈aj , ({〈rj , sj〉}(Ej)j )
j〉)j)}
E3 = E2 ∪ {mpair(m, ({〈mpair(o, (So)
o), s′〉}(Rm)m)
m)}
E4 = E3 ∪ {mpair(w, 〈aw, {〈(sw)
w, H(〈mpair(y, (sy)
y), S′〉)〉}F (〈mpair(y,(sy)y),S′〉)〉)}
E5 = E4
The normalisation of S\{step 5} by our rules system gives the system below. Note that this system is not
put in the disjunctive form to avoid redundancy.
(S\{step 5})

y = ∀i, j, k, k2, q, o, q1, o1, x, z, z1, z2, z3, z4, z5
(step 1)

y ∧ (step 2)

y ∧ (step 3)

y ∧ (step 4)

y
where,
(step 1)

y =
((L ∈ Forgec(E1, ∅) ∧ (Ei = e)
m) ∨ ((L = mpair(t, 〈l, {e}p〉))
sm ∧ (Ei = e)
m)
∨((L = 〈l, {e}p〉)
sm ∧ (Ei = e)
m) ∨ ((L = l)sm ∧ (Ei = e)
m)
∨((L = {e}p)
sm ∧ (Ei = e)
m) ∨ ((L = l)sm ∧ (Ej = e)
m))
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(step 2)

y =
(((Rk = rk)
m ∧ (Sk = sk)
m ∧ (Ek = e)
f )
∨((Rk2 = rk2)
m ∧ (Sk2 = sk2)
m ∧ (Ek2 = e)
f ))
(step 3)

y =
(((Rq = rq)
f ∧ (S′ = s′)sm ∧ (So = so)
f )
∨((Rq1 = rq1)
f ∧ (S′ = s′)sm ∧ (So1 = so1)
f ))
(step 4)

y =
(((Sx = sx)
f ∧ (Sz3 = sz3)
f ∧ (Sz3 = sz3)
f )∨
((Sx = sx)
f ∧ (Sz1 = sz1)
f ∧ (Sz = sz)
f )∨
((Sx1 = sx1)
f ∧ (Sz5 = sz5)
f ∧ (Sz2 = sz2)
f ))
If we try to normalize the last step step 5 leads to :
∃m ∃o2 ∃w
(F (〈mpair(z, (Sz)
z), s′〉) ∈ Subd(S
′, E5, E , ∅)
∧F (〈mpair(y, (sy)
y), S′〉) ∈ Forge(E5, {{〈(sw)
w, H(〈mpair(y, (sy)
y), S′〉)〉}F (〈mpair(y,(sy)y),S′〉)}))
∨(F (〈mpair(z, (Sz)
z), s′〉) ∈ Subd((So2)
o2 , E5, E , ∅)∧
(Rm)
m ∈ Forge(E5, {{〈mpair(o, (So)
o), s′〉}(Rm)m}))
The interleaving between F (〈mpair(z, (Sz)
z), s′〉) ∈ Subd(S
′, E5, E , ∅) with each block obtained above leads to
⊥ since in each block, the submaster constraint for S′ is S′ = s′. In the same way, the interleaving between
F (〈mpair(z, (Sz)
z), s′〉) ∈ Subd((So2)
o2 , E5, E , ∅) and the master constraint for So in each block leads to ⊥
since the ”value” of So is a constant so. Thus, we conclude that an execution of Asokan-Ginzboorg with a
single session is secure against a secrecy attack.
10.2 Second Scenario: Asokan-Ginzboorg with Two Parallel Sessions
Consider two parallel sessions. In the two following specifications (A, i, j) denotes the step i of the participant
A in the session j. (L, , 1) (resp (L, , 2)) denotes the leader of the first session (resp second session) and
(S, , 1) (resp (S, , 2)) denotes the similator of the first session (resp second session). The specification of the
first session is given below:
(L, 1, 1) Init ⇒ mpair(t, 〈l, {e}p〉)
(S, 1, 1) mpair(i, 〈L, {Ei}p〉) ⇒ mpair(j, (〈aj , ({〈rj , sj〉}(Ej)j )
j〉)j)
(L, 2, 1) mpair(k, (〈ak, ({〈Rk, Sk〉}(e)k)
k〉)k) ⇒ mpair(m, ({〈mpair(o, (So)
o), s′〉}(Rm)m)
m)
∧witness((L, , 1), (S, , 1), f s, 〈mpair(o, (So)
o), s′〉)
(S, 2, 1) mpair(q, ({〈mpair(u, (su)
u), S′〉}(rq)q )
q) ⇒
mpair(w, 〈aw, {〈(sw)
w, H(〈mpair(y, (sy)
y), S′〉)〉}F (〈mpair(y,(sy)y),S′〉)〉)
∧request((S, , 1), (L, , 1), f s, 〈mpair(u, (su)
u), S′〉)
(L, 3, 1) mpair(x, 〈ax, {〈(Sx)
x, H(〈mpair(z, (Sz)
z), s′〉)〉}F (〈mpair(z,(Sz)z),s′〉)〉) ⇒ End
The specification of the second session is given below:
(L, 1, 2) Init ⇒ mpair(t, 〈l, {e2}p〉)
(S, 1, 2) mpair(i, 〈L′, {E′i}p〉) ⇒ mpair(j, (〈aj , ({〈r
′
j , s
′
j〉}(E′j)j )
j〉)j)
(L, 2, 2) mpair(k, (〈ak, ({〈R
′
k, S
′
k〉}(e2)k)
k〉)k) ⇒ mpair(m, ({〈mpair(o, (S′o)
o), s”〉}(R′m)m)
m)
∧witness((L, , 2), (S, , 2), s s, 〈mpair(o, (S′o)
o), s”〉)
(S, 2, 2) mpair(q, ({〈mpair(u, (s′u)
u), S”〉}(r′q)q )
q) ⇒
mpair(w, 〈aw, {〈(s
′
w)
w, H(〈mpair(y, (s′y)
y), S”〉)〉}F (〈mpair(y,(s′y)y),S”〉)〉)
∧request((S, , 2), (L, , 2), s s, 〈mpair(u, (s′u)
u), S”〉)
(L, 3, 2) mpair(x, 〈ax, {〈(S
′
x)
x, H(〈mpair(z, (S′z)
z), s”〉)〉}F (〈mpair(z,(S′z)z),s”〉)〉) ⇒ End
Steps are ordered as follow: WL = 1, 2, 3, WS = 1, 2 with 1 <WL 2, 2 <WL 3, and 1 <WS 2 for each session.
We consider the following execution:
(L, 1, 1), (L, 1, 2), (S, 1, 1), (S, 1, 2), (L, 2, 1), (L, 2, 2), (S, 2, 1), (S, 2, 2), (L, 3, 1), (S, 3, 2). The property we want
to check is the authentication of the group key in each session which is defined in the two specification below
INRIA
Verification of Parameterized Cryptographic Protocols 49
by witness and request. Then, the constraint system S that we have to solve is specified below:
(step 1) mpair(i, 〈L, {Ei}p〉) ∈ Forge(E2, ∅)
(step 2) mpair(i, 〈L′, {E′i}p〉) ∈ Forge(E3, ∅)
(step 3) mpair(k, (〈ak, ({〈Rk, Sk〉}(e)k)
k〉)k) ∈ Forge(E4, ∅)
(step 4) mpair(k, (〈ak, ({〈R
′
k, S
′
k〉}(e2)k)
k〉)k) ∈ Forge(E5, ∅)
(step 5) mpair(q, ({〈mpair(u, (su)
u), S′〉}(rq)q )
q) ∈ Forge(E6, ∅)
(step 6) mpair(q, ({〈mpair(u, (s′u)
u), S”〉}(r′q)q )
q) ∈ Forge(E7, ∅)
(step 7) mpair(x, 〈ax, {〈(Sx)
x, H(〈mpair(z, (Sz)
z), s′〉)〉}F (〈mpair(z,(Sz)z),s′〉)〉) ∈ Forge(E8, ∅)
(step 8) mpair(x, 〈ax, {〈(S
′
x)
x, H(〈mpair(z, (S′z)
z), s”〉)〉}F (〈mpair(z,(S′z)z),s”〉)〉) ∈ Forge(E9, ∅)
where Ei are defined as follows:
E2 = {mpair(t, 〈l, {e}p〉), mpair(t, 〈l2, {e2}p〉)}
E3 = E2 ∪ {mpair(j, (〈aj , ({〈rj , sj〉}(Ej)j )
j〉)j)}
E4 = E3 ∪ {mpair(j, (〈aj , ({〈r
′
j , s
′
j〉}(E′j)j )
j〉)j)}
E5 = E4 ∪ {mpair(m, ({〈mpair(o, (So)
o), s′〉}(Rm)m)
m)}
E6 = E5 ∪ {mpair(m, ({〈mpair(o, (S
′
o)
o), s”〉}(R′m)m)
m)}
E7 = E6 ∪ {mpair(w, 〈aw, {〈(sw)
w, H(〈mpair(y, (sy)
y), S′〉)〉}F (〈mpair(y,(sy)y),S′〉)〉)}
E8 = E7 ∪ {mpair(w, 〈aw, {〈(s
′
w)
w, H(〈mpair(y, (s′y)
y), S”〉)〉}F (〈mpair(y,(s′y)y),S”〉)〉)}
E9 = E8
We normalise S by our rules system. We just focus on a single block of the normalized system:
(L ∈ Forgec(E2, ∅) ∧ L
′ ∈ Forgec(E3, ∅) ∧ (Ei1 = e2)
m ∧ (E′i4 = e)
m∧
(Rk1 = r
′
k1
)m ∧ (Sk1 = s
′
k1
)m ∧ (E′j1 = e)
f∧
(R′k2 = rk2)
f ∧ (S′k2 = sk2)
f ∧ (Ej2 = e2)
f∧
(R′q1 = rq1)
f ∧ (S′ = s”)sm ∧ (S′o1 = so1)
f∧
(Rq2 = r
′
q2
)f ∧ (S” = s′)sm ∧ (So2 = s
′
o2
)f∧
(Sx1 = s
′
x1
)f ∧ (Sy1 = s
′
y1
)f ∧ (S′x2 = sx2)
f ∧ (S′z1 = sz1)
f
∧witness((L, , 1), (S, , 1), f s, 〈mpair(o, (So)
o), s′〉)
∧witness((L, , 2), (S, , 2), s s, 〈mpair(o, (S′o)
o), s”〉)
∧request((S, , 1), (L, , 1), f s, 〈mpair(u, (su)
u), S′〉)
∧request((S, , 2), (L, , 2), s s, 〈mpair(u, (s′u)
u), S”〉))
Index variables in this block are quantified in S by:
∀i1,∀i4,∀k1,∀k2,∀q1,∀q2,∀o1,∀o2,∀x1,∀x2,∀y1,∀z1, ∃j1,∃j2
This block corresponds to an authentication attack on fs. Indeed, the solution σ of this block gives the
value s′o to So. Thus, the request for fs gives a value different from the one of the corresponding witness. The
same raison is valid for ss.
11 Conclusion and Further Works
We have proposed an extension of the constraint-based approach in symbolic protocol verification in order
to handle a class of protocols (the Well-Tagged ones with Autonomous Keys) which admit unbounded lists
in messages. This class can be used to model in particular interesting group protocols. We have proposed a
decision procedure for Well-Tagged protocols with Autonomous Keys. We have studied the Asokan-Ginzboorg
protocol with keys having index variables outside mpair’s. We showed that the analysis of this protocol
terminates. Thus, we conjecture termination for a larger class than Well-Tagged protocols where the restriction
of autonomous keys is weakened to include at least this protocol.
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[KT07] R. Küsters and T. Truderung. On the automatic analysis of recursive security protocols with xor.
Technical report, ETH Zurich, 2007. An abridged version appears in STACS 2007.
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